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Introduction
Bu dünyada beraberce yasiyoruz We live together on planet earth,
Dogu ve batiyi birlestiriyoruz and if we want to grow in peace
Sinirlari asiyoruz We need to erase our borders,
Kültürler kaynasiyor share our rich cultures.
Birbirini tamamliyor. Yes, connect and blend the West
 with the East.
1Azize-A Azize-A
In her rap song ‘Bosporus Bridge’, the Berlin-Turkish rapper Azize-A,
attempts to locate the descendants of Turkish migrants in a hybrid
space where cultural borders blend, where the periphery meets the
centre, and where the West merges with the East. She perceives these
transparent cultural border crossings as sites of creative cultural pro-
duction, not as what Renato Rosaldo (1989: 208) calls ‘empty transi-
tional zones.’ So far, Turkish immigrants in Germany have been re-
garded by most Turkish and German scholars as culturally invisible
because they were no longer what they once were and not yet what
they could become. Only recently some scholars have begun to in-
quire into the creative character and potential of newly emerging syn-
cretic cultures.
     We can identify three stages in the studies on Turkish migrants in
Germany. In the early period of migration in the sixties, the syncretic
nature of existing migrant cultures was not of interest to scholars an-
alysing the situation of Turkish Gastarbeiter (guest worker) in Ger-
many. The studies carried out during this period were mainly con-
cerned with economics and statistics, ‘culture’ and the dreams of re-
turn (cf. inter alia Abadan, 1964; Castles and Kosack, 1973). As Ayse
Çaglar (1994) has rightfully stated, the reason behind this neglect is
twofold. First, at the beginning of the migration process, Turkish
workers were demographically highly homogenous, consisting of ei-
ther single males or females, and were not visible in the public space.
13
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Second, workers in this period were considered temporary, and they
themselves regarded their situation as such (Çaglar, 1994: 16-17).
     The end of recruiting foreign labour to Germany in 1973 and the
beginning of family reunion mark the beginning of the second stage.
The number of studies on Turkish migrants’ culture increased with the
visibility of Turkish migrants becoming more evident in the public
space after the family reunification. Faced with the choice of leaving
Germany without a possibility of returning, most migrants decided to
stay in Germany for the time being and were joined by their families.
The transformation from being a rotatable workforce to becoming in-
creasingly settled went hand in hand with the emergence of communi-
ty structures (development of ethnic small business, sport clubs, reli-
gious organisations and meeting places), which made Turkish migrants
more visible to the German populations. Furthermore, the rising pres-
ence of non-working dependants, women and children, necessitated
the provision of some basic social services, such as education and
housing. Against this background, studies of this period concentrated
on the reorganisation of family, parent-child-relationships, integration,
assimilation and ‘acculturation’ of migrants to German culture (cf.
inter alia Abadan-Unat, 1985; Nauck, 1988; Kagitçibasi, 1987). The
key words in these studies were ‘cultural conflict,’ ‘culture shock,’ ‘ac-
culturation,’ ‘inbetweenness’ and ‘identity crisis.’
     The third stage – starting in the 1990s – is characterised by a wide
diversity of approaches. In this last stage, questions pertaining to the
relationship between structure and agency, and interest in cultural
production have come to the fore. Studies have dealt with such ques-
tions concerning citizenship, discrimination and racism, socio-econo-
mic performance and increasingly with the emergence of diasporic net-
works as well as cultural production (cf. inter alia Çaglar, 1994; Man-
del, 1996; Schwartz, 1992; Zaimoglu, 1995; Faist, 2000b).
     This study is critical of conventional approaches that followed a ho-
listic notion of culture. Rather than reducing Turkish-German youth
cultures to the realms of ‘ethnic exoticism,’ this work claims to be
evolving around the notion of cultural syncreticism, or bricolage,
which has become the dominant paradigm in the study of transnation-
al cultures and modern diasporas. The formation and articulation of
the German-Turkish hip-hop youth culture will be investigated within
the concept of cultural bricolage. The main framework of such an in-
vestigation should, of course, consist of the question of ‘how those
14
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youngsters see themselves’: as ‘Gastarbeiter,’ immigrant, ‘gurbetçi’ (in
exile), caught ‘betwixt and between,’ as with no culture to call their
own, or as agents and avant-garde of new cultural forms.
Research Framework and Interest
As I began to search the Turkish diasporic youth in Berlin, my atten-
tion often wandered to some more particular aspects of diasporic
youth culture. I became fascinated with the hip-hop youth culture,
undoubtedly because Turkish hip-hop has represented an adequate
model of cultural bricolage and diasporic consciousness. This book
focuses on the processes of cultural identity formation and articula-
tion among the Turkish male hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg,
Berlin. My main hypothesis is that Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth has
developed a politics of diaspora to tackle exclusion and discrimina-
tion in their country of settlement. As a response to those boundaries
that have been erected to keep them apart from the majority German
society, these youngsters have created symbolic boundaries based
upon parental, local and global cultures that mark their uniqueness.
Apparently, these symbolic boundaries have been created through
diasporic networks and modern means of communication and trans-
portation.
     The politics of diaspora is a product of exclusionist strategies of
‘differential incorporation’ (Rex, 1994) applied by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany vis-à-vis migrants. The politics of diaspora, which I
shall call diasporic consciousness in the following chapters, or diaspo-
ric identity, is comprised of both particularist and universalist constit-
uents. The particularist components consist of an attachment to home-
land, religion and ethnicity; and provide these youngsters with a net-
work of solidarity and a sense of confinement. The universalistic con-
stituents include various aspects of global hip-hop culture such as rap,
graffiti, breakdance and ‘cool’ style; they equip the youngsters with
those means to symbolically transcend the discipline and power of the
nation-state and to integrate themselves into a global youth culture. In
this sense, the notion of modern diaspora, as I shall suggest in the fol-
lowing chapters, appears to be a useful concept for the study of con-
temporary labour migrants and their descendants: it embraces and
conceptualises two of the main antithetical forces that characterise
modern times, namely localism and globalism.
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     My main interest lies upon the creation of diasporic cultural identi-
ties amongst the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg,
Berlin. I am not concerned with generalised external pronouncements
about the ‘problems’ or ‘crises’ of Turkish identity, but focus on the
form and content of these identities as they are experienced in every-
day life. In doing so, I try to move away from a predominantly mac-
ro-structural approach, in which Turkish youth constitutes a social
category considered only in its relation to institutions.
     The research for this work has been carried in a Turkish enclave.
However, it does not claim to shed light on the situation of all young-
sters living in this enclave. In this sense, my work is rather illustrative,
not representative. Various other youth groups such as Islamic youth,
middle-class youth and Alevi youth will be touched upon in order to
provide the reader with a deeper analytical insights for understanding
the distinct situation of Turkish hip-hop youth. Far from constituting
a culture of despair and nihilism, I intend to demonstrate that Turkish
hip-hop youths are concerned with the construction of new cultural
alternatives, in which identity is created and re-created as part of an
ongoing and dynamic process. By focusing on a specific group of
Turkish youths, I seek to compose an alternative picture of Turkish
youth, commonly portrayed as destructive, Islamic, fundamentalist
and problematic by the majority society (cf. inter alia Der Spiegel
1997; Focus 1997; Heitmeyer, 1997).
     Flagging up the notions of cultural bricolage, diasporic conscious-
ness and globalisation, my research draws from and contributes to the
fields of migration studies, ‘race’ and ethnic relations and diaspora
studies (cf. inter alia Clifford, 1997, 1994, 1992; Hall, 1994; Gilroy,
1995, 1994, 1993; Cohen, 1997, 1996, 1995; Vertovec, 1997, 1996b).
The growing research on transnational migrant communities and their
descendants suggests that the notion of diaspora can be considered an
intermediate concept between the local and global, thus transcending
narrow and limited national perspectives. The material analysed in this
study provides further evidence that the contemporary notion of dias-
pora is a beneficial concept in order to study the formation and articu-
lation of the cultural identity among transnational communities.
     Much of the current research on the Turkish migrants and their de-
scendants in Germany has focused on socio-economic issues, emphasi-
sing their labour relations, residential patterns and ‘acculturation’ dif-
ficulties. No research has yet been undertaken to explore the forma-
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tion and articulation of both cultural identity and political participa-
tion strategies among German-Turks, based on the notion of diaspora.
One of the central claims here is that working-class Turkish hip-hop
youth culture in Berlin can adequately display how cultural bricolage
is formed by the diasporic youth in collision, negotiation and dialogue
with the parental, ‘host’ and global cultures. The idea of cultural brico-
lage, thus, contravenes those problematic terms such as ‘deculturated,’
‘inbetween’ and ‘degenerated,’ attributed to the German-Turkish
youth.
     In addition to investigating how the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths
have constructed and articulated a form of diasporic consciousness and
cultural bricolage, this study also scrutinises how the Berlin-Turks,
those allegedly least autonomous and influential actors of the German
social system, have hitherto developed two major strategies for politi-
cal participation. These two strategies are namely migrant strategy and
minority strategy. These political participation strategies have been
built up by migrants along ethnic lines as a response to the exclusionist
and segregationist regimes of incorporation applied by the Federal Re-
public of Germany vis-à-vis migrants. Migrant strategy was formed at
the beginning of the migratory process as a need to cope with the de-
stabilising effects of migration. Minority strategy, on the other hand,
emerged sometime after the family reunion started and the labour re-
cruitment ceased in 1973. While the former strategy was based on a
non-associational community formation, ethnic enclave, hemsehri (fel-
low citizens) bonding, and a Gastarbeiter ideology (see Chapter 2), the
latter was based on the idea of permanent settlement and the discours-
es of culture and community. Shedding light upon these two strategies,
my work will also demonstrate how the modern diaspora discourse
appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, these ethnic strate-
gies.
     Before describing the details of my field research in Berlin, let me
briefly touch upon some of the terms I will be using in the book. The
terms such as Turkish hip-hop youth and/or Berlin-Turkish hip-hop
youth, which I will interchangeably use throughout the work, primari-
ly refer to the working-class male Turkish diasporic hip-hop youth.
Hip-Hop, in general, has its roots in urban American ghettos and rep-
resents a form of youth culture that expresses the anger, visions and
experiences of black and/or Latino ‘underclass’ youngsters. Although
there are some successful female hip-hoppers such as Queen Latifah
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and Sister Souljah, hip-hop remains a predominantly male domain.
Against this background, I choose to focus in my research on male,
working-class youngsters. During the course of my research, I did,
however, meet and converse with a number of Turkish women hip-
hoppers, who provided me with a valuable insight into their experi-
ence both as a comparison with, and contrast to, the experience of
Turkish men. Clearly, an analysis of female hip-hoppers is necessary
in the future in order to gain a fuller picture on cultural forms created
by diasporic youth.
     A separate note is also needed for the contextual use of the term
‘German-Turk’ in this work. The notion of German-Turk is neither a
term used by the descendants of Turkish migrants to identify them,
nor is it used in the political or academic debate in Germany. I use the
term German-Turk in the Anglo-Saxon academic tradition to catego-
rise diasporic youths; the term attributes a hybrid form of cultural
identity to those groups of young people. There is no doubt that polit-
ical regimes of incorporation applied to the immigrants in Germany
are very different from those in the United States and England. Accor-
dingly, unlike Italian-American or Chinese-British, Turks have never
been defined as German-Turks or Turkish-German by the official dis-
course. They have rather been considered apart. That is why, practical-
ly, it does not seem appropriate to call the Turkish diasporic commu-
nities in Germany ‘German-Turks.’ Yet, it is a helpful term for my
purposes for two reasons: the term distances the researcher from es-
sentialising the descendants of the transnational migrants as ‘Turkish;’
furthermore it underlines the transcultural character of these youths.
The Universe of the Research
The main body of my research took place among three separate youth
groups in Berlin. Two of the groups are located in the Turkish ethnic
2enclave in Kreuzberg 36 , spending their leisure time in two different
youth centres. The first one, which was the focus of my research, is
called Naunyn Ritze Kinder & Jugend Kulturzentrum located in Nau-
nynstraße. The second one is the Chip Jugend, Kultur & Kommunika-
tionszentrum located in Reichenberger Straße. Both centres are quite
close to each other, so that the youth workers and some of the young-
sters are in contact. Both centres are financed by local organisations
and Kreuzberg municipality.
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     The third youth group is comprised of youngsters living mostly
outside Kreuzberg and attending the gymnasium. These middle-class
Turkish youths were approached in order to build, by way of contrast,
a fuller view of the life worlds of the working-class Turkish hip-hop
youngsters, and to indicate the heterogeneity of the Turkish diasporic
communities. Inclusion of the middle-class Turkish youth will also
provide us with a ground where we can more precisely differentiate
between the strategies of cultural identity formation undertaken by
various Turkish youth groups in the diaspora. In what follows, I shall
briefly describe these groups.
Naunyn Ritze Youth Centre
Naunyn Ritze youth centre is situated in Naunynstraße, a street that is
predominantly inhabited by the Turkish migrants originating from the
eastern rural parts of Turkey (see Chapter 3). The centre is run by the
Kreuzberg municipality and a Kreuzberg neighbourhood organisation,
Mixtur 36 e. V. The main activities in the centre are breakdance, capo-
eira (Brazilian dance), mountain climbing, graffiti, painting, photog-
raphy, bodybuilding and taekwondo. The Turkish youngsters in the
centre, who number between forty-five and fifty, are mainly involved
in breakdance, graffiti, painting, body building and taekwondo. Some
of them have won many prizes in Berlin’s breakdance and graffiti
competitions. The other activities are dominated mostly by Germans.
The centre is open from Tuesday to Saturday between 15.00 and 22.00
o’clock. The proportion of girls and boys coming to the centre is
almost equal. There is a café in the centre where the youngsters usually
congregate; in addition, the girls have a separate room for themselves.
     The centre employs approximately ten youth workers, three of
whom are Berlin-Turks. The youth workers have the controlling
power over the youngsters. There is some tension between the Ger-
man youth workers and the Turkish youngsters, and the Turkish
youth workers, Neco (25), Elif (25) and Ibo (28), try to absorb this
tension since they are more respected by their co-ethnic youngsters.
Incidentally, the presence of the Turkish female youth worker, Elif,
encourages the Turkish girls to come to the centre and to become in-
volved in the activities.
Naunyn Ritze is the most popular centre for Turkish minority hip-
hop youth. This is the centre where the previously active 36ers and 36
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Boys gangsta groups, and the local rap group Islamic Force, which I
shall examine more fully in Chapter 6, originated. It is also the place
where interested parties of the German media come in order to collect
trendy material on Turkish hip-hop youth culture. There is always
American music in the background. It is the head youth worker, Peter,
who decides which music to play, not the youngsters. Yet, the girls and
boys, when they meet up in their private rooms in the centre prefer lis-
tening to Turkish arabesk, Turkish folk music, Turkish pop music and
Islamic Force (see Chapter 6). Arabesk, hip-hop, Turkish folk music
and Turkish pop music are respectively the most popular types of
music amongst the youngsters. The pessimism of arabesk, the romance
of the Turkish pop, and the ‘coolness’ of rap match the feelings they
have. They call arabesk ‘isyan müzigi’ (rebellion music). Arabesk is a
protest style of music in itself, but it has always had a passivist beat
and a pessimist content, which leads to what Adorno (1990/1941: 312)
called ‘rhythmic obedience’ (see Chapter 6).
     The youngsters in Naunyn Ritze are mainly Alevis (see Chapter 3)
– few are Sunnis – and their parents migrated mostly from the eastern
parts of Turkey. This group is a relatively homogenous group in terms
of ethnicity compared to the other 2 youth groups examined in this study.
Chip Youth Centre
Chip is located in Reichenberger Straße, a street that is situated on the
other side of the Kotbusser Tor U-Bahn station and which is inhabited
by mixed ethnic dwellers such as Turkish, Lebanese, Yugoslavian and
German (see Chapter 3). It is also administered by the municipality.
Activities in the centre include music, graffiti, photography and com-
puting. It is smaller than Naunyn Ritze; there are only five youth
workers, none of whom are Turkish. The research was carried out
with approximately twenty Turkish youngsters. The centre is mostly
dominated by Turkish and Lebanese male youngsters. Turkish girls
participate only in the vocational training activities, and rarely spend
their spare time in the centre’s café. In these respects, Chip is quite dif-
ferent from Naunyn Ritze.
     The controlling power resides in the hands of the male youngsters,
especially of the Turks. There is always a tension between the youth
workers and the youngsters; even I, myself, could feel this tension
during the course of my research. Furthermore, the relations between
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the Turkish and Arabic youths are problematic and sometimes violent.
The youngsters and the youth workers told me that an Arab killed a
Turkish youngster in front of the centre in 1994. Thus the tension be-
tween the groups has continued since. It should be noted that Chip is
another important centre like Naunyn Ritze: Chip has previously been
a meeting place for one of Berlin’s gangsta groups – the Fatbacks, a
group that was mostly composed of Turkish and Arab youngsters.
Tension between the Naunyn Ritze boys and Chip boys still exist,
however sometimes alliances are formed to fight against other Arab or
German youngsters.
     The Turkish youngsters coming to the centre are mainly Sunnis.
Their parents originate from various regions in Turkey. It is a more
heterogeneous centre in terms of parental origins. It is the youngsters
themselves who decide which type of music is played in the café. They
mostly choose the melancholic and pessimistic Turkish arabesk, which
plays in the background. Wolfgang, a youth worker, indicated that the
youth workers in the centre have been trying to adopt a democratic
understanding in Chip. Although they have granted the youngsters the
freedom to choose their type of music, they were not happy with the
pessimist and passivist arabesk music. Two months after my first visit
to the centre, the youth workers had made some rearrangements in the
organisation, i. e. they took over the running of the café from the
youngsters, and now they play hip-hop music to attract also German
3youngsters to the centre.
BTBTM Youth Group
This is a group of between fifteen and twenty middle-class youngsters,
living mostly outside Kreuzberg. They all attend Gymnasium. In addi-
tion, they take some additional courses at the Technische Universität
delivered by a Turkish student organisation called Berlin-Turkish Sci-
4ence and Technology Centre (BTBTM). Courses that they are taking
include Turkish, Maths, Physics, Biology and German literature.
These youngsters decided to form a group that meets regularly and
gives them the opportunity to exchange ideas about their problems.
Their meetings were organised by a university student, Nurdan who
was then the head of the BTBTM. Discussion topics include identity,
sexism displayed by Turkish men, youth, racism, xenophobia and na-
tionalism. At the end of these meetings, which lasted nearly one year,
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they initiated a Jugendfest (youth festival) in the Werkstatt der Kultu-
ren located in the neighbouring district of Neukölln. They presented
their own works to German and Turkish audience (see Chapter 4). I
joined their meetings as an observer and also participated in the festival
and their entertainments.
     While doing the research, I spent time with several political activists
in their community organisations, with a few families in their homes,
with many first generation male migrants in their traditional Turkish
cafés, and with many youth social workers in the youth centres. How-
ever, I spent most of my time with youths in the street, at their other
‘hangouts’ and in their youth centres. Of these three distinct afore-
mentioned youth groups, Naunyn Ritze youths became the core of my
field research. Accordingly, in the following section I will narrate the
story of my acceptance into the Naunyn Ritze youth centre.
Developing Rapport with Youngsters
At the very beginning of my research, I was a stranger for the youths,
coming from a place that they did not know. I was obviously a Turk-
ish citizen, but what kind of Turkish? Was I Kurdish, or Alevi, or
Sunni, or what? They were initially extremely sceptical about me, as
they always are about any stranger. However, as the social workers of
the Naunyn Ritze Youth Centre, Neco and Elif, had introduced me to
them, they had a slightly more positive first impression of me. Beyond
their introductions, our rapport depended on my own ability to com-
municate with them. Should I act as a researcher asking many ques-
tions, or as a participant observer scrutinising everything, or should I
interact with them as ‘myself’? These were the questions with which I
struggled in the beginning. Actually, it seemed extremely difficult, and
not at all reasonable, to decide on which role to choose at the very be-
ginning of the research. I merely endeavoured to avoid the formalism
of research methods.
     I was at the centre almost every day, except on holidays. I intro-
duced myself as a student coming from England and doing research
about experiences of Turkish hip-hop youngsters in Kreuzberg. Their
first reaction, or first confirmation, of what I was doing, was that I had
come to the right place to research such a subject. Naunyn Ritze has
hitherto been the most popular place for German and other interna-
tional journalists who want to find out about the daily life of Turkish
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youngsters and gangsta groups living in Kreuzberg. That is why I was
also treated as a television or newspaper journalist at first sight and
was even asked by the youngsters where my camera or tape-recorder
was. Since I avoided using any mechanical equipment to record, to
videotape, or to take pictures, I convinced them that I was not a jour-
nalist. Although they were at first slightly disappointed, it did not take
long for them to get used to the fact that I was just a student. They
immediately wanted to know what kind of student I was. Apparently,
I did not match the type of student they had in mind – according to
them ‘I was a bit old to be a student.’
     Repeatedly, they asked me questions about England and the Turk-
ish youths living there. They wanted me to make a comparison be-
tween themselves and the British-Turkish youths. I let them question
me as much as possible in order to balance our positions. My transna-
tional identity – or, in their perceptions, cosmopolitan identity – obvi-
ously worked in my favour and facilitated a rapport with them. They
found my English connection more interesting to play with than my
Turkish connection. I was trying, at all times, to avoid being received
as merely an academic researcher. Rather, I was presenting myself as a
student doing his PhD., or doctorate, which they failed to understand
clearly. To make it clear for them, I told them that this research would,
at the end, lead to a book about them. It was pleasant for them to imag-
ine their stories printed in a book. Then, they all agreed to help me.
     While I never concealed the fact that I was doing research, these
youngsters did not generally define my identity as merely a researcher.
I was seen as an elder brother (agabey) and a good friend who would
understand their problems and help them obtain their goals. Accord-
ingly, my relationship with the youngsters developed on a friendly ba-
sis. If the researcher makes friends with the actors of the research and
considers them ‘interlocutors’ rather than ‘informants’ and/or ‘re-
spondents,’ and if the actors trust the researcher, they will also be hon-
est with him/her (Horowitz, 1983, 1986; Adler et al., 1986; Alasuutari,
1995: 52-56). My personal background is working class and I am of
Turkish-Alevi origin, therefore quite similar to those of the youngs-
ters. Accordingly, I was not relegated to a marginal position in the
course of the research. Rather, I was considered an insider to a certain
extent, though they maintained a fragile distance.
     In the course of the field research, I did not need to apply any of
the formal participatory roles established by various schools of re-
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search. For instance, I refused to implement both the Chicago school
of symbolic interactionism, whereby the researcher attempts to take
the most objective and detached position, and the ethnomethodologi-
cal way of subjective interactionism, whereby the researcher takes the
most radically subjective and involved position. I tried to refrain from
a variety of research postures differing in the degree of researcher’s in-
volvement. Hence, I tried to abstain from the use of two polar field re-
search stances: the observer-as-participant and the participant-as-ob-
server. Rather, I eventually maintained a balance between involvement
and detachment. I was spending time with the youngsters, getting to
know them informally, but also trying to avoid becoming personally
or emotionally involved with them to retain my objectivity.
     Developing close relationships with the youngsters still made me
aware of the severe pitfalls associated with losing detachment and ob-
jectivity: ‘going native’ (Berg, 1995; Rosaldo 1989, Chap. 8; Adler et
al., 1986; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). ‘Going native’ refers to
developing an overrapport with research subjects that can harm the
data-gathering process. Overrapport may also bias the researcher’s
own perspectives, leading him/her uncritically to accept the views of
the members as his/her own (Adler et al., 1986: 364). The rapport I de-
veloped with the youths never involved making repeated overtures of
friendliness, artificial postures to attract the attention of the youngs-
ters, or exploiting the norms of interpersonal reciprocity to build a re-
search web of friendly relations and key informants. Because playing
roles and using deceptive strategies in the interest of sociological in-
quiry do not constitute a good faith commitment.
     Another crucial point to be raised about gaining rapport among the
youngsters is the advantages and disadvantages of being an ‘ethnic’ re-
searcher. As an ethnic minority researcher I acquired privileged rela-
tions with both Turkish youngsters and adults. Familiarity with the
language and physical space of the Turkish minority in Berlin provid-
ed me with an easy access to the youth groups that I worked with. I
had more advantages compared to German researchers because of the
negative perception that the working-class Turkish youths have of the
Germans. The youngsters assumed that I empathised with them – an
empathy that they would not expect from a German researcher. But as
well as providing a crucial advantage in facilitating the process of ‘get-
ting in,’ being an ethnic researcher brings about some disadvantages.
It might accelerate ‘going native,’ and it might also lead to the senti-
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mentalisation of the research due to the close effective links established
with the people researched. Above all, sometimes the minorities might
expect the ethnic researcher to solve their problems, or at least to me-
diate between the governmental authorities and themselves. Having in
mind all these disadvantages of being an ethnic researcher, I tried to
abstain from developing an overrapport and giving an impression,
which might lead them to think that I was there to find a solution to
their problems.
     I had a theoretical and ethical difficulty in treating the youngsters in
the process of social inquiry. Was I going to treat them as ‘respon-
dents,’ ‘informants’ or whatever? After spending some time to get into
their worlds, I realised that treating the youngsters as ‘respondents’
was not relevant and ethical at all because it was the parents, youth
workers and the police who asked questions in their world. These
were the social actors who signified power to be obeyed by the young-
sters. Accordingly, I tried to refrain from adopting the power to ask
questions as granted. Above all, the researcher who has the power to
ask questions attempts to place himself/herself on a higher position
than that of the people s/he searches. Such a positioning might lead to
the manipulation of the research on the sidewalk of the researcher. In
other words, this notion might invite the risk of praising the scientific
dogmatism or pure sociological investigation.
     Unlike ‘respondents,’ the term ‘informants’ might, at first glance,
seem a more reasonable role to give the youngsters because, then, they
are considered to narrate their own life stories to the researcher who
supposedly stands on a neutral, or rather assimilated, positioning. Al-
though this term ethically seems more accurate, the researcher ceases
to exist as a subject. Contrarily, this term might invite the risk of ‘go-
ing native,’ which is contemplated as the end of scientific knowledge.
Thus, I also tried to avoid purely ethnographic approach, praising the
youngsters and their narratives more than necessary. As Rosaldo
(1989: 180) put it I had to dance “on the edge of a paradox by simul-
taneously becoming ‘one of the people’ and remaining an academic.”
     Bearing in mind the limitations of these two terms, I prefer using
the term ‘interlocutor’ that locates the researcher and youngsters as
separate subjects, who are free from ideological manipulation of each
other and open to dialogical interaction. In doing so, I tried to distance
myself from pure sociological and ethnographic puritanism, or from
what Rosaldo (1989) calls ‘sociological and ethnographic monumental-
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ism.’ Treating the youngsters as ‘interlocutors’ is also an attempt to
minimise the question of power between the researcher and the people
‘researched.’ This term, at the same time, situates the researcher in a
middle position where s/he can utilise both his/her objective and sub-
jective dispositions in his/her attempt to capture and explain the full
meaning of the social life of the people ‘researched.’ Without objectivi-
ty, researching particular/local cultures and identities is out of the
question because objectivism attempts to prevent the subjective re-
searcher to romanticise his/her subjects. Identically, it is also accurate
to claim that the subjective character of the human beings that collect
and interpret the knowledge influences all human knowledge. There-
fore, social analysts should explore their subjects from a number of
different positions, rather than being locked into any particular one.
     I spent approximately eight months in Berlin, from January to Au-
gust 1996. Afterwards, I had a few more trips to Berlin for a couple of
weeks, one of which was in December 1996, and the others in June
1997, September 1998 and August 2000. Besides interacting and mak-
ing participant observation, I also carried out semi-structured in-depth
interviews with ten members of the each youth group, five of whom
are girls and five boys. My intention was to obtain a summary of the
experiences utilising some ‘key questions’ suggested by an examina-
tion of the data. However, these interviews remained semi-structured
in that the replies by the youngsters led to the generation of further
questions as I sought explanations and elaboration of the events. In the
course of the research I did not use any tape- or video-recorder to re-
cord the interviews or informal chats I made with the youngsters.
Since there were many journalists visiting these two youth centres, es-
pecially Naunyn Ritze, the youngsters seemed to develop a fixed way
of representation of themselves to the media. Being equipped with no
electronic recorder, I aimed not to be received as a journalist by the
youths.
The Implications and the Scope of the Study
As pointed out before, my work mainly reflects the stories and narra-
tives of the two working-class youth groups who took part in the field
research in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg 36. During the course of the
study, it has become evident that the processes of cultural identity
formation of these youth groups primarily revolved around two sig-
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nificant constituents: diasporic cultural consciousness and global hip-
hop youth culture. Accordingly, this work explores these two constitu-
ents in order to map out the landscape of these youths’ cultural identi-
ty. To do so, these Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth groups should be
situated in a broader social and cultural framework highlighting their
ethnic enclave, their parental culture, middle-class Turkish youth cul-
ture, majority society culture and contemporary global youth culture.
     Thus, this study is built on three principal phases. The first phase
portrays the diasporic urban space created by the Turkish migrants
and their descendants in Kreuzberg. The second phase of this study
considers teenagers as they interact and develop identities in various
social settings: in their homes, in the schools, on the streets, and in
Turkey. The third phase of the study examines the process by which
the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth develops a diasporic consciousness
in collision, negotiation and dialogue with the majority society.
Hence, the main theme, which these three phases aim to reveal, is the
cultural bricolage and diasporic cultural identity constructed and ar-
ticulated by the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths that are subject to the
streams of globalisation.
     The first chapter explicates the debates over the relative importance
of theoretical notions such as culture, youth culture, ‘subculture,’ eth-
nicity, globalism and hip-hop in the study of German-Turkish hip-
hop youth. In a first step, two distinct notions of culture namely the
holistic notion of culture and the syncretic notion of culture are put
forward. Departing from this differentiation, I summarise the main
trends that characterise studies on German-Turks. Highlighting the
limits of these conventional studies, I base my argument on the idea of
cultural bricolage through which the youngsters construct their identi-
ties. In this chapter, where I question some theoretical conceptualisa-
tions, I also try to develop a theoretical frame that allows differentiat-
ing the hip-hop youth culture from the traditional concept of ‘subcul-
ture.’
     The second chapter explores the migratory process in the Federal
Republic of Germany, which has resulted in the formation of a dias-
poric consciousness by the Turkish labour migrants. Prior to describ-
ing the formation of diasporic consciousness, it discusses ethnic-based
strategies of political participation developed by the Turkish migrants
in Germany since the beginning of the migratory process in 1961. In
drawing up the main framework of migrant strategy and minority
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strategy, I also outline the migratory process and the incorporation re-
gimes in the Federal Republic of Germany, leading to the ‘ethnic mi-
norisation’ of the labour migrants.
     Chapter 3 begins with delineating the importance of Kreuzberg for
migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and demonstrates how Turkish
migrants and their descendants in Kreuzberg 36 have created a modern
diasporic space, or what they call ‘Kleines Istanbul’ (Little Istanbul).
Thus, it portrays the images, symbols, sounds, views and traditions
carried by transnational migrants from their homeland to form a dia-
sporic space which provides them with a protective symbolic ‘fortress’
against institutional discrimination, assimilation and racism. Subse-
quently, the major constituents of this diasporic space are displayed:
the Turkish media and ethnic associations in Berlin. Eventually, this
diasporic space and its cultural constituents are evaluated in the broad-
er setting of multicultural Berlin with special reference to the Turkish
Alevi community. This final section aims to raise the question of ide-
ology of multiculturalism and its discontents for the Turkish diasporic
communities.
     Chapter 4 examines the process of ‘homing of diaspora’ by the
working-class Turkish male youths in Kreuzberg that experience a so-
cioeconomic and political marginality. Being subject to structural
outsiderism, working-class Turkish diasporic youth develops a ‘de-
motic’ discourse and a language of fatalism against exclusion and dis-
crimination. This chapter also delineates the principal life-worlds of
the working-class diasporic Turkish youth: youth centre, street, school
and household. The male peer groups construct their identities in ne-
gotiation between these distinct worlds. To understand the working-
class Turkish diasporic youth, this chapter also explores a relevant side
of the identity formation processes among the middle-class diasporic
Turkish youth.
     Chapter 5 investigates the major constituents of ‘third culture’
and/or cultural syncreticism developed by the working-class Turkish
hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg. Their cultural syncreticism becomes ap-
parent in their leisure culture, which is characterised by both particu-
laristic and universalistic constituents. The particularist components of
their leisure culture are ‘âlem’ (meeting with friends), dügüns (wed-
ding ceremony) and arabesk music, while the universalist ones are rap,
graffiti, dance and ‘cool’ style. Defining the main framework of the
cultural identity formation processes and of leisure culture of these
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hip-hop youngsters, this chapter underlines the multicultural compe-
tence of ethnic minority youths.
     Chapter 6 calls attention to the issues of cultural syncreticism,
‘double diasporic consciousness’ and transculturation. It explores the
discourses and social identities of the Berlin-Turkish rappers whom I
consider contemporary minstrels, ‘organic intellectuals’ and ‘storytel-
lers’ of their own communities. What they call ‘Oriental’ hip-hop pro-
vides these youngsters with a ground where they can express their
imagaginary nostalgia towards ‘home’ and ‘already discovered country
of the past’ as well as to manifest their attachment to the ‘undiscovered
country of the future.’ In other words, ‘Oriental’ hip-hop as an ex-
pressive cultural form represents the symbolic dialogue undertaken by
the diasporic youths between ‘past’ and ‘present,’ between ‘tradition’
and ‘translation,’ between ‘there’ and ‘here,’ and between the local and
global.
     Finally, I conclude that a diaspora can be created through cultural
artefacts and a shared imagery that symbolically connect the new
country of settlement to homeland. These symbolic links between the
diaspora and homeland can only be produced through modern means
of communication and transportation. I am aware that in rapidly
changing world all generations are transitional, but I am convinced
nonetheless that Turkish hip-hop youngsters in Berlin have construct-
ed something unique – a ‘third culture,’ which transcends conventional
binary understandings of cultural interaction.
Notes
1 Orientation (1997). Bosporus Bridge. Berlin: GGM Orient Ex-
press. The project of ‘Orientation’ run by the Oriental Express, is
a mix of ‘oriental hip-hop’ and ‘arabesk soul.’ It aims to introduce
an amalgamation of various musical forms to the Berlin audience.
Meryl Prettyman made the translation of this song. I made the
English translations of all the other Turkish rap songs in this book.
2 The number 36 refers to one of the pre-reunification postal area
codes of the Kreuzberg district which is densely populated by
Turkish migrants. Kreuzberg 36 comprises the three U-Bahn sta-
tions Kotbusser Tor, Görlitzer Bahnhof and Schlesisches Tor.
Kreuzberg 36 can be defined as a Turkish ethnic ‘enclave,’ not a
‘ghetto.’ Peter Marcuse (1996) describes enclaves as ‘those areas in
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which immigrants have congregated and which are seen as having
positive value, as opposed to the word ‘ghetto,’ which has a clear-
ly pejorative connotation.’ In this sense, enclaves refer to symbolic
walls of protection, cohesion and solidarity for immigrants and
ethnic minorities. Kreuzberg as an ethnic enclave is rather differ-
ent from those black and Hispanic ghetto examples in the United
States, where the poor, the unemployed, the excluded and the
homeless are most frequently concentrated.
3 Chip was temporarily closed in June 1997 due to some violence
among the youths.
4 Berlin Türk Bilim ve Teknoloji Merkezi (BTBTM) was founded
in 1977 by a group of Turkish university students in order to pro-
vide technology transfer to Turkey from Germany. Although it
was established in the very beginning as an initiative aiming to
contribute to the technological development of Turkey, it has re-
cently become a social democratic student initiative dealing with
the problems of the second and third generation Turkish students.
It has become more oriented to the Turks living in Berlin rather
than to Turkey. Since 1992 they have conducted a project in Ber-
lin, called ‘Project Zweite Generation’ (Second Generation Proj-
ect). Through this project they aim to assist Turkish students with
their problems whilst studying in the high schools in Berlin.
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Chapter 1
The Notions of Culture, Youth Culture,
Ethnicity, and Globalisation
As the main theme of this work is to explore the construction and ar-
ticulation processes of the diasporic cultural identity among the work-
ing-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths, the concepts of culture, mi-
nority youth culture, ethnicity, globalisation and diaspora must also be
examined. Accordingly, this chapter aims to redefine the concepts of
culture and minority youth culture by departing from the convention-
al definition of culture in order to provide a theoretical ground for un-
derstanding diasporic youth culture. Raymond Williams (1983: 90) has
defined culture in three different ways that are in fact complementary
to each other. Firstly, culture could be used to refer to ‘a general pro-
cess of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’ (anthropologi-
cal definition). Secondly, culture might be used to suggest ‘a particular
way of life, whether of a people, a period, or a group’ (sociological
definition). Finally, culture could refer to ‘the works and practices of
intellectual and especially artistic activity’ (humanistic definition).
While culture was previously defined as the received high culture of
various literary and philosophical canons, now it is characterised in a
broader sense as any expressive activity contributing to social learning.
     The expansion of the notion of culture affects the way in which
popular culture is now conceptualised as a broad ensemble of every-
day discursive practices that may fall outside the traditional parameters
of official high culture. Over the past three decades the dominance of
high culture over popular culture has depreciated. Popular culture is
articulated as a structured terrain of cultural exchange and negotiation
between forces of incorporation and resistance: a struggle between the
attempt to universalise the interests of the dominant against the resist-
ance of the subordinate (Storey, 1993). The upsurge of popular culture
31
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S.  31- 54) T01_02 Chapter 1.p 297863215586
Chapter 1
in alliance with global culture crosscuts with the rapid industrialisa-
tion, urbanisation, domestic/international migration and social mobili-
sation since the 1960s, when the periphery started to infiltrate the cen-
tre. Popular culture has mainly been formed in urban spaces in which
many kinds of cultures and life forms have to intermingle. It is also ev-
ident that much of the impetus behind the expansion of the notion of
culture springs from the sweeping transformations in information
technology after World War Two – a point to which I shall return
shortly.
     The study of youth cultures has recently gained a remarkable space
within the field of popular culture. The expansion of the ideology of
consumerism, leisure industry, post-Fordist economic production, the
extension of the adolescence period through raising of the school leav-
ing age, and the globalisation of Western urban culture turned the
concept of youth to be one of the significant fields of study in social
sciences. Topics that receive scholarly attention include definitions of
style, musical tastes, unemployment, delinquency, sexuality, resist-
ance, difference and ethnicity. Beginning with the Chicago School of
sociology and continuing throughout the 1960s, interest on youth
began to emerge. In the 1970s, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies (CCCS) became the site of a great deal of research on youth
‘subcultures.’ These studies examined working-class youth subcultures
as social groups through analyses of class structures (Cohen, 1972;
Hall and Jefferson, 1976). While these works were highly influential in
determining how youths were to be conceptualised, it remained at the
level of the examination of facets of youth cultures as expressions of
class conflict or the position of youth in future adult roles. Further-
more, these studies also helped to reinforce the view of youth as pri-
marily passive.
     In this context, particular cultural forms have been produced and
articulated by minority youths, a group that emerged after the settle-
1ment of migrant labour in the 1970s in the continental Europe. The
cultural forms produced by minority youths provide a number of fa-
cilitating conditions for the creation of new ethnic cultures and identi-
ties, which celebrate specificity, difference and distinction (Hannerz,
1989; Appadurai, 1990). More recent studies on the minority youth
cultures involve notions such as globalisation, diaspora, ‘youthnicity,’
multiculturalism, cultural agency, leisure, transnationalism, transcultu-
ration, bricolage, syncreticism, différance, racism, exclusion and he-
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gemony (cf. inter alia Gilroy, 1993; Keith, 1995; Amit-Talai and Wulff,
1995; Wilpert, 1989; Liebkind, 1989; Pamgren et al., 1992, Ålund,
1996; Ålund-Schierup, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Mandel, 1990; Vertovec,
1996a, 1995). The primary difference of these works from those of the
Chicago School and of the CCCS is that youths are not considered
victims of technology and consumerism, or passive receptors of paren-
tal culture, but active agents who are capable of producing, reprodu-
cing and articulating their cultures. Much of my work shall follow the
recent approach to portray the expressive cultures of the Berlin-
Turkish hip-hop youth. Yet, some aspects of the CCCS scholars will
necessarily be taken into consideration in the course of analysis.
     Contemporary scholarly works on minority youth cultures also
refer to the notion of modern diaspora in order to describe the com-
plexities of simultaneous processes of cultural localisation and trans-
culturation by the respective youths. The diaspora idea invites us to
explore expressive minority youth cultures in relation to their ‘roots’
and ‘routes’ without essentialising them (Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994,
1995; Clifford, 1992, 1994; Hall, 1994). Diaspora studies, as I will
demonstrate, provide us with a convenient framework to display cul-
tures of bricolage, which exist in mixing rather than in static ethnic
lines. In what follows, I will elaborate various notions of culture in
relation to the literature on Turks in Germany. Thereafter, the litera-
ture of the earlier schools working on youth cultures will be briefly
reviewed. Consequently, I will locate the minority hip-hop youth
culture in the framework of modern diaspora studies.
Notions of Culture
There are two principal notions of culture that I will briefly summarise
in this section. The first one is the holistic notion of culture, and the
second is the syncretic notion of culture. The former considers culture a
highly integrated and grasped static ‘whole.’ This is the dominant par-
adigm of the classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality
were the main characteristics. The latter notion is the one, which is
most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in space.
This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by the contempo-
rary scholars to demonstrate the fact that cultures emerge in mixing
beyond the political and geographical territories.
     The term culture came to the fore in Europe during the construc-
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tion of cultural nationalist identities. As the main constituent of the
age of nationalism was territoriality, culture was defined as the cumu-
lative of ‘shared meanings and values,’ which manifested itself in that
particular territory throughout history. This is the holistic notion of
culture that has provided the basic for the emergence of the myth of
distinct national cultures. To quote Eric Wolf,
The demonstration that each struggling nation possessed a distinctive society,
animated by its special spirit or culture, served to legitimate its aspirations to
form a separate state of its own. The notion of separate and integral cultures
responded to this political project. Once we locate the reality of society in his-
torically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and branching social align-
ments, however, the concept of a boxed, unitary and bounded culture must
give way to a sense of the fluidity and permeability of cultural sets. In the
rough and tumble of social interaction, groups are known to exploit the am-
biguities of inherited forms, to impart new evaluations or valences to them, to
borrow forms more expressive of their interests, or to create wholly new forms
in answer to changed circumstances (1982: 387).
The idea that cultures exist as separate and integral entities clearly
supported the project of defining the ‘imagined communities’ (Ander-
son, 1983) of nations struggling for independence or dominance. The
holistic notion of culture resembles the usage of the German Roman-
tics, as in ‘Volk culture’ imprisoning cultures within distinct social
compartments containing separate sets of ‘shared meanings and val-
ues.’ This understanding attributes a time, context, territoriality,
space, unity and memory to culture. According to this approach, mo-
dernity, which appears in the form of electronic communications,
transportation, deterritorialisation and cultural imperialism, has dis-
rupted the ‘unity and authenticity of culture’ (Smith, 1990, 1995; Bell,
1978).
     The main claim of the holistic approach is that ‘shared meanings
and values’ are the principal constituents of each distinct culture. The
focus on ‘shared meanings and values’ may sometimes make culture
sound too unitary, homogeneous, holistic and too cognitive. The dis-
turbance of this unity and holism is considered to result in crisis,
breakdown or degeneration. The themes of ‘identity crisis,’ ‘in-be-
tweenness,’ ‘split identities’ and ‘degeneration’ raised by some scholars
in the study of ethnic minorities – a point to which I shall return in the
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next chapter – is the product of such an assumption. This assumption
claims that culture emerges in discrete ethnic lines, and holds no place
for syncreticism and bricolage. Syncreticism could merely be consid-
ered, in this approach, nothing but an impurity polluting the ‘authen-
tic culture.’
     Although some researchers working on Turkish migrants’ culture
in Germany note emergent syncreticisms, they dislike these ‘cultural
impurities,’ to use James Clifford’s term (1988). The common trend
amongst these scholars in the context of Turkish migrants in Germany
is either to label the cultures of bricolage as ‘degenerate’ (Abadan-
Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987), or to diagnose the situation as
‘fragmented cultural world leading to a crisis of identity’ (Mushaben,
1985). These scholars regard the Turkish migrants as the victims of
transnational capitalist process. This is why those ‘victims’ have been
considered to be incapable of coping with the new circumstances and
obstacles emerging in the diaspora. This approach negates the sub-
ject-centered analysis. Ironically, this notion of culture also provides
the ground for the formation of multiculturalist polities. Multicultur-
alism, as I shall explore in the coming chapters, assumes that cultures
are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes belonging to
ethnic groups.
     Most of the studies on Turks and Turkish culture in Germany are
based on a notion linking ethnicity and culture. This approach mainly
rests on the assumption that Turkish migrants carry their own distinct
cultural baggages all the way along from home to the country of set-
tlement. Underestimating the situational and instrumental nature of
ethnicity, these scholars went back to the place of origin of migrants to
find out the main parameters of their social, cultural and ethnic identi-
fications. These analysts took the ‘traditional culture’ of Turkey as
their basis to ascertain the migrants’ social and cultural identities in
their new social milieu. The emphasis is usually placed on the norms,
values and codes that predominate in rural areas of Turkey. Islam, on
the other hand, comes to the fore in these studies as the core of this
‘traditional culture.’ Moreover, this group of scholars approaches the
issue through the lens of an ‘identity’ framework in which identity is
considered stable, fixed, centred and coherent (Abadan-Unat, 1976,
1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987; Mushaben, 1985).
     On the other hand, the syncretic notion of culture claims that mixing
and bricolage are the main characteristics of cultures. In this approach,
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culture does not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in com-
plex, dynamic patterns of syncreticism (Gilroy, 1987: 13); and cultural
identity is considered a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as ‘being’ (Hall,
1989, 1994). It seems more appropriate for this perspective to treat mi-
grant cultures as mixing their new set of tools, which they acquire in
the migration experience, with their previous lives and cultural reper-
toires. The major challenge to the scholars who are bound to the holis-
tic notion of culture comes from those who reject the idea of viewing
ethnic groups as pre-given social units.
     The problematisation of ethnicity and culture of Turkish migrants
in an anti-essentialist perspective is relatively new. The Berliner Insti-
tut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung (BIVS) focuses on the ethnic
group formation processes and shifting boundaries between ethnic
groups (Blaschke, 1983; Schwartz, 1992). Ruth Mandel (1989, 1990,
1996) emphasises the construction of new ethnicities amongst the
Turkish diaspora, and sheds light on the formation of what Avtar Brah
(1996) calls ‘diasporic space’ (gurbet). She considers this space hetero-
geneous, whether articulated as gurbet or as a potential Dar al-Islam
(Land of Islam). Similarly, Thomas Faist (1991, 1995, 2000b) is con-
cerned with the exclusion of Turkish youth from the labour market
and schooling. Herman Tertilt (1996) did a research on the life-worlds
of a Turkish gangsta group located in Frankfurt. Bridging the theories
of sociology and ethnology, and referring to the ‘subculture’ notion of
the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, Tertilt tries to portray the in-
dividual members of the gang, Turkish Power Boys, and the signifi-
cance of parental culture, migration, peer groups, masculinity, drug
2and violence in their expressive culture.
     There are some Turkish scholars and intellectuals who also start off
from the syncretic notion of culture in their interpretation of the cult-
ural formation processes of the Turkish migrants and their descen-
dants. Ayse Çaglar (1994, 1990 and 1998) prefers exploring the cul-
tures and life-worlds of the first generation Turkish migrants in the
context of their own social spaces rather than within a framework en-
capsulated in a reified ethnicity and/or an immutable ‘Turkish culture.’
She denies the conventional holistic notion of culture and considers
the cultural practices of German Turks like any other ‘culture’ in to-
day’s world:
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The product of several interlocking histories and cultural traditions mediated
and transplanted by the media and the host society. The traces of different
cultural traditions and languages are visible in these new forms, created by the
fusion of these distinct traditions, but the emergent forms are reducible to
none of them. Hence, they can neither be explained in relation to a fixed, uni-
tary, and bounded traditional Turkish culture, or within an acculturation
framework. In fact, migration is one of those processes that aggravate the flow
of images and cultural forms bringing about results in surprising combinations
and crossovers of codes and discourses. The emergent cultural forms and prac-
tices of German Turks need to be understood first as products of such process-
es (Çaglar, 1994: 7).
Likewise, Gündüz Vassaf (1982) refuses some conceptualisations,
which are attributed to the children of Turkish migrants in Europe es-
pecially by the Turkish ‘experts’ – concepts like ‘in-betweenness,’ ‘lost
generation’ and ‘split identities.’ Rejecting the treatment of migrants’
children as problematic, he rightly claims that those children have de-
veloped their own cultural space. “This is the new cultural space,” says
Vassaf “which has been recently built up in the West by all the con-
stituent ethnics of Europe such as Austrians, Algerians, Turks, Ger-
mans, Surinamese, Norwegians, Moroccans, Swedes” (1982: 155).
     In the same manner, Feridun Zaimoglu (1995 and 1998) who is a
German-Turk, attempts to conceptualise the way the German-Turkish
youth speaks. He calls this newly emerging language Kanak-Sprak
(kanake language), which forms a ‘creole art.’ Giving examples of this
language, Zaimoglu demonstrates the main characteristics of this lan-
guage: sentences without comma, full stop, capital letter, or any kind
of punctuation, with frequent switches between Turkish and German
– a point which I will touch upon later. All these scholars, whose no-
tion of culture springs from the principle of syncreticism, call attention
to the creative and hybrid aspects of migrants’ practices rather than
seeing them as symptoms of a long list of problems and crises. The
consideration of diasporic cultures in the framework of syncreticism is
linked to the process of globalisation leading to cultural heterogeneity
and bricolage. In what follows, I will demonstrate the link between
globalism, syncreticism and identity.
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Globalism and Syncreticism
Modernity has resulted in ‘cultural flows in space’ loosening up of so-
cial and cultural boundaries, migration, expansion of global culture,
cultural melting-pots known as ‘global cities,’ cultural variety, trans-
culturation, transnationalism, syncreticism and new social movements
(Berman, 1983; Hannerz 1992, 1996; Melucci, 1989; Ålund-Schierup,
1991). All these features and aspects of late-modernity are known as
constituents of the age of globalism. Many scholars in various social,
political and economic fields (cf. inter alia, Robertson, Giddens, Hall,
Appadurai, Hannerz, Brecher et al., Sklair and Robin Cohen) have
3raised globalism as one of the primary conditions of modernity. In
this book, I shall limit my focus to the social impacts of globalisation
and with what Brecher et al. (1993) have called ‘globalisation from be-
low.’ In this sense, globalism indicates, as Roland Robertson (1992: 8)
has posited, ‘the compression of the world and the intensification of
the consciousness of the world as a whole’ by means of communica-
tions and transportation. What comes out of the compression process
of the world as a whole is a global culture, which is unlike convention-
al culture, i. e., timeless, memoryless, contextless and translocal. As
Arjun Appadurai posits that the global culture consists of five signifi-
cant flows moving in non-isomorphic paths:
Ethnoscapes produced by flows of people: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles
and guest workers. Secondly, there are technoscapes, the machinery and plant
flows produced by multinational and national corporations and government
agencies. Thirdly, there are finanscapes, produced by the rapid flows of money
in the currency markets and stock exchanges. Fourthly, there are mediascapes,
the repertoire of images of information, the flows, which are produced and dis-
tributed by newspapers, magazines, television and film. Fifthly, there are ideo-
scapes, linked to flows of images, which are associated with state or counter-
state movement ideologies, which are comprised of elements of freedom, wel-
fare, rights, etc. (1990: 6-7, as paraphrased by Featherstone, Introduction).
With reference to the global cultural flows displayed by Appadurai, an
interest in ‘diaspora’ has been equated with anthropology’s now com-
monplace anti-essentialist and constructivist approach to ethnicity
(Hall, 1994; Clifford, 1994; Hannerz, 1996; Vertovec, 1996b). In this
approach, the fluidity of constructed styles and identities amongst ge-
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neric diasporic communities is particularly emphasised. These con-
temporary studies partly focus on the construction of diasporic youth
cultures that emerge in the crossing of local-global and past-present.
These cultural forms are sometimes called syncretic, creolized, translat-
ed, crossover, cut ‘n’ mix, hybrid or alternate (Vertovec, 1996b: 28).
In this work, I will interchangeably refer to the notions of ‘bricolage,’
‘hybridity’ and ‘creolization’ in order to demonstrate transnational and
transcultural formation and articulation of culture in Turkish diaspora.
I shall briefly clarify these terms.
     Hybridity – etymologically linked to animal husbandry and crop
management – may presuppose the ‘pure’ origin of elements prior to
their hybridisation. As one of the definitions found in Oxford’s En-
glish Dictionary clarifies, a hybrid is ‘an animal or plant that is the off-
spring of individuals of different kinds.’ On the other hand, the ety-
mology of bricolage points to the construction or creation from what-
ever is immediately available for use, as exemplified in The Savage
Mind by Levi-Strauss (1966: 17) to define ‘bricoleur’:
The bricoleur is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, un-
like the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of
raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project.
His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to
make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’ that is to say with a set of tools and mate-
rials, which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains
bears no relation to the current project, but is the contingent result of all the
occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with
the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions.
The process of bricolage involves a ‘science of the concrete’ as op-
posed to our ‘civilised’ science of the ‘abstract’ because the ‘bricoleur’
attaches more importance to the ‘things’ rather than to the ‘thoughts.’
Unlike hybridity, bricolage foregrounds political – rather than nat-
ural – paradigm of articulation and identity. To put it differently, the
notion of bricolage, unlike hybridity, presumes the individual as a so-
cial agent who is capable of making decisions. As far as Turkish hip-
hop youths in Kreuzberg are concerned, the act of bricolage as a con-
scious action of diasporic subject will be readdressed in terms of lin-
gual code-switching, graffiti painting/writing and daily life-worlds in
the following chapters.
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     In the same way, creolization takes place in the process of inter-
change between the cultural centre and periphery (Hannerz, 1989,
1996). Ulf Hannerz uses the term, creolization, to refer to the process
of globalisation, which is what Roland Robertson (1992: 6) calls ‘the
compression of the world into a single place.’ To paraphrase Hannerz
(1996: 12), ‘The third world is in the First World, and the First World
in the Third; the North is in the South, and the South is in the North;
the centre is in the periphery, and the periphery is in the centre.’
Speaking on such a conceptual basis, Hannerz (1996: 153-154) intro-
duces another concept to demonstrate the two-way character of creoli-
zation in the European context: ‘double creolizing.’ Berlin, for in-
stance, is subject to two quite separate forms of creolization processes.
On the one hand, there is the creolization of German national culture
in the form of what Hannerz calls ‘Americanization;’ on the other,
there is that multifaceted creolization process, which involves the
greater majority of immigrants, coming in as labour migrants and
refugees, and mostly having to adopt to German circumstances.
     Creolization was once something that happened to the colonial
others of the world, and now, it happens to a larger world population
by means of global telecommunications systems and global market
forces (Friedman, 1994: 208).
     Although the process of creolization in the age of colonialism was
based on the introduction of ‘high cultures’ and ‘civilisation’ to the
‘uncultured’ and ‘uncivilised’ lands, the new form of creolization is
different from the previous one in the sense that it introduces what
Clifford calls ‘post-culture.’ Clifford (1988: 95) proposes the notion of
‘post-culture’ in his apprehension of a postmodern condition:
In a world with many voices speaking all at once […] where American clothes
made in Korea are worn by young people in Russia, where everyone’s ‘roots’
are in some degree cut […] I evoke this syncretic, ‘postcultural’ situation only to
gesture toward the standpoint (though not so easily spatialised), the condition
of uncertainty from which I am writing.
It is evident that globalism and localism are two simultaneous phe-
nomena of the late modern times. On the one hand, globalisation of
the world in the form of the dominance of global mass media, mass
education, monetary economies, identical clothes, household goods,
ideas, fantasies, books, music and communication networks spreads all
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our identities all over the map (Berman, 1983: 35), and brings about
4deterritorialisation. On the other hand, localisation, in the form of
desperate allegiances to ethnic, national, cultural, religious, class and
sexual groups, is thought to give us a kind of ‘firm’ identity (Berman,
1983: 35). The simultaneous intensive flows of global and local dynam-
ics seem to have an essential influence on the construction of new
identities and cultural forms. Henceforth, the link between globalisa-
tion and new identities will be expounded upon.
Glocalised Identities
The relationship between ‘local’ and ‘global’ has become increasingly
salient in a wide variety of intellectual and practical contexts. The
compression of time and space in the age of globalism has led to the
formation of new identities. These identities have been grounded on
the paramount antithetical forces of ‘local’ and ‘global,’ or on what
Featherstone (1990) calls ‘glocal’ (global and local). It is evident that
the increase in knowledge and interaction between the social and indi-
vidual agents through the modern means of communication and trans-
portation have awakened individuals, minorities and nations to differ-
ences, and repositioned them in a new social setting. As Hall (1991a:
21) rightly emphasises, “when you know what everybody else is, then
you are what they are not.” In other words, intense contact with new
social and political environments, confrontation with personalities of
various ethnic and national backgrounds in the age of global capital-
ism, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation deepen local and particu-
laristic responses as well as giving the individual, groups or nations a
global perspective. Accordingly, this ‘glocal’ condition creates new
perceptions of identity, and changes the world of meanings and sym-
bols of the respective units (Featherstone, 1990: 14).
     Before describing the particular aspects of this ‘glocal’ condition, let
me briefly outline the principal dynamics of the question of identity
and ethnicity. Our identity, be it individual, political, communal, eth-
nic or national, is shaped by recognition, non-recognition or mis-rec-
ognition of the ‘others’ (Taylor, 1994: 25). The genesis of the human
mind develops in a dialogical sense, not in a monological sense. We can
construct our identities only if we are able to experience others’ reac-
tions to our attitudes and behaviour. Unless we are defined by others,
we cannot represent ourselves. Thus, it is impossible to build an iden-
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tity without a dialogue with the ‘other.’ Here, ‘the other,’ as Baudril-
lard (1973: 174) states, is what allows us not to repeat ourselves forev-
er.
     Considering the perpetual encounters with the constitutive ‘others,’
identities, as Stuart Hall (1991b: 47) stated, “are never completed,
never finished; they are always in process of formation.” If we go fur-
ther, we can argue that the condition of existence of every identity is
the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an ‘other’ that is
going to play the role of a ‘constitutive outside.’ Likewise, the con-
struction of ethnic identity follows a similar path. Fredrik Barth (1969,
1994) has convincingly articulated the notion of ethnicity as mutable,
arguing that ethnicity is the product of social ascriptions, a kind of la-
belling process engaged in by oneself and others. In the Barthian ap-
proach, ethnic identity is regarded as a feature of social organisation,
rather than a nebulous expression of culture. Thus, one’s ethnic identi-
ty is a composite of the view one has of oneself as well as the views
held by others about one’s ethnic identity. To put it differently, ethnic
identity is the product of a dialogical and dialectical process involving
internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s
self-identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations – i. e. what you
think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is (Na-
gel, 1994: 154). Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are explicitly
socially constructed in relation to the ‘Other.’
     The advent of global capitalism, transnationalism and urbanisation
has brought about a radical demographic change all over the world.
Such an intensive demographic change that has accelerated after the
World War II has, in fact, led to a kind of reverse invasion of the colo-
nial-capitalist centre by its periphery. As Kevin Robins (1991: 25) put
it “the periphery infiltrated the colonial core” in terms of culture, reli-
gion, language and ethnicity:
[…] In a process of unequal cultural encounter, ‘foreign’ populations have been
compelled to be the subjects and subalterns of Western Empire, while no less
significantly, the west has come face to face with the ‘alien’ and ‘exotic’ culture
of its ‘Other.’ Globalization, as it dissolves the barriers of distance, makes the
encounter of colonial center and colonised periphery immediate and intense.
Since no group can now claim explicit superiority, each group can em-
phasise its own language, religion, and culture (ibid.: 170). Accor-
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dingly, ethnicity could openly and proudly be represented, vocalised
and politicised. In this sense, the subjects of the age of globalism – in
this case transnational communities – have constructed ‘new ethnici-
ties’ as their new social identities. These new ethnicised social identi-
ties have become the principal characteristic of the modern ‘glocal’
condition. This ‘glocal’ condition, as Alexandra Ålund (1995) accu-
rately has stated, is characterised by a parallelism between centrifugal
and centripetal forces where processes of transnational compression
are accompanied by processes of fragmentation.
     The coexistence of the global and local in the form of ‘glocal’ results
in the devaluation of authenticity, thus in the acceleration of the proc-
esses of cultural bricolage. This century has been mainly characterised
by a drastic expansion of mobility, including tourism, migrant labour,
immigration, modern diasporas, and urban sprawl. The cities all over
the world have become stages on which heterogeneous populations
interact with each other (Clifford, 1988: 13-14). Thus, the cultural au-
thenticity partly ends in the urban world where different cultural bag-
gages intermingle and become subject to bricolage. People belonging
to such cultures of bricolage have had to ‘translate’ themselves to the
newly emerging urban-global culture, and have had to live with more
5than one identity (Hall, 1993: 310). Asad is an eloquent exponent of
this state of cultural bricolage, or of what he calls mélange:
In the vision of a fractured, fluid world, all human beings live in the same cult-
ural predicament […]. Everyone is dislocated; no one is rooted. Because there is
no such thing as authenticity, borrowing and copying do not signify a lack
(Asad, 1993: 9-10).
In a sense, authenticity is replaced with cultural bricolage in the era of
late-modernity because the growing trend of ‘global homogenisation’
no longer allows national-cultural islands to exist. Thus, ‘glocalised’
identities are brought into open by the concomitant dynamics of lo-
cal/global, traditional/translational and past/future.
     Ethnic minority youth cultures are also subject to these processes
of globalism and localism. In what follows, I will summarise the previ-
ous schools working on the youth cultures under the designation of
‘subcultural theory’ in order to see the differences of the contempo-
rary minority youth cultures from the earlier ones. Thereafter, con-
temporary hip-hop youth culture will be briefly outlined to display
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the insufficiency of the subcultural theory in investigating the global-
local youth cultures, and to expose the impact of global streams on
local cultural forms.
Subcultural Theory
The concept of ‘subculture’ often refers to separateness by highlight-
ing cultural contrast in terms of cultural clashes. The notion of ‘sub-
culture’ was traditionally used as a convenient label to define some
groups of people, who had something in common with each other and
had a different way of life from the members of other social groups.
The concept has its origins in research on American society. In the late
1940s, it came to be linked to the sociology of deviance. Studies of
subculture, as I shall briefly touch upon in a while, pictured common
people not only as highly differentiated, but as active and creative.
Subcultures have usually been considered to be opposed to both the
‘public’ and the ‘masses.’ While the ‘public’ has been conceived as a
body of rational individuals, responsible citizens who are able to form
their own opinion and express it through officially recognised demo-
cratic channels, the ‘mass’ has often been portrayed as undifferentiat-
ed, irrational and politically manipulated.
     The Chicago School of sociology, in which the tradition of subcul-
tural studies has its roots, was interested in exploring the diversity of
human behaviour in the American city. The notion of a mass society,
on the other hand, was developed by critical theorists working in an
entirely different scholarly tradition at the Frankfurt School (which
was relocated at Columbia University in New York during the Second
World War). These two academic legacies are to some extent fused in
the subcultural studies in the Birmingham tradition of the 1970s,
which focused on the relations between subcultures and media, com-
merce and mass culture.
     The Chicago School of sociology concentrated on the investigation
of human behaviour in an urban environment. Robert E. Park et al.
(1925) portrayed the changing face of the modern city in relation to
the division of labour, money, transportation, communication and so-
cial mobility. The subsequent members of the School dealt with the
existing consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation. Cressey
(1932) touched upon the social mobility of woman migrants; Milton
M. Gordon (1947) studied the children of migrant ethnic groups; and
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Howard Becker (1997/1963) worked with the jazz musicians as anoth-
er form of deviant ‘subculture.’ During the 1960s the perspective on
society’s various ‘subcultures’ began to shift from the negative notion
of ‘deviation’ to the positive notion of ‘cultural multitude,’ as exhibit-
ed by Becker (ibid.) in explaining the cultural productivity of the ‘de-
viant’ jazz musicians. Jock Young (1971), influenced by both the
Frankfurt School’s Marxist visions of a mass society and the Chicago
School’s liberal-pluralist studies of ‘subcultures,’ alternately consid-
ered ‘subcultures’ resistant and subordinate, politically hopeful and
6spectacularly impotent. Young’s main contribution to the theory of
‘subcultures’ was the way he defined ‘leisure’: leisure is purportedly
non-alienated activity, which is undertaken by individual to win per-
sonal space. In fact, Jock Young’s work acts as a bridge between the
distinct theoretical and political agendas of the work associated with
the Chicago School and those of the later Birmingham School.
     The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham
University (CCCS) was established in 1964, and profoundly shaped
the theories of ‘subculture’ for the next two decades. Researchers tur-
ned their attention precisely to the category of ‘youth.’ Their analyses
were influenced by the work of a number of British Marxist critiques –
Raymond Williams, T. H. Thomson and Richard Hoggart, but also by
continental theorists such as Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci and
Roland Barthes. The primary aim of the Birmingham theorists was to
locate youth subcultures in relation to three broader cultural struc-
tures, the working class or ‘parent culture,’ ‘dominant’ culture, and
mass culture. Analysts at the CCCS emphasised the expressive culture
of youth that is subject to the market forces. Culture of the post war
youth was shaped by the affluence of the consumer market, the rise of
mass culture, mass communication, telecommunication, education fa-
cilities, and the arrival of the whole range of distinctive styles in dress
and rock-music (Clarke et al., 1975).
     The analysts at the Birmingham School defined ‘subcultures’ as
‘subsets – smaller, mere localised and differentiated structures within
one of the larger cultural networks’ (Clarke et al., 1975: 13). Subcul-
ture is both distinct from, and overlaps with, the culture of which it is
a part. The school always dealt with working-class youth ‘subcultur-
es;’ and their subcultural status was linked to their class subordination.
Changes in leisure activities as well as commercialism fostered a ‘ge-
nerational consciousness’ for working-class youth in a way that unbal-
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anced their class- and family-based identity. ‘Generational conscious-
ness’ is likely to be strong among those youngsters who are upwardly
and outwardly mobile. It involves that young persons value the ‘dom-
inant’ culture, and sacrifice the ‘parent’ culture (Clarke et al., 1975:
51). Working-class youth, having generational consciousness, affirm
the ‘dominant culture’ while protesting it. In this sense, the theorists
sharply differentiate working-class youth cultures from middle-class
ones. Middle-class cultures – such as the hippie movement, student
protests and drop-out ‘subcultures’ – attempt to transform the domi-
nant culture as in new patterns of living, of family life, or work, be-
cause they spring from the social space of the dominant culture, which
shapes the structure. The working-class youth cultures, on the other
hand, affirm the dominant culture while they criticise the ‘parent’ cul-
ture from which they originate.
     The key aspect of the agenda for the CCCS was a kind of symptom
of class-in-decline. The main hypothesis was: when working-class
communities have been undergoing change and displacement, and
when the ‘parent’ culture is no longer cohesive, working-class youth
responds by becoming ‘subcultural.’ Phil Cohen (1972) claimed that
youth attempts to replace a lost sense of working-class ‘community’
with subcultural ‘territory’ – a shift which is symptomatic of the relo-
cation of youthful expression to the field of leisure rather than work.
In his work, where he explained the post war British youth living in
the East End of London, Cohen (1972: 26) defines ‘subculture’ as:
A compromise solution to two contradictory needs: the need to create and ex-
press autonomy and difference from parents and, by extension, their culture
and the need to maintain the security of existing ego defences and the parental
identifications which support them.
Although they may win space, ‘subcultures,’ thus, play an essentially
conservative role. Their conservative role is furthermore strengthened
because they fail to bring about a major structural change and fail to
provide the youth with career prospects. Subsequently, John Clarke,
Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, in their theoretical in-
troduction to Resistance Through Rituals (1975), carried the notion of
‘subcultures’ further, acknowledging the increasing role of ‘affluence’
and leisure in youth activity while insisting on youth’s continuing lo-
cation in class-based categories. To explain this dynamic relation be-
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tween leisure and class, they returned to Antonio Gramsci, drawing on
his notion of hegemony – a term that describes the means by which
the ruling classes secure their authority over subordinate classes, not
by coercion but by obtaining the latter’s consent. This is done through
on-going processes of negotiation and regulation between ruling and
subaltern classes. The subaltern classes operate by winning space back
and issuing challenges. The working-class ‘subcultures,’ thus, consis-
tently win space from the dominant culture (Clarke et al., 1975: 42).
Clarke et al., thus, emphasise ‘resistance’ more than Cohen, giving
subcultures a more creative kind of agency. Yet, these analysts agree
with Cohen’s narrative of failure in a wider context: working-class
youth’s ‘resistance’ is acted out in the ‘limited’ field of leisure, rather
than in the work place.
     In contrast to most of the researchers at the CCCS, Angela
McRobbie (1991/1978) has offered a very different perspective on
youth subcultures, looking at the way subcultural analysis had tended
more or less to equate subcultural youth with boys and to ignore the
role of girls altogether. Dick Hebdige, on the other hand, reshaped the
main focus of the school. His spectacular work, Subculture: The
Meaning of Style (1979) offers a genealogy that is less bound up with
class than the other researchers at the CCCS. Indeed, in his book pri-
ority is given to ethnicity rather than class. Subcultural style is always
culturally syncretic – for instance Ska borrows from both reggae and
the Caribbean traditions. To explain this syncretic process, he borrow-
ed Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of bricolage – a term that I shall also
very often cite in my work. Hebdige saw punks as bricoleurs par excel-
lence, using dislocation as a form of ‘refusal.’
     The legacy of the CCCS was also seen in the subsequent works of
Stuart Hall (1988, 1991, 1992, 1997) and Paul Gilroy (1987, 1993, and
1995). My theoretical framework is partly indebted to the works of
both the Chicago and Birmingham theorists. Yet, in my work I seek to
go beyond the approach of subcultural theory. As Chris Waters (1981)
argued, subcultural theory seems to reify separate homogenous and
oppositional cultural groups and regards ‘cultures’ as static entities. As
pointed out before, from my point of view there are no static entities
called ‘cultures,’ there are, instead, ‘constitutive social processes, creat-
ing specific and distinctive ways of life’ (Williams, 1977: 19). Fur-
thermore, subcultural theory does not seem to be applicable for the
study of contemporary minority youth cultures, which are, to a high
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degree, subject to transnational streams. Minority youth cultures such
as hip-hop are based on a bricolage of styles, discourses, signs, sym-
bols, meanings and myths that travel throughout the world. They
emerge in a time of impurity and blending. The term subculture is in-
sufficient to explore cultural forms of minority youth, whose identity
formation processes are subject to a more complex set of dynamics
rather than that of majority youth. Subsequently, I will explore the
major landmarks of the formation of one of the minority youth cul-
tures, i. e., hip-hop. Hip-Hop youth culture will be scrutinised in line
with its origins and its impact on a remarkable number of working-
class Berlin-Turkish youths that have been practising structural outsi-
derism.
Outsiderism: Ethnic Minority Hip-Hop Youth Culture
Today, youngsters live in a time of crisis, a time of exceptional damage
and danger. Since the 1970s, deindustrialisation, post-Fordism, con-
sumerism, economic restructuring and resurgence of racism and xeno-
phobia have created fundamentally new realities for young people.
Our discussions of minority youth cultures are incomplete if we fail to
locate them within the racialised and ethnicisized social crisis of our
time; but our understanding of that crisis is also incomplete if we can-
not distance ourselves from the nostalgia of 1960s and if we fail to un-
derstand what young people are trying to express through their dance,
dress, speech and visual imagery (Lipsitz, 1994: 18).
     Unwanted as workers, underfunded as students, undermined as cit-
izens, and wanted only by the police and the courts, minority youth
recently seem to be subject to a state of structural outsiderism. Struc-
tural outsiderism can create minority youth cultures that offer the
youngsters an identity and a sense of belonging in a harsh world.
Modern cities tend to be fragmented into patchwork diasporic home-
lands such as Kreuzberg, Southall and Rinkeby. Despite the cultural
stigma surrounding them, such minority youth cultures and diasporic
homelands offer intimacy and security. It is the feeling of being subor-
dinate outsiders that creates toughness, gangs and rap groups within
ethnic minority youth as a form of reaction. Protest and opposition
are simultaneously created in these occasions. The formation of gangs,
rap groups, conflict, symbolic disputes and violence reflects the new
poverty, civil insecurity and homelessness in society. The cultural
48
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S.  31- 54) T01_02 Chapter 1.p 297863215586
Culture, Youth Culture, Ethnicity & Globalisation
markers of protest and opposition are frequently cosmopolitan in na-
ture. Global hip-hop youth culture, which is inspired by the Bronx,
Harlem and the NBA (National Basketball League), is an instance of
such cosmopolitan minority youth cultures. Hip-Hop trousers, Rasta
hair, new linguistic expressions with a strong black-American accent,
and a permanent ‘cool’ posture “are scattered around the symbolically
loaded ‘dramaturgy’ to provide roots but also to build barriers”
against the life-worlds of dominant ethnic majority and migrant par-
ents (Ålund, 1996: 27). These cultural markers serve to unite divided
young people in one life style that symbolises protest and counter-
culture. They attempt to create space for themselves by their peculiar
music sound, noisy cars, expanding graffiti boundaries, rebellious
dressing style, and symbols. All these cultural markers urge the
youngsters to form an alternative family network in the street and
youth centres. These relations formed in opposition to the outside
world give potency to the youths to form a peculiar diasporic cultural
identity on the parameters of ‘authenticity,’ transculturalism and
transnationalism.
     In Berlin, as in many other big cities of Western Europe, new cul-
tures transcending frontiers, cultural amalgamations and transethnic
urban social movements have taken successive forms. Kreuzberg is il-
lustrative in this sense. Young people, in general, are socially conscious
and critical of the increasing discrimination, segregation, exclusion and
racism in society. Consciousness of a shared position of subordination
in society is expressed via the words of rap music, graffiti on the city
walls, paintings and drawings in a way that branches out into new and
growing social movements against racism and enforced ethnic bounda-
ries. These new syncretic forms of expressive minority youth cultures
expose a social movement of urban youth that already has a distinct
political ideology. Gilroy (1987) defines this movement in the British
context as an utopian extension of the boundaries of politics, a power-
ful cultural formation, and an alternative public sphere which may
offer a significant alternative to the misery of hard drugs and the radi-
cal powerlessness of inner urban life.
     Hip-Hop youth culture, which is an amalgamation of rap, break-
dance and graffiti, was first created throughout the 1970s by predomi-
nantly black and Latino dancers, musicians and graffiti artists in New
York. Rap as a musical form started to appear on recordings from the
late 1970s and drew on the Caribbean vocalising associated with Ja-
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maican sound systems, African rhythm and blues and soul styles.
These were later connected to fragments of Euro-disco music. Rap was
created out of a series of musical exchanges across the Atlantic, forged
together with the techniques of scratching and mixing, using turnta-
bles, mixers and drum machines. It was formed initially out of specific
conditions within the Bronx area of New York City. Following blues,
jazz and reggae, the ghetto became central to the emergence of rap.
Unlike reggae artists, who were responding to the experience of immi-
gration, rap in the USA was formed out of the experience of urban
segregation. Rap, thus, emerges as the cultural form of resistance
against social exclusion in the age of deindustrialisation. In other
words, rap has become the music of the tense present for those who do
not have a past to celebrate or a future to rely on.
     Two different rap schools dominate the American rap scene: West
Coast and East Coast. The East Coast rap refers to the non-commer-
cial rap made in New York by the emergent artists, many of whom are
women, Chicano, Korean and Samoan. The orientation of the lyrics is
more significant than the rhythm and melody; and what is crucial is
the message and the narrative of the artists. Contrarily, the West Coast
rap is more commercial; and rhythm is more important than lyrics.
Some scholars, in their exploration of hip-hop youth culture in the
USA, neglect the East Coast rap tradition due to the focus on a very
partial and commercial L. A. pop-rap scene (Brennan, 1994; Cross,
1993). Afrika Bambaataa, DJ Kool Herc and Grandmaster Flash are
some examples of the East Coast rap. Ice-T, Tone Loc, Ice Cube and
Easy-E are the examples of the West Coast rap.
     New York City is the source of the global hip-hop youth culture.
Just before the gangs of the Bronx disintegrated in the summer of
1972, there had been an explosion of writing on the walls of the Bronx.
Early pioneers included Taki, Super Kool and Lee. This was the be-
ginning of the social practice we now know as graffiti. There had al-
ways been writing on walls, but the figurative and written type of graf-
fiti of the dispossessed black and Chicano youth created a new form of
art in the Bronx. In 1973 Kool Herc began to formulate what later be-
came known as hip-hop by playing James Brown, doing shout-outs
from the microphone, and screaming ‘Rock the house.’ He called his
dancers B-boys. These ‘break’ (B-) dancers battled on the floor to see
who could bust the most outrageous moves. They would dance solo or
in crews. Breaking advanced very quickly into an astonishing combi-
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nation of gymnastics, jazz and kung fu moves all held together by a
pacing to the beat that marked out the territory of the breaker.
Grandmaster Flash and Afrika Bambaataa who were in competition
with Kool Herc also made major contributions to the hip-hop culture
(Cross, 1993).
     In the early 1980s, the intervention of Hollywood transformed the
local Black & Hispanic American hip-hop youth culture into a global
youth culture. The movies such as Flashdance, Breakin,’ Wild Style
and Breakin and Entering brought the new dance to the world. Ac-
cordingly, the meaning of the black and Chicano origin hip-hop youth
culture was stripped away by means of mass media, modern technolo-
gy and the entertainment / music industry. Although a great size of
world youth population was attracted by this new youth culture, it
was the minority youths that were largely fascinated by the message
and content of the hip-hop culture. This new cultural form was attrac-
tive for the working-class ethnic minority youths that have been sub-
ject to structural outsiderism, exclusion, segregation, racism and xeno-
phobia in their countries of settlement, because it was providing them
with a great opportunity to articulate their social and cultural identi-
ties. Rap turned out to be an efficient informal way of articulation of
identity for the ethnic minority youths in an environment where they
could not express themselves formally through media.
     As an exceptional global youth culture that emerged through con-
temporary transnational means of communications with a particularist
local focus, hip-hop has also introduced an opportunity to the ethnic
minority youths in the West to express their ethnicity and ‘authentic’
(parental) cultures (Ålund and Schierup, 1991; Ålund, 1996; Sansone,
1995). The daily life of the descendants of migrants depends very
much on the management of ethnicity. Their ethnicity implies a great
deal of self-reliance, skills in the presentation of self in different cir-
cumstances and a degree of integration in, and familiarity with, Ger-
man majority society. In fact, their use of traditions requires both de-
tachments from the parental culture and a particular form of ethnic al-
legiance. Through the agency of hip-hop and the rap lyrics, Berlin-
Turkish youths, for instance, are capable of celebrating their Turkish-
ness and diasporic positionings, as I shall specifically explain in the
coming chapters.
     Since the rappers are the major producers of the hip-hop culture,
they seem to have a great impact on the construction of cultural identi-
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ty of the minority youths. As ‘organic intellectuals’ and ‘contempo-
rary minstrels’ of their own ethnic communities, they can transform
‘common-sense’ knowledge of oppression into a new critical aware-
ness that is attentive to ethnic, class and sexual contradictions (Decker,
1992: 80; Negus, 1996: 105-113). As I shall later point out in drawing
up the framework of the deployment of the parental culture, the Turk-
ish rappers in Berlin also verbalise a ‘double diasporic consciousness.’
The working-class youth groups I worked with were highly attracted
by Turkish arabesk music and hip-hop. Arabesk is a hybrid form of
urban music, which appeared in Turkey in the late sixties as a reflec-
tion of their parents’ first experience of immigration in the homeland.
It narrates and musicalises the troublesome experience of dislocation,
dispersion and longing for home. Hip-Hop, contrarily, reflects the ex-
periences of migration and urban segregation in the diaspora. On that
account, as arabesk music taste manifesting the continuation of paren-
tal culture represents one side of the ‘double diasporic consciousness’
of these youngsters, hip-hop represents the other side (see Chapter 6).
     The study of modern diasporic consciousness has recently become
a crucial aspect within the field of cultural and ethnic studies. In this
work, I perceive the diaspora communities becoming more active, ra-
tional social agents making decisions, developing ethnic strategies and
transnational networks to survive and to maximise their gains in their
country of settlement. The Turkish diaspora in Western Europe, par-
ticularly in Germany, constitutes an illustrative sample in terms of the
processes of identity and ethnic strategy formation of the modern di-
aspora communities. It is evident that the Turkish diaspora in West
Europe with its three million members constitutes a transmigratory
feature by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. The
Turkish diaspora can no longer be exclusively defined as the foreign
workers who have been driven away from their homeland as a necessi-
ty of the global capitalism; rather they should be seen as having be-
come political and social actors in their new countries of residence.
*  *  *
To recapitulate, this chapter has been primarily concerned with the re-
definition of notions of culture and minority youth culture. It was
stated that there have been two dominant understandings of culture:
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holistic and syncretic. While the holistic notion of culture perceives
transnational migrants and their descendants as ‘victims of displace-
ment,’ conversely the syncretic notion sees them as ‘bricoleurs’ and ac-
tive social agents. Subsequently, it was expounded that the study of
ethnic minority youth cultures should consist of the analysis of global
cultural flows, which shape the identity formation processes of the
displaced individuals. Accordingly, the question of identity has been
outlined as a matter of politics and process, but not of essence and in-
heritance.
     This chapter has also explored the theories of youth culture and
‘subculture,’ which were put forward by the Chicago School of soci-
ology and CCCS at Birmingham University. This chapter has claimed
that these two schools, which have studied youth cultures through the
notions of ‘deviation’ (by the Chicago theorists), class parameters and
generational conflict (by the Birmingham theorists), have serious pit-
falls. The theories of ‘subcultures’ have been found insufficient to
study ethnic minority youth cultures. This is why my work attempts
to go beyond the limits of these theories, combining the concepts of
ethnicity, cultural bricolage, globalism and diasporic consciousness.
To do so, Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth culture will be thoroughly
explored in the following chapters.
     It is evident that the immigrants and their descendants take actions,
make decisions, form political, religious, ethnic organisations, consti-
tute discourses, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in
networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to both
their country of origin and settlement. Accordingly, in the next chap-
ter I shall scrutinise the political participation strategies employed by
the Turkish population in Berlin since the beginning of the migratory
process in the 1960s. The mapping-out of these strategies will be re-
flecting on all of the Turkish communities in order to be able to locate
the working-class minority youth culture within a broader framework.
In this context, I will also suggest the notion of ‘diasporic youth’ as
an alternative term to those problematic conceptualisations on Tur-
kish-origin youth in Germany such as ‘immigrant youth’ and ‘foreign
youth.’
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Notes
1 This is a process that was undertaken somewhat earlier in the
United Kingdom. For further information, see Clarke et al. (1975)
and Hebdige (1979).
2 Although Faist (1991) has a Barthian perspective, he paradoxically
refers to the ‘second generation’ Turks as migrants. Similarly,
Thomas Tertilt (1996) also has the same tendency to place the chil-
dren of immigrants in the category of migrants.
3 For a very brief summary of the various theories of globalisation,
see Leslie Sklair (1993: 7-10) where he classifies the theories of
globalism in three types: (a) world-system-model by Immanuel
Wallerstein; (b) globalisation of culture model by Theory, Culture
and Society group (TCS); and (c) global system model by himself.
4 Deterritorialization is one of the main parameters of the modern
world, which implies the transparency of territories for some trans-
national actors such as modern diasporas, transnational corpora-
tions, money, and global communications networks (Appadurai,
1990: 295-310; Friedman, 1994: 210).
5 Although all cultures without any exception are subject to a bri-
colage quality, the juxtapositions of elements and practices in
transnational migrant cultures are more drastic than those in rela-
tively more established cultures.
6 In his work Young (1971: 134) concludes that ‘it was not the drug
per se, but the reason why the drug was taken determined whether
there would be an adverse social reaction to its consumption. The
crucial yardstick in this respect is the ethos of productivity [a point
which I will return in the coming sections]. If a drug either stepped
up work efficiency or aided relaxation after work it was approved
of; if it was used for purely hedonistic ends it was condemned.’
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Chapter 2
Constructing Modern Diasporas
This chapter sets out to provide us with a theoretical context to under-
stand the way in which the diasporic identity is constructed and artic-
ulated by the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. In doing so, my aim is
not to reinscribe the ideology of cultural difference by locating the
descendants of Turkish migrants as Berlin-Turks in a continuous space
between Germany and Turkey. Neither am I attempting to exoticise
these youths in their cultural space by pinning their identity on a kind
of essence. What I want to do is to demonstrate that the whole ques-
tion of identity is a matter of politics and process rather than of inher-
itance. In order to reveal a fuller view of the diasporic consciousness
displayed by the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth, I shall
explore the nature of ethnicity as an expression of collective identity
within the Berlin-Turkish population. Therefore, I will firstly examine
how the Berlin-Turkish population has historically employed ethnici-
ty as a survival strategy during the process of negotiation with majori-
ty society. Secondly, I will scrutinise the notion of diaspora under the
guidance of contemporary scholars who offer various interpretations
of the concept. Finally, I will contemplate the cultural identity of the
Berlin-Turkish youths in the light of, and in relation to, the notion of
diaspora.
The Changing Face of Ethnic Group Political Strategies
Contemporary labour-ethnic minorities in Europe can no longer be
simply considered temporary migrant communities who live with the
‘myth of return’ or the passive victims of global capitalism. They have
rather become permanent sojourners, active social agents and deci-
sion-makers in their destination countries. The strategies and organisa-
tions developed by the migrants and their descendants in their coun-
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tries of settlement may spring from various material and political
sources. These sources are namely the racial and exclusionary immi-
gration policies of the country of settlement, the repressive political
regime of their country of origin, their homeland’s relations with other
countries, the changing streams in world politics, inter-diaspora-rela-
tions and class interests. These factors, which are strengthened by
global interconnectedness, have recently become the main determi-
nants of the politics of identity undertaken by ethnic minorities in the
West.
     As these factors are applied to the Berlin-Turks, it becomes appar-
ent that both internal and external factors have impelled them to con-
struct some ethnic-based political participation strategies and identi-
ties. There is enough evidence that Turkish labour migrants in Europe
have developed two various political participation strategies depending
on the nature of problems they have encountered in time: a migrant
strategy and a minority strategy. Both strategies have been principally
formed along ethnic lines due to the institutional and political context
of Germany since the first recruitment treaty in 1961.
     In what follows, after a brief history of recruitment and migratory
process in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), I shall examine
how these political strategies have been constructed and articulated by
the Berlin-Turkish migrants along ethnic lines. Subsequently, I shall
introduce the notion of diasporic identity as a form of ethnic con-
sciousness, which is peculiar to the working-class Turkish hip-hop
youth in Berlin.
The Migratory Process
Migration into post war Germany started as labour recruitment to
mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the
FRG concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean
countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey
(1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and
Yugoslavia (1968). The German Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit – BA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned.
Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BA and pay a fee. The
BA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them
1medical check-ups and screened police and political records. Mi-
grants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, later by
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all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual
jobs (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were de-
signed to solve immediate labour shortages in Germany by recruiting
workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Cas-
tles et al., 1984). The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700
in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 (Table 1).
Table 1: Germany’s Non-German Population and Turkish Minority
Year Non-German Population   % Turkish Minority   %
1961 686,200          1.2 6,700          1.0 
1970 2,600,600          4.3 249,400          16.5 
1973 3,966,200          6.4 605,000          15.2 
1977 3,948,300          6.4 508,000          12.9 
1987 4,240,500          6.9 1,453,700          34.3 
1989 4,845,900          7.7 1,612,600          33.3 
a1990 5,342,500          8.4 1,675,900          32.0 
b1991 5,882,300          7.3 1,779,600          30.3 
1992 6,495,800          8.0 1,854,900          28.6 
1993 6,878,100          8.5 1,918,400          27.9 
1994 6,990,510          8.6 1,965,577          28.1 
a) Data from 1961-1990 for the ‘old’ Länder;
b) Data from 1991 for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Länder.
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
1992, 1994, and 1995
In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly
men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in
comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from
the economically more developed regions of the country (Abadan-
Unat, 1976; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; Martin, 1991). The
ratio of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2 percent. In the second
half of the 1960s, recruitment consisted of rural workers (Gökdere,
1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since
the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labour, it
was conversely the women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964.
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Turkish workers who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from
the eastern provinces and from economically less-developed regions of
Turkey.
     As shown in the Table 1, there has been a continual increase in the
non-German population through the post-war-period. The exceptions
are the figures for 1977, which can be explained because the entry of
non-European Community workers was banned in November 1973
by the German government due to the oil crisis, the consequent
economic stagnation and political considerations. Since 1973, the
composition of the Turkish migrant population has tended to become
a more general population migration in the form of family reunifica-
tion and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration.
The Formation of Ethnic-Based Political Strategies
Der Spiegel (14 April 1997), a prominent liberal weekly magazine,
denounced the ‘foreigners’ in the country as ‘dangerously alien’ and as
the cause of the failure of the ‘multicultural society.’ In the magazine,
Turkish youths in Germany were presented as ‘criminals,’ ‘fundamen-
talists,’ ‘nationalist’ and ‘traumatic.’ A similar trend to the media cov-
erage of the Turks in Germany has also recently been exhibited in the
academia. Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1997), who was referred to in the Der
Spiegel article, has become a polemical name after the publication of
his book on the German-Turkish youth, Verlockender Fundamenta-
lismus (Enticing Fundamentalism). In his book, he concluded that it is
the Turks who are not tempted to integrate and to incorporate them-
selves into the system. His main criterion in declaring the self-isola-
tionist tendency of the Turkish-origin youths was their contentment to
live with Islam and Turkishness. What was missing in both works was
the underestimation of the structural constraints of Germany, which
has remarkably shaped the survival strategies of migrants and their
descendants. Such an approach, which does not consider the impact of
the institutional structure of the receiving country on immigrant
political mobilisation, is quite essentialist and exclusionist.
     Why do migrants withdraw from ‘host-society’ political life?
Patrick R. Ireland (1994) has drawn our attention to the legal condi-
tions and political institutions of the receiving counties in mapping out
the nature of immigrant political mobilisation. He has stated that
“certain immigrant communities have withdrawn voluntarily from
58
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S.  55- 85) T01_03 Chapter 2.p 297863215602
Constructing Modern Diasporas
host-society political life in the face of institutional indifference and
hostility” (1994: 8). Ireland has formulated the ‘institutional channel-
ing theory’ as an alternative to the class and race/ethnicity theories to
understand immigrant political strategies. Accordingly, he claims that
the reason behind migrant groups’ organising themselves politically
along ethnic lines is primarily because ‘host-society’ institutions have
nurtured ethnicity through their policies and practices. Similarly,
Turkish migrants have hitherto organised themselves politically in
Germany along ethnic lines because the institutional context in which
they have been has primarily made them to do so.
     The primary constituent of the German institutional context to
which the immigrants are subject, is the laws of citizenship which
frame the legal status of minorities. The Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), recognises two
categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all
individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression, liberty of
person, and freedom of conscience (Art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). Reserved rights
are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable as-
sembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of
occupation (Art. 8, 9, 11 and 12). The Basic Law does not prescribe
how citizenship is recognised or conferred, but the criteria are based
first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the ac-
quisition of citizenship are defined by the Basic Law Article 116, the
preamble to the Basic Law, and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizen-
ship Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz), and provide that
2citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child. Article 116 of
the Basic Law reads as follows:
(1) A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless otherwise
regulated by law, is a person who possesses German citizenship, or who has
been received in the territory of the German Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a
refugee or expellee of German stock or as the spouse or descendant of such a
person.
(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945,
were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and
their descendants, shall be granted citizenship on application.
The Imperial Naturalisation Law of 1913 was designed to make the
acquisition of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that
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the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the East, especially
Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers
to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from outside the
Reich (Brubaker, 1992: 114-119; Klusmeyer, 1993: 84; Marshall, 1992).
     The claim to naturalisation has always been difficult for the non-
EU ‘foreigners’ in the FRG, and has required repudiation of the
citizenship of the country of origin. The non-EU ‘foreigners’ are
denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born
and raised in Germany could not automatically receive the rights of
3citizenship. The ‘foreigners’ who are willing to renounce their
previous citizenship can be naturalised only after they have been living
in Germany for at least fifteen years. In contrast, the Volksdeutschen
(ethnic Germans defined by the Article 116 of the Basic Law) – pri-
marily Poles and Russians who can improve German ancestry – have a
constitutional right to naturalisation.
     However, the German government recently established two mech-
anisms that, for the first time, provide migrants with the right to claim
citizenship. According to the new Ausländergesetz (1991) and the
Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrens-, ausländer- und staatsangehö-
rigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften (1993), two groups of Ausländer have
been legally entitled to naturalisation (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the
Ausländergesetz). Paragraph 85 declares that ‘foreigners’ between the
ages of 16 and 23, who have been resident in Germany for more than
eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and
who have not been convicted of serious offences, have the right to be
naturalised. On the other hand, paragraph 86 introduces that those
‘migrants,’ who have been resident in Germany for at least 15 years
and possess a residence permit, have the right to naturalisation. The
absence of a conviction of a serious criminal offence and financial
independence of the applicant are also primarily crucial for the acqui-
4sition of citizenship according to this paragraph. Besides, the new
stcitizenship law, which was put into force since the 1 of January 2000,
makes it possible for the children of immigrants to acquire dual citi-
zenship up until the age of 23. The age of 23 is the threshold for the
5youngsters to decide on either German or Turkish citizenship.
     Non-European Union immigrants, or resident aliens, mostly have
been given what Marshall (1950) defined as social and civil rights, but
not political rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence
in Germany where their political participation in the system was not
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legally allowed. The legal barriers denying political participation pro-
vided a ground for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organise
themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a response to the
German insistence on the exclusionary ‘Ausländerstatus,’ Turkish
migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures
6and maintain ethnic boundaries. The lack of political participation
and representation in the receiving country made them direct their
political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this home-
oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey that
has set up networks of consular services and other official organisa-
tions (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition
parties and movements have also forged an organisational presence in
Germany.
     This early form of political participation that was home-oriented
has crosscut with the migrant strategy, the framework of which I shall
discuss below. In the later stages of the migratory process, the legal
position of the immigrants with regard to residence and political rights
has remained provisional. They have been given the same rights as
Germans in the unions and in workplace co-determination under the
law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), but they are still excluded from all
other forms of formal participation or personal influence in political
decision-making process. This is the stage when the Turkish immi-
grants have been systematically marginalised by the state. As a re-
sponse to this ‘ethnic minorisation’ they started forming their own
associations along ethnic lines – a point which I shall again explore in
the following section.
     In addition to the constitutional barriers, the absence of a general
immigration policy has also compelled the Turkish immigrants in
Germany to isolate themselves in ethnic enclaves from the dominant
7society. From its inception to the present, the Federal Republic’s
official policy has been that “Germany is not a country of immigra-
tion.” Lacking a general immigration policy, the Bundestag (Federal
Parliament) issued the Ausländergesetz (Foreigners Law) in 1965. This
law did not give foreigners a right to residence, merely stating that “a
residence permit may be granted, if it does not harm the interests of
the Federal Republic of Germany.” This term is a key phrase in poli-
cies regarding migrants. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was not only
the granting of political rights to foreign immigrants, which was cer-
tainly not seen as being in the interests of the German Federal Repub-
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lic, also the law of 1965 specifically excluded them from other civil
rights:
Foreigners enjoy all basic rights; except the basic rights of assembly, freedom
of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of
work and place of education, and protection from extradition abroad (Allge-
meine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur Ausführung des Ausländergesetzes, § 6).
Thus, the German state established a system of ‘institutional discrimi-
nation,’ through which temporary guest workers could be recruited,
controlled and sent away, ‘as the interests of capital dictated’ (Castles,
1985: 523). The main concern of the first stage of the Ausländerpolitik
between 1965 and 1973 was economic considerations. The second
stage of the law was shaped by concerns of increasing social problems
and political tensions. The early policy was impracticable, not only
because of the various international agreements granting rights of
family reunification, to which Germany was a party, but also because
many firms found that rotation led to problems of labour fluctuation
and high training costs (ibid.). Accordingly, in November 1973 the
entry of further labour force from non-EC countries was banned, and
family reunion permitted. Afterwards, the Federal Labour Office
decreed that work permits for migrant workers were not to be renew-
ed if West German workers were thought to be available for the job
concerned. This meant that in some cases the migrant workers were
forced to leave their jobs and return home.
     The third stage of the Ausländerpolitik started when the CDU
(Christlich Demokratische Union – Christian Democratic Party) came
into power in 1983. By the early 1980s the ‘foreigners problem’ had
become a major issue in West German politics. While in power, the
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic
Party) had moved towards increasingly restrictive policies on migrant
rights. On the other hand, the CDU was proposing to implement
stricter policies for the control of foreigners and encouragement of
repatriation. A CDU resolution in the Federal Parliament in 1981
stated: “The role of the Federal Republic of Germany as a national
unitary state and as part of a divided nation does not permit the
commencement of an irreversible development to a multiethnic state”
(Castles, 1985: 528). Consequently, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s gov-
ernment in coalition with CSU (Christlich Soziale Union – Christian
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Social Party) and FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei – Free Democratic
Party) radicalised the Ausländerpolitik, aiming for the restriction of
further immigration and encouragement of repatriation. By ‘integra-
tion,’ the conservative government meant that those foreigners who
were unable to adapt themselves to the German norms, values and
laws were to be deported to allow those remaining to be assimilated.
In addition to the so-called ‘integration’ the government restricted the
entry of further immigrants, spouses and dependent children of immi-
grants by applying new quotas. Finally, the government encouraged
repatriation with a decree between October 30, 1983 and June 30, 1984
by offering premiums of 10,500 DM plus 1,500 DM per dependent
child if they left the country immediately. The government also
‘guaranteed’ the reintegration of repatriating children to the new
conditions in Turkey by subsidising some adaptation schools and
8providing German teachers in these schools.
     The alteration of the ethnic strategies amongst the Berlin-Turks has
considerably been bounded to the transformation of the Ausländerpo-
litik in Berlin as well as to the ethnically defined citizenship laws. The
periodisation of the Ausländerpolitik in Berlin is slightly different
from the rest of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thomas Schwartz
(1992: 121-138) provides an overview of three phases of Ausländerpoli-
tik in Berlin. In the first phase (late 1960s and early 1970s), when the
wall was constructed, the law was characterised mainly in terms of
addressing problems of urban planning. Accordingly, demographic
and employment factors became the key concerns of policy makers,
and ‘integration’ was considered a structural concern. Later, in the
second phase of the Ausländerpolitik (1980s), ‘representative politics’
(Beauftragtenpolitik) emerged as the central orientation of Berlin
government. Berlin was the first Land in the Federal Republic to
establish an office of Ausländerbeauftragte (Commissioner for Fo-
reigners’ Affairs). The office was originally envisioned as a liaison be-
tween local government and the various ethnic organisations. The last
phase is the one, which was introduced by the Red-Green coalition in
1998. This phase, which is in a sense peculiar to Berlin, has been dom-
inated by concepts of anti-racism and multiculturalism – a point to
which I shall return shortly. These phases of Ausländerpolitik have
shaped the form of political participation of those Turkish migrants
who lack legal political rights. In the following section, after pointing
out the three phases of Ausländerpolitik, I will elaborate the main
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landmarks of the ethnic strategies developed by Berlin-Turkish com-
munities in relation to the Ausländerpolitik.
Migrant Strategy
The first generation of migrants, who conceived themselves as tempo-
rary, arrived in their country of residence by leaving their families
behind a painful experience. The nature of the migration to the West
from Turkey is mostly chain migration. This type of migration has
played a major role in the incorporation of kin and fellow villagers
into the migration stream. Chain migration in Berlin has two aspects.
The first aspect is the in-coming spouses and children who joined the
process of migration with the family reunification in 1973 and on-
wards. The second aspect of chain migration is the dense in-coming of
migrants from disaster areas in Turkey, in a way that led to high
representation of people from the Varto/Erzurum and Gediz/Kütahya
areas (earthquakes) as well as Konya and Isparta (floods) (Gitmez and
Wilpert, 1987: 93).
     Chain migration makes migrants’ family relations or local commu-
nity relations both in the country of origin and in the country of
immigration more vital and instrumental. When the migrants arrive in
the receiving country their kin and former neighbours give them
shelter, advice and support. Their previous social group status and
class, lack of language, the exclusionist incorporation regimes as well
as the segregationist housing policies of the receiving countries make
them stick together and develop solidarity by means of informal local
networks. Their desperate will to return has made them invest at home
rather than in Berlin. The migrant strategy is formed in their own local
neighbourhood, in which they stick together, isolated from the rest of
the society. Most socialising has been carried out with other Turks,
preferably hemsehris (fellow-villagers, Landsmannschaften), in private
homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive
domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties
frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings and
circumcisions (Mandel, 1990: 155). It is the development of social
networks, based on kinship or common area of origin and the need for
mutual help in the new environment, that made possible the construc-
tion of migrant strategy (Castles and Miller, 1993: 25).
     The first generation migrants, who were recruited by Germany on
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the basis of Gastarbeiter (guest worker) system, have called themselves
gurbetçi. The gurbetçi is the one who lives in a state of gurbet. Gurbet
is an Arabic word which derives from garaba, to go away, to depart,
to be absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from
one’s homeland, to live as a foreigner in a country. It is important to
note that gurbet does not necessarily refer to a foreign country; one
can perfectly be in gurbet in one’s own country: the state of gurbet
covers, for instance, Turkish migrants living in Berlin as well as those
living in Istanbul. The gurbetçis feel that their primary identification is
with the village where they were born rather than the city. The emer-
gent literature and music genres produced by Turkish artists in West-
ern Europe draw upon a long tradition of exile and gurbet experiences
(Çaglar, 1994; Mandel, 1990). The term gurbetçi dominated first
generation German-Turks’ discourse. Defining themselves as gurbetçi,
Turkish migrants raised the points, which prevented Germany from
becoming a homeland for them. A feeling of security, trust, behaviour-
al confidence, certainty, assurance and finding social recognition are
the dominant needs that the notion of Heimat fulfils. Germany could
not meet these needs of the first generation immigrants. The discourse
of gurbetçi in alliance with the ‘will to return,’ in this case, has become
an essential survival strategy for the migrants in the process of quest
for home.
     The Gurbetçis used to mystify the homeland in their arts, literature
and musical genres as a place to which they would return some day. It
would be misleading to abstract them from their attachments to their
traditional past and continuous process of migration in exploring their
migrant identity. In their expressive culture they have tended to ro-
manticise the past, and continuously sought the Turkey of the times
they left behind in the 60s and 70s. The first generation migrants still
keep the same discourse in their daily lives. Most of them are twice-
migrants – an experience which they express as ‘gurbetin gurbeti’
(exile of exile). Although such a ‘double migrancy’ discourse is still
partly alive for most of the first generation migrants, it is subject to
change. It is because, the migrants have started to understand that the
‘will to return’ was nothing but a myth, and that they were treated as
strangers in both their country of residence and homeland. In Germa-
ny, they have been simply called as Ausländer (foreigner), and in
9Turkey as Almanci (German like).
     The migrant strategy was constructed sometime during the first
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decade of the migration wave in the sixties when the socialisation
process of migrants was based on a non-associational community
formation, ethnic enclave, hemsehri bonding, and a Gastarbeiter
ideology. In this very early period of migration, the primary concern
of migrants was to earn money and return to Turkey. In this stage,
Turkish workers were demographically more homogenous, densely
accommodated in Wohnheims (dormitory-like hotels) and were not
very visible in the receiving society. In such conditions they need not
form associations to become socialised and politicised. Yet there were
some informal Turkish worker associations prior to the family reunifi-
cation in mid 1970s. They were followed by the growth of religious
and politically conservative associations in the 1970s. Until around
1981 it was possible to categorise the majority of Turkish associations
within one of the two extreme poles of Turkish society. They were
either affiliated with one of the Turkish worker associations attached
to a centre-left political party in Turkey, or they were more religiously
organised, some aligned with the extreme right parties (Gitmez and
Wilpert, 1987: 107). It was in the early 1980s that Turkish migrants
10started to form ethnic and political associations. It was a time when
issues of ‘integration’ were highly discussed in Germany and became
present in the Ausländerpolitik, and also a time when a new policy of
‘assimilation or return’ was put into force by the government of
Helmut Kohl in Germany.
Minority Strategy
In 1983 the federal parliament passed a law encouraging Ausländer
(foreigners) to leave Germany, and paying them to do so. However,
since the beginning of the 1980s many German cities, especially Ber-
lin, also established official institutions (Ausländerbeauftragte) for
working with minorities of foreign origin. In this second stage of
Ausländerpolitik, integration and/or assimilation became the major
concern of the Federal Republic (Schwartz, 1992; Vertovec, 1996a).
Since the early 1980s, the government of Helmut Kohl reflected the
rising tide of rightist sentiments, putting into practice an Ausländerpo-
litik based on the restriction of all forms of new immigration, and a
policy of ‘assimilation or return’ for all the ‘foreigners’ present in the
country (Vertovec, 1996a: 384). At this stage of the Ausländerpoli-
tik, the orientations of Turkish formal associations reached a turning
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point in Berlin. Those ethnic organisations, which were established at
this stage, were highly oriented towards Germany. The rise of numer-
ous ethnic associations was not only due to the rightist Ausländerpoli-
tik radicalising between ‘assimilation’ and ‘return,’ but also to the
11exclusionary laws of national belonging, rise of racist attacks, insti-
tutional racism, structural outsiderism, family reunification, growing
consciousness of long-term settlement, upward social mobilisation,
and to the widespread control of political movements in Turkey after
the advent of the military regime in 1980. Accordingly all these aspects
enforced the formation of ethnic and political associations amongst the
Turkish population in Germany to come to terms with the problems
emerging in both the countries of reception and origin.
     Despite the existence of a modern welfare state which provides the
most basic social services in terms of health, education and social
security, Turks found it necessary and opportune to set up their own
services to mediate between individuals and German institutions.
Turks may have previously accepted German advocates; recently,
“they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and their own
understanding of what it means and what should mean to be of Tur-
kish-origin in German society” (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996: xx).
The emergence of ethnic communities with their own institutions such
as ethnic associations, cultural associations, youth clubs, cafés, agen-
12cies, and professions give rise to the birth of a new ethnic-based
political strategy, i. e. a minority strategy. The permanent settlement
brings about the necessity of a long-live strategy rather than the
migrant strategy, in order, not only to maintain culture, but more
importantly to cope with disadvantage, to improve life chances against
political exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation, and to provide
protection from racism (Castles and Miller, 1993: 114).
     Depending upon the integration policies of the receiving country,
the formation of ethnic minority organisations might spring from
various material reasons. Ethnic minorities may be seen as social
groups which are the result of both ‘other’-definition and ‘self’-defini-
tion. On the one hand, the ethnic minorities are defined by dominant
social groups in regard to their perceived phenotypical or cultural
characteristics, which lead to the imposition of specific economic,
social or legal situations. On the other hand, their members generally
share a self-definition or ethnic identity based on ideas of common
origins, history, culture, experience and values (ibid.: 28). Thus, the
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construction of ethnic minority is highly related to the political struc-
ture of the receiving society. As Castles and Miller (ibid.: 26) state,
At one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual
acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of ethnic communi-
ties, which can be seen as part of a multicultural society. At the other extreme,
denial of the reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers,
and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to formation of ethnic minorities,
whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive. In the first case,
the immigrants and their descendants are seen as an integral part of a society,
which is willing to reshape its culture and identity. In the second, immigrants
are excluded and marginalised, so that they live on the fringes of a society,
which is determined to preserve myths of a static culture and a homogenous
identity.
The experience of discrimination and racism in western European
countries forced immigrants to constitute their own communities and
to define their group boundaries in cultural terms (ibid.: 28). This is
the new form of racism “which differs from the vulgar and compro-
mised racism of biological differences” (Ålund, 1994: 63). The ‘new
racism’ continues to focus on simplified and reified cultural differenc-
es, and it does not claim that different cultures have different values,
but that they are different and remain so (Barker, 1981). The ideologi-
cal pillar of new racism is the holistic understanding of culture, which
does not encourage the cultures to mix and construct a bricolage. The
rationale behind the holistic notion of culture, which leads to new
racism, is that the dominant national identities could become uncer-
tain. The formation of community in response to the racialisation
process, in return, reinforces fears of separatism and ethnic enclaves on
the part of the majority society, leading to the furtherance of exclu-
sionary practices and racism.
     These conditions have set certain parameters for the life of a Turk-
ish minority in Berlin and the socialisation of the following genera-
tions. The internal social structure of Turkish population in Berlin
presents additional contingencies which contribute to the perception
and evaluation of world views and collective, ethnic and national
identities (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 91). The prominent advocate of
ethnic minority strategy in Berlin is a conservative ethnic association,
Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin)
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(Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 115; Özcan, 1994: 319). TGB attempts to
eradicate the use of the label ‘migrant,’ and to be officially perceived as
an ethnic minority in the long run like the Danish ethnic minority in
Schleswig-Holstein and the Sorben ethnic minority in southern Bran-
13denburg. Acceptance as a minority implies that the residency, and
not nationality, matters. It also implies that cultural diversity is not
perceived as a danger but condoned as a social reality (Horrocks and
Kolinsky, 1996: xiii).
     Their attempt to go beyond the perception of being ‘migrant’
demonstrates the sharp discursive transition they have had after the
former migrant strategy. The notion of ‘migrant’ has very negative
connotations for the TGB members. Firstly, as Mustafa Çakmakoglu,
the former head of TGB, put it, those ‘who betray Turkey’ qualify as
migrants. Here, the former category of ‘those who betray Turkey’ is a
political categorisation; it contains left wing and Islamic-universal-
ist immigrants. TGB has a Turkish-Islamise ideology, which gives
priority to Turkishness. Hence, those who underestimate Turkishness
are considered ‘traitors.’ By subtracting themselves from this notion,
the members of TGB attempt to differentiate themselves from those
‘traitors.’ Secondly, their refusal of the notion of ‘migrant’ is related to
the term’s negative historical connotations within the Turkish context.
Migrants (göçmen and/or muhacir) in Turkey are those Balkan-Turks,
Afghans and Kurds who migrated to Turkey. These migrants have
usually been considered by the Turkish people to be competing for the
scarce resources of Turkey with themselves. That is why the TGB
members do not want to enjoy such an undesirable label.
     Moreover, it is evident that a minority status can provide them with
substantial cultural and religious rights such as acquiring bilingual
education and gaining financial support from the Federal government
for their mosques, schools and other cultural projects. To be perceived
as an ethnic minority by the German constitution, the members of the
concerned group should be German citizens. For this purpose, TGB
tries to convince Turks not to neglect gaining German citizenship.
Their minority strategy derives from their practical expectations from
such a political category. As Abdul Janmohamed and David Lloyd
(1990: 9) remind us, their discourse indicates that
Becoming minor is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities
in dominant ideology would want us to believe) but a question of position: a
69
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S.  55- 85) T01_03 Chapter 2.p 297863215602
Chapter 2
subject position that in the final analysis can be defined only in ‘political’ terms
that is, in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disenfran-
chisement, social manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural
formation of minority subjects and discourses […].
Minority strategy develops within a binary relation with majority
society. In this binary relation, the minority attempts to negate the
prior hegemonic negation of itself by the majority society in a way
that reaffirms its minor location. The collective nature of all minority
discourses derives from the fact that “minority individuals are always
treated and forced to experience themselves generically” in many fields
of social life such as in the literary and/or political system (ibid.: 10).
The literary system in Germany is an excellent example to illustrate
the way in which a ‘foreigner,’ say a ‘Turkish’ novelist, expresses
his/her feelings and emotions generically as a member of Turkish
minority, not as a member of the German literary system. Aras Ören,
Yüksel Pazarkaya, Zafer Senocak, Emine Sevgi Özdamar and Zehra
Çirak are some of the Turkish-origin literary figures in Germany,
writing from the margin. These novelists and poets are considered to
belong to the so-called Gastarbeiterliteratur (guestworker literature)
or Ausländerliteratur (foreigners’ literature) sphere (Suhr, 1989; Tera-
oka, 1990). These literary figures are expected to reflect the problems
of their own communities, and regarded as the spokespeople of the
speechless by the dominant culture.
     Most of these Turkish-origin literary figures such as Aras Ören and
Zehra Çirak reject the label of ‘Turkish’ novelist/poet, because they
“emphasise universal human values rather than cultural, national, or
even class differences; [they are] global in scope rather than local in
focus and concern; and they attempt to be unifying rather than oppo-
14sitional” (Teraoka, 1990: 304). As someone coerced into a negative,
generic subject-position, the migrant individual is forced to respond
by transforming that position into a positive, collective one. In our
example it is the Turkish-origin literary figures that are forced to
become the spokespeople of a Turkish minority.
     The ethnic formation of minorities is not solely a product of ethnic
groups’ rational choice to come to terms with the discriminatory and
racist polities of the receiving country. It is also evident that ethnic
minorities can be formed ‘from above’ by the state itself as a result of
the exclusionary political system. Immigrant workers in Germany are,
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on the one hand, integrated into the social system, but on the other
hand not admitted to the political platform. This is due to the concept
of the ‘jus sanguinis’, which is expressed in the Article 116 of the
German Basic Law, reserving citizenship to ethnic Germans based on
blood. As non-citizens, ‘foreigners’ do not have the right to political
rights. They cannot themselves struggle for their interests in the politi-
cal system and have to find ‘deputising majority speakers’ (Radtke,
1994: 33). When the constitutional restrictions for migrants’ political
participation are combined with the contemporary local polities of
‘multiculturalism’ in Berlin, migrants are strongly encouraged into
‘ethnic minorisation’ by the state itself (Rath, 1993). As Radtke (1993:
36) reminds us, it is partly the official discourse of ‘multiculturalism’
that has induced migrant groups in Germany to form homogeneous
communities around religious and traditional symbols, not only to
protect a cultural identity in an unfriendly and sometimes racist envi-
ronment, but also to present themselves in the way that the majority
wanted to see them.
     The construction of ethnic-based political strategies is strictly
dependent on the policies implemented by the government of the
receiving society. As I have tried to explain, those varying governmen-
tal policies concerning the ‘foreign’ immigrants – no matter if they
were formed by the conservatives or social democrats – have contri-
buted to the othering and minorisation of Turkish population in the
FRG. Aras Ören, Turkish novelist and poet, warns of the dangers
inherent in the acceptance of otherness and cultural difference:
[I am afraid that while] the conservatives lock us into our cultural ghetto by
preserving the culture we brought with us as it is and by denying that there can
be symbiosis or development, […] the progressives try to drive us back into that
same ghetto because, filled with enthusiasm, by the originality and excotism of
our culture, they champion it so fervently that they are even afraid it might
disappear, be absorbed by German culture (Quoted in Suhr, 1989: 102).
The former political participation strategies, which have been devel-
oped by the Turkish migrants along ethnic lines, were both based on
binary relation between the migrants and the majority society. The
first strategy, migrant strategy, was characterised by a ‘will to return.’
It was a response to the early German recruitment politics, which was
built on the notion of Gastarbeiter (guestworker). On the other hand,
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the minority strategy was a response to the culturalisation and minori-
sation of the Turkish population by the German institutional structur-
15ing.
Diaspora Strategy
The first generation immigrants as a set of survival strategies have
primarily developed these two ethnic-based political strategies. Con-
versely, their descendants who were born and raised in Germany have
followed different patterns, depending on their class, gender and social
status. Those who live in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg, where I conduct-
ed my research, having grown up in an ethnic enclave have carried the
norms and traditions of their parents in themselves as well as receiving
those of the majority society and international society. Additionally,
they also employed ethnicity, religion and culture for the construction
and articulation of their identities. They have acquired a cultural
identity, which springs from parental, dominant and global cultures.
This cultural identity can be defined as diasporic. Diasporic conscious-
ness refers to individuals’ awareness of a range of decentered, multi-
location attachments, of being simultaneously ‘home away from home’
or ‘here and there’ (Vertovec, 1997: 100).
     The enhancement of telecommunications and the ease of travel
made possible the emergence of alternate cultural forms and multiple
identities for the diasporic youth. Above all, these transnational
networks helped the descendants of the immigrants to dissolve the
‘inevitable’ binary relation between minority and majority. The fol-
lowing section will be an attempt to expose the main parameters of the
modern notion of diaspora by referring to some scholars, and also to
demonstrate the two inter-related main approaches on diaspora, as
Vertovec (1997) put it: ‘diaspora as a form of consciousness’ and
‘diaspora as a mode of cultural production.’ Thus, it attempts to
provide a theoretical ground for the understanding of the diasporic
cultural identity of the working-class Turkish male hip-hop youth in
Kreuzberg.
Diaspora Revisited
Recently, the notion of diaspora has been extensively used by a wide
range of scholars aiming to contribute to the definition of transnation-
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al migrants. The new trend of diaspora studies defines the diasporas as
exemplary communities of the transnational moment. The term ‘dia-
spora’ is derived from the Greek verb sperio (to sow, to scatter) and
the preposition dia (through, apart). For Greeks, the term referred to
migration and colonisation, whereas for Jews, Africans, Palestinians
and Armenians the same term acquired more unfortunate, brutal and
traumatic dispersion through scattering (Cohen, 1997: ix). Yet, the
contemporary notion of diaspora is not limited only with Jewish,
Greek, Palestinian and Armenian dispersive experiences; rather it
describes a larger domain that includes words like immigrant, expatri-
ate, refugee, guest worker, exile community and ethnic community
(Tölölian, 1991: 5). The primary difference between the old and mod-
ern form of diasporas lies in their changing will to go back to the
‘Holy Land,’ or homeland. In this sense, the old diasporas resemble
the story of Ulysses while the new ones have been like that of Abra-
16ham. After the Trojan War, Ulysses encountered many problems on
the way back to Ithaca. Although he had many obstacles during his
journey, he was determined to go back home. Conversely, the experi-
ence of the modern labour diasporas resembles the Prophet Abraham’s
biblical journey. In the first part of the Bible, it is written that Abra-
ham, upon the request of God, had to journey with his people to find
a new home in the unknown and he never went back to the place he
left behind.
     The classification of Robin Cohen is quite influential in mapping
out the differences between modern and old diasporas. His historical
explanation of diaspora goes back to the Biblical Jewish diaspora,
which was based on a forced dispersion experience. He has a clear
picture of old and new diasporas, which he separates on the basis of
the genesis of global economy. Old diasporas are twofold: a) forced
diasporas such as Jewish and Armenian, b) colonising diasporas such
as Greek and British. On the other hand, the modern diasporas are
threefold: a) trading diasporas like Jewish and Lebanese; b) business
diasporas such as British; and c) labour diasporas such as Irish, Indian,
Chinese, Sikh and Turkish. The main driving force behind the con-
struction of modern labour diasporas is the global economic needs,
which bring about an extensive immigration from periphery to the
global and regional centres.
     William Safran, in his study of “Diasporas in Modern Societies:
Myths of Homelands and Return,” draws up the general framework of
73
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S.  55- 85) T01_03 Chapter 2.p 297863215602
Chapter 2
an ideal type of diaspora. He defines diaspora as ‘expatriate minority
communities’
(1) that are dispersed from an original centre to at least two periph-
eral places;
(2) that maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original
homeland;
(3) that believe they are not fully accepted by their host country;
(4) that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the
time is right;
(5) that are committed to the maintenance and restoration of this
homeland; and
(6) of which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are important-
ly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland (Saf-
ran, 1991: 83-84).
Safran’s ideal type of ‘centred’ diaspora, oriented by continuous cul-
tural connections to a source and by a teleology of ‘return,’ is inappli-
cable to the recent experiences of diaspora like African/American,
Caribbean/British, South Asian/British, Turkish/German and/or Al-
gerian/French. These histories of displacement fall into a category of
what Clifford calls ‘quasi diasporas.’ Similarly, Turkish diaspora (like
the South Asian diaspora) “is not so much oriented to roots in a spe-
cific place and a desire for return as around an ability to recreate a cul-
ture in diverse locations. Such a state of diaspora falls outside the strict
definition of diaspora” (Clifford, 1994: 306).
     Clifford also states that the old version of ‘centred’ diaspora which
has been formed around a teleology of return is getting looser because
of the global social changes that mainly derive from de-colonisation,
immigration, and globalisation. He avoids the old notion of diaspora
to scrutinise and enlighten the modern diasporas because,
The transnational connections linking diasporas need not be articulated prima-
rily through a real or symbolic homeland – at least not to the degree that
Safran implies. Decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those
formed around a teleology of origin/return. And a shared, ongoing history of
displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as important as the
projection of a specific origin (Clifford, 1994: 306; emphasis mine).
Thus, Clifford suggests that some groups can become identified as
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more or less diasporic, having only two, or three, or four of the six
basic features of Safran’s ideal type of diaspora.
     The changing nature of space and time in the age of globalism
facilitates the emergence of diasporic consciousness. Globalisation
emerging as the rise of communications, transportation, migration,
modern diasporas, de-monopolisation of national legal systems, new
international division of labour, and global culture, empowers the
minorities against the hegemony of nation-state, and breaks up the
conventional power relations between majority and minority. The
modern “communicative circuitry has enabled dispersed populations
to converse, interact and even symbolise significant elements of their
social and cultural lives” (Gilroy, 1994: 211). For instance, the Turkish
TV programmes are easily received in Europe by the Turkish diaspora.
The official TRT International and some other private channels and
newspapers spread the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state
through the diaspora.
     Thus, Turkish official ideology that has recently become more
hegemonic and nationalist has a very important role on the construc-
tion of Turkish diaspora nationalism at the imaginary level which
17gives a special emphasis on Turkishness. For instance, during the
intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces into the Northern Iraq in
the winter of 1996 to prevent the logistic settlement of the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) in the region, the Turkish TV channels organ-
ised an international campaign to collect money for the Turkish Armed
Forces. In Germany, a big amount of money has been collected from
the Turkish people. This is evidence of the transnational exploitation
of the masses by the nation-state, and of the power of the ideology of
nationalism. This change in the homeland’s orientation to the diaspora
is a part of the realpolitik because the homeland governments tend to
exploit diaspora sentiments for their purposes (Safran, 1991: 93).
     These changes in the global network, international politics, and
internal politics have played an important role in the making of dias-
pora consciousness. The diaspora consciousness seems to be supple-
menting minority strategy by means of these global transformations.
As Clifford (1994: 310-311) rightfully states, transnational connections
with homeland, other members of diaspora in various geographies,
and/or with a world-political force (such as Islam) break the binary
relation of minority communities with majority societies as well as
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giving added weight to claims against an oppressive national hegemo-
ny. Through the agency of these connections, diasporic subjects have
the chance to create a home away from the homeland, a home which is
surrounded by rhythms, figures and images of the homeland provided
by TV, video cassettes, tapes, radio, and by the local network they
developed in time.
     The diaspora consciousness requires the idea of dwelling here in the
country of residence and a connection there in the homeland. The
modern diasporas are no longer immigrant communities; they are
rather sojourners. Diasporic discourses, as Clifford (1994: 311) states,
reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that
includes the homeland, not as something left behind, but as a place of
attachment in a ‘contrapuntal modernity.’ Clifford borrows the term
‘contrapuntal’ from Edward Said who has used the term to character-
ise one of the positive aspects of conditions of exile:
[…] For an exile, habits of life, expression or activity in the new environment
inevitably occurs against the memory of these things in another environment.
Thus, both the new and the old environments are vivid, actual, occurring
together contrapuntally (quoted in Clifford, ibid.: 329).
Diasporic subject constructs his/her cultural identity in a dialogue
between the past and the future, ‘there’ and ‘here,’ local and global,
and heritage ad politics. The particular experiences of diaspora bring
back the memories of the counterparts of those experiences that were
once undertaken in the homeland. Memorising those experiences, on
the one hand, reinforces the habits of life; on the other, reminds the
diasporic subject the condition of dispersal or diaspora.
     The contemporary diaspora discourses are developed on two
paramount dimensions: universalism and particularism. The universal-
ist axis refers us to the model of diasporic transnationalism, in the
form of ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1990), or ‘process of heterogenesis’
(Guattari, 1989), or ‘third culture’ (Featherstone, 1990) – a point to
which I shall shortly return in the following chapters. The universalist
dimension, which contains the use of all the aspects of globalism and
transnationalism, refers to that the diasporic consciousness constitutes a
post-national identity. The members of the post-national diasporic
communities can escape the power of the nation-state to inform their
sense of collective identity. In this new space it is possible to evade the
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politics of polarity and emerge as ‘the others of our selves’ (Bhabha,
1988: 22). This is the cultural space where the quest for knowing and
othering the Other becomes irrelevant, and cultures merge together in
a way that leads to the construction of syncretic cultural forms.
     On the other hand, the particularist axis presents the model of
cultural essentialism, or diasporic nationalism. The process of home-
seeking, as Clifford offers, might result with the existence of a kind of
diaspora nationalism, which is, in itself, critical to the majority nation-
alism, and an anti-nationalist nationalism (Clifford, 1994: 307). The
nature of diaspora nationalism is cultural, which is based on alienation,
and celebration of the past and authenticity. For migrants as well as for
anybody else, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past
(Berger, 1972: 11) in a way that constructs ‘imaginary homelands’ as
Salman Rushdie (1991: 9) has pointed out in his work Imaginary
Homelands:
It is my present that is foreign, and […] the past is home, albeit a lost home in a
lost city in the mists of lost time […] [Thus,], we will, in short, create fictions,
not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands.
As Clifford rightly states, those migrant and/or minority groups who
are alienated by the system, and swept up in a destiny dominated by
the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures. What is different
about them remains tied to traditional pasts (Clifford, 1988: 5). Remak-
ing the past, or recovering the past, serves at least a dual purpose for
the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming to terms with
the present without being seen to criticise the existing status quo. The
‘glorious’ past is, here, handled by the diasporic subject as a strategic
tool absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined with
exclusion, structural outsiderism, poverty, racism and institutional
discrimination. Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of the self
not dependent on criteria handed down by others – the past is what
the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40).
     Although, the main driving forces behind the construction of
diasporic consciousness are compression of time and space in the form
of globalisation, and the internal institutional context to which the
minority community is subject in the country of settlement, homeland
government’s orientation towards the diaspora communities is quite
determinant too. The changing nature of the orientation of the Turkish
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government to the Turks in West Europe has an influential impact on
the construction of a kind of diasporic consciousness within the
Turkish communities. The official attempts of the Turkish government
to form a Turkish lobby in Germany make the Turkish communities
that have various political and ideological standpoints, compete with
each other for the claim to be the mere representative of the Turkish
minority. These ethnic organisations which are in search for recogni-
tion by both the country of residence and homeland, tend to improve
their orientation to the homeland, and to work for the political and
economic interests of the homeland. Thus, such a transnational politi-
cal network leads the Turkish minority organisations to play more on
the axis of Turkishness as a result of the hegemonic ideology of the
Turkish nation-state. Here, it should be stated that, while the official
lobbying activities attempt to contribute to the creation of a diasporic
consciousness on the one hand, they deepen the ideological cleavages
between the extremely heterogeneous Turkish communities on the
other. For instance, the competition between Türkische Gemeinde zu
Berlin (TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin) and Türkischer Bund in
Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB, Turkish Association of Berlin-Bran-
denburg) to conduct the lobbying activities, expands the divisions
between the groups.
     Therefore, the notion of ‘diaspora’ (with lower case ‘d’) should be
considered a theoretical concept that meets the contemporary needs of
the study of ethnicity and nationalism in a broader transnational level.
The term ‘diaspora’ might also be useful as an intermediate concept
between the local and the global, transcending the national perspec-
tives which often limit transnational cultural studies (Gillespie, 1996:
6). The term ‘Diaspora’ (with a capital ‘D’) was once a concept refer-
ring to the traumatic dispersion of the Jews and the Armenians from
their historical homelands throughout many lands. The connotations
of the term were usually negative as they were associated with forced
displacement, victimisation, alienation, and loss. Now, the term
‘diaspora’ is often used by the scholars as a beneficial term to practical-
ly describe any community that is transnational.
     Contemplating the modern diasporic situations as the unsurprising
feature of globalisation (particularly involving the advance of tele-
communications and the ease of travel), Vertovec (1997, 1996b) states
that there are three different approaches to the notion of modern
diaspora, put forward by contemporary scholars. In sum, the first
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standpoint regards diaspora as a social form (Boyarin and Boyarin,
1993; Safran, 1991). Diaspora as a social form refers to the transnation-
al communities whose social, economic and political networks cross
the borders of nation-states. The second approach conceives diaspora
as a type of consciousness, which emerges by means of transnational
networks (Clifford, 1994, 1992; Hall, 1994, 1991; Bhabha, 1990; Gil-
roy, 1993, 1987; Cohen, 1997; Vertovec, 1997, 1996b). This approach
departs from W. E. B. Du Bois’ notion of ‘double consciousness,’ and
refers to individuals’ awareness of being simultaneously ‘home away
from home’ or ‘here and there.’ And the last but not the least, is the
understanding, which regards diaspora as a mode of cultural construc-
tion and expression (Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994; Hall, 1994). This ap-
proach emphasises the flow of constructed styles and identities among
diasporic people. Subsequently, I shall provide a theoretical frame-
work for the exploration of the construction and articulation of the
diasporic cultural identity of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth
in Berlin.
Diasporic Consciousness
The labour migration into Europe is mainly a post war phenomenon
resulting in the permanent settlement of millions of people away from
their country of origin. After a few decades these peoples who used to
be merely temporary workers, and treated so, have become sojourners,
and constructed homes away from their homelands. The centring of
ethnic minorities around an axis of origin, ethnicity and religion leads
to the construction of a modern diasporic cultural identity which leans
on both inheritance and politics. Diasporic cultural identity becomes
the major politics of identity for the descendants of migrants who
were born and raised in the country of residence. The gap between the
institutional-societal treatment of the new generations and their own
identification that they exhibit with the presentational or expressive
forms of representation in the country of residence brings about the
‘problem of identity.’ The quest for identity for these new generations
results with the employment and maintenance of ethnicity and religion
as a source of identity. The self-identification of second/third genera-
tion Berlin-Turks is predominantly shaped by the symbolic ethnic and
religious connotations.
     The working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters construct a form of
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diasporic cultural identity by means of global culture which transcend
the boundaries of territorial nation-state. In this way, diaspora is
described as involving the production and reproduction of social and
cultural phenomena on a transnational axis (Vertovec, 1996b; Clifford,
1994; Appadurai, 1990; Hannerz, 1996). The diasporic identity con-
structed by ethnic minority youths has been a ‘valuable component of
the critique of absolutist political sensibilities’ within nation-state
(Gilroy, 1994: 210). As I will explain below, the construction of such a
diasporic cultural identity has connections with the production and
articulation of culture on a transnational level. This is evident in the
production and reproduction of forms which are sometimes called
‘syncretic,’ ‘bricolage,’ ‘creolized,’ ‘translated,’ ‘crossover,’ ‘cut’n’
mix,’ ‘hybrid,’ ‘alternate’ or ‘melange.’ Hall’s metaphorical insights
regarding diaspora, ethnicity and identity draw up the framework of
the existing modern diaspora identities:
[…] diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only
be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs
return, even if it means pushing other people into the sea. This is the old, the
imperialising, the hegemonising, form of ethnicity. We have seen the fate of the
people of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking conception of dias-
pora – and the complicity of the West with it. The diaspora experience as I
intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a
necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives
with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are
those, which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew,
through transformation and difference (Hall, 1994: 235).
Hall explicitly distances himself from the old ‘imperialising,’ ‘back-
ward’ notion of diaspora, and celebrates the modern notion that hosts
hybridity and creolization. The production of such ‘hybrid’ cultural
phenomena and ‘new ethnicities’ is especially to be found among
diasporic youth whose primary socialisation has taken place with the
cross-currents of differing cultural fields (Vertovec, 1996b: 29).
     The construction of diasporic cultural identity derives from cul-
tures and histories in negotiation, collision and dialogue. Diasporic
identity is a disaggregated identity, and it disrupts the very categories
of identity because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious,
but all of these in dialectical tension with one another (Boyarin and
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Boyarin, 1993: 721). Thus, the existence of the diaspora idea invites us
to see the formation of cultural bricolage within the boundaries of the
contested domains between the local and the global, between binary
oppositions, between ‘here’ and ‘there,’ and between past and present.
This permanent state of ‘double consciousness’ takes the diasporic
subject beyond the modern nation-state and its institutional order.
The main determinants giving a diasporic character to these cultures
are, for Clifford (1994: 306), the obstacles, openings, antagonisms,
connections that the respective group has experienced, and the trans-
national links facilitated by globalised communication and transport.
     Transnational connections constitute what Clifford calls a ‘multi-
local diaspora culture’ amongst the multiple communities of dis-
persed immigrant population (Clifford, 1994: 304). By the multi-locale
diaspora culture, we do not mean a specific geographical boundary,
but cultural boundary, which is linked with the homeland culture.
Those dispersed people, once separated from homeland by geographi-
cal distance and political barriers, increasingly find themselves in
‘border relations’ with the homeland and their fellow diasporic ‘mates’
by means of modern technologies of transportation, communication
and labour migration. The means of transportation, telephones, faxes,
Internet, TV, radio, tape and videocassettes, and mobile job markets
reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic between diasporic
subjects and homeland. Today, it is much easier to live in two worlds
than it was two decades ago.
     Most sociological studies have broadly described German-Turkish
youth in terms of stereotypical notions like ‘identity crisis,’ ‘in-be-
tweenness,’ ‘lost generation,’ ‘split identities’ and ‘disoriented children’
(Abadan-Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987; Mushabe, 1985; Önder,
1996). German-Turkish youth were predominantly problematised in
the Turkish scholarship. This is the rationale behind opening adapta-
tion schools for the returnee children in Turkey with the co-operation
of Turkish and German governments. This problem-oriented image
drawn by many scholars is full of contradictions, and lacks sufficient
empirical data. The ‘second generation’ (German: die zweite Genera-
tion; Turkish: ikinci kusak), often described in melodramatic terms as
‘caught between two cultures but part of neither,’ constructs its identi-
ty in a social field where they successfully negotiate various cultures
(Mandel, 1990: 155). German-Turkish youngsters, like the other
diasporic youths, tend to form a bricolage of cultures and identities,
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while at the same time keeping to their ethnic and cultural ‘roots.’
Thus, diasporic cultural identity should be mapped out within the co-
ordinates of global (diaspora) and local (national-regional). These are
as Hall comments “cultures of hybridity which have renounced the
dream or ambition of rediscovering any kind of ‘lost’ cultural purity, or
ethnic absolutism. They are irrevocably translated” (Hall, 1992: 310).
     Turkish youth experience a permanent tension between homeless-
ness and home in a way that leads to the construction of more mean-
ingful, complex and multiple identities. Diasporic cultural identity of
Turkish youth springs from their constant quest for home. For the
modern diasporic subject, home is the place to which they cannot
return. It is this perpetual dream of return, but not the act of return,
which shapes the modern diasporic cultural identity. Should the con-
dition of multiple identities, which is situated by the diasporic youth,
be treated as the indication of their state of ‘in-betweenness’? Or,
should it be conceived as representing the ‘third space,’ or ‘third
culture’? This is the essential question, which I have tried to answer in
my work. In the following chapters, I shall, from time to time, return
to this question and elaborate upon the diasporic cultural identity of
Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg.
*  *  *
To recapitulate, this chapter has portrayed the transmission of the
ethnic-based political strategies, which the Berlin-Turks developed
since the beginning of the migratory process. These strategies have
been outlined as migrant strategy and minority strategy. The change in
the political strategies of the immigrants has been primarily presented
as subject to the social, political, and economic relations between
receiving society and ethnic minority. Then, it has been stated that, the
more the ethnic minorities suffer from racism, exclusion, segregation,
and majority nationalism, the more they tend to have associations with
the homeland, co-ethnics, or with a world-political force such as
Islam. Secondly, it was stated that this change is also a product of the
globalisation, which appears as an individual consciousness of the
global situation. Thus, the ethnic communities who are dispersed away
from homeland acquire the chance to feel strong attachments, at
symbolic level, to their homelands and co-ethnics by means of modern
technology. Thirdly, it was argued that the homeland government’s
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changing orientation to the expatriates has become a very determinant
factor in the changing face of the ethnic-based political strategies.
Accordingly, it was concluded that they always tend to exploit the
immigrants’ sentiments for their own purposes.
     It should also be stated that there are no clear-cut boundaries
between the strategies outlined above, they are rather overlapping.
Diasporic consciousness has been introduced in this chapter as the
contemporary form of ethnic consciousness. Diasporic identity is
initiated by the expanding networks of communication and transpor-
tation. The Berlin-Turks tend to develop more transnational attach-
ments with their homelands. By doing so, they transcend the obligato-
ry binarism between themselves and the German nation-state. They
rather prefer being attached to their ‘imaginary homelands.’ As Cohen
(1996: 516) has stated, modern diasporic identities are mostly con-
structed on an imaginary axis:
[D]iasporas can be constituted by acts of the imagination […] In the age of
cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created
through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared imagination.
In the following chapters, the construction and articulation of the
diasporic consciousness of the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop
youth and the formation of this complex diasporic culture will cover a
wider space. By doing so, I will demonstrate that the whole question
of diasporic identity is a matter of politics and process rather than of
essence and inheritance. Accordingly, the following chapter will
scrutinise the formation of a diasporic space in a multicultural setting.
The delineation of the diasporic space shaped by the Turkish migrants
in Kreuzberg will help us understand the nature of the urban land-
scape housing the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth.
Notes
1 The story of migration from the ‘developing’ countries to the
FRG was successfully exhibited by John Berger et al. (1975) in the
book, The Seventh Man. The photographs in the book taken
during the journey from home to Germany can partly express the
difficulties, which the immigrants had to experience during the
migration. The photos taken during the medical check-ups, for
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instance, evidently prove how degrading was the way the selec-
tion of the workers was conducted by the ‘experts’ of the recruit-
ing country.
2 Until 1974, the father determined a child’s nationality, but now
either parent is sufficient.
3 It is common for Turkish applicants to reapply immediately
after their German naturalisation for their temporarily-lost Turk-
ish citizenship. Turkey allows dual citizenship once the military
service of the applicant has been resolved.
4 For further information about the new German citizenship laws
and regulations, see Brandt (1996).
5 For further information on the new citizenship laws and the
related parliamenterian discussions see, Innenausschuß des Deut-
schen Bundestages (1999).
6 This strong ethnic boundary construction is what Rex (1994: 2)
calls ‘differential incorporation.’
7 Fredrik Barth (1969) has defined such withdrawal from the
majority society as ‘isolation.’
8 There are five adaptation schools in Turkey as such: one in Anka-
ra, one in Izmir and three in Istanbul. These secondary and high
schools are subject to the curriculum of the Ministry of National
Education in Turkey. The schools are called Alman Anadolu Lisesi
(German Anatolian Grammar School) where the medium of edu-
cation is German. These schools were formed under the joint
Cultural Treaty signed between Turkish and German governments
in 1984. By this treaty it was agreed that the German government
would contribute to finance the education of the returnee children
and to provide 90 German teachers. In the first year of their arrival
in Turkey, the students are placed in a prep-school where there are
only returnees. Here, they are given intensive courses on Turkish
language and literature, Turkish history, and Turkish geography.
The following year they are placed in mixed classrooms with the
local students. The rationale behind the mixed classroom pro-
gramme is to assimilate them to the Turkish culture and way of life
more easily. For a detailed information about the reintegration of
the returnees, see Abadan-Unat (1988).
9 Almanci literally means German-like which bears witness to a
combination of difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection.
10 For a detailed explanation about the history of Turkish ethnic
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associations in Berlin and Germany, see Özcan (1994), Seidel-Pie-
len (1995) and Gitmez and Wilpert (1987).
11 For a detailed information about the laws of belonging in Ger-
many, see Senders (1996) and Klusmeyer (1992).
12 For a detailed map of these associations, see TBB Türkçe Danis-
ma Yerleri Kilavuzu.
13 Danish and Sorben ethnic groups enjoy minority status in Ger-
many with accompanying language and cultural rights.
14 For further information on ‘Gastarbeiterliteratur,’ see also Hor-
rocks and Kolinsky (1996) and Gürsoy-Tezcan (1992).
15 It should be stated that ethnic strategies developed by Kurds and
Alevis have different dynamics and need further inquiry. Howev-
er, Alevis and their ethnic structuring will be explored in the
following chapter.
16 The analogy of Ulysses and Abraham belongs to Emmanuel
Levinas (1986: 348; 1987: 91). In explaining the attempt of con-
ventional philosophy to seek the knowledge about the ‘Other,’
Levinas stated that the history of philosophy has been like the
story of Ulysses who ‘through all his wanderings only returns to
his native island’ (1986: 348). He preferred the story of Abraham
to that of Ulysses. Conventional philosophy has always sought to
return to familiar ground of ‘being,’ ‘truth’ and ‘the same;’ Levi-
nas’ endeavour was to take it elsewhere. He proposed that philos-
ophy should accept that we do not, can not and should not know
the Other, rather than seeking knowledge of it.
17 For a detailed map of Turkish TV channels and the spread of
Turkish official ideology, see Aksoy and Robins (1997).
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Chapter 3
Kreuzberg 36:
A Diasporic Space in Multicultural Berlin
Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg have constructed a social space of their
own – a diasporic space where they have developed a web of social in-
stitutions, norms and values. This diasporic space has provided the
Turkish population with a ground to acquire a set of positive and re-
sistant articulations of identity in a country such as Germany that pre-
viously had an exclusionist ideology towards the immigrants. Resist-
ance to exclusion in the Turkish diaspora context can take the form of
distinct national and religious aspirations. I do not want to claim that
diasporic cultural politics are somehow free of nationalist, religious
and chauvinist agendas, but one should also remember that, as Clifford
(1994: 307) has put it, such discourses are usually weapons used by rel-
atively weak groups.
     In modern diaspora experience that is facilitated by transnational
circuit of communications and transportation, identities are construct-
ed in a way that bends together both global and local, roots and rou-
tes, inheritance and politics, past and present. As I pointed out in the
former chapters, modern diasporic identity is formed and articulated
in both particularist and universalist axes. Kreuzberg 36, as a typical
example of diasporic space, gives the individual the sense of simultane-
ously being ‘here’ (diaspora) and ‘there’ (homeland). What are the
main constitutive entanglements turning this urban space into a dias-
poric space? What are the components of the particularist dimension
of the modern diasporic identity? To what extent do the transnational
Turkish media contribute to the construction of a distinct diasporic
consciousness? What kind of discourses do the major Turkish ethnic
organisations articulate to partake in the social and political life in
multicultural Berlin? What kind of multicultural institutions have
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emerged in Berlin to incorporate the ethnic minorities into the main-
stream? And how do the Turkish ethnic associations respond to the
dominant discourse of multiculturalism? Accordingly, this chapter
will primarily aim to answer these essential questions as well as to ex-
pound the principal features of Kreuzberg 36 as constituting a diaspo-
ric urban space for Turkish migrants.
A Turkish Ethnic Enclave
Kreuzberg is a densely populated area located in the centre of Berlin.
It is full of various social and cultural undercurrents. On the one hand,
it is the ever-lasting dream of many left wing, or liberal, Germans to
buy a flat by the picturesque Landwehrkanal that crosscuts Kreuz-
1berg; on the other hand, it has been the main quarter of the working-
class cultures throughout history. Kreuzberg has always been defined
as a working-class area since the mid 17th century. It provided immi-
grants, guestworkers (Gastarbeiter) and asylum-seekers with shelter.
In the seventeenth century, French Protestant refugees (Huguenots)
found asylum there. In the nineteenth century, indigent, landless im-
migrants from Silesia, Pomerania, and eastern Prussia came in for the
search of work. At the turn of the last century, the district served as
home to industrial workshops and small factories, as well as to the
workers employed in them (Mandel, 1996: 149; Knödler-Bunte, 1987:
219-238). Until the division of Germany in the aftermath of the World
War II, Kreuzberg was situated adjacent to the district of Mitte that
houses many historical monuments and the bureaucratic settlement of
the Second Reich, Weimar Republic and Third Reich. After the divi-
sion, it has become the very periphery of the West Berlin, hosting the
‘Gastarbeiter’ from Turkey, Greece, Lebanon and Portugal. Reunifica-
tion has brought a new outlook to the district. Recently, it is becoming
one of the new centres of the expanding metropolitan city of Berlin. In
this section, I will explore the social-cultural geography of Kreuzberg,
but only with a limitation to Kreuzberg 36 and Kotbusser Tor where I
conducted most of my field research.
     The topography of the ethnic minorities in Kreuzberg has entirely
changed since the reunification in 1991 (Table 2). For instance, the po-
sitioning of the Turkish minority has undergone a drastic shift. While
the ‘Gastarbeiter,’ who are predominantly Turkish and Kurdish, were
previously dwelling in the south-eastern periphery of West Berlin,
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they have suddenly found themselves in the centre of the city with the
reunification. Kreuzberg 36 resembles a kind of ‘Kleines Istanbul’
(Little Istanbul), which is surrounded by the images, signs, rhythms,
music, foods, shops, banks, traditional cafés, and major political issues
of Turkey: a Turkish diaspora. Beyond that, in many senses, it resem-
bles a cultural island within the urban landscape. With the ethnic mi-
norities, working-class groups, left wing political groupings, anarchists
and marginal youth, Kreuzberg represents a permanent state of festivi-
ty. It is literally a multi-cultural neighbourhood.
Table 2: Demographic Structure of Kreuzberg, 25.07.1996
Country of Origin Population Percent
Turkey 28,913        18.70        
Ex-Yugoslavia 3,211        2.06        
Poland 1,681        1.07        
Greece 1,497        0.95        
Italy 995        0.64        
Croatia 1,320        0.85        
Ex-Soviet Union 538        0.52        
Iran 620        0.34        
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1,611        1.04        
Lebanon 740        0.47        
Others 10,864        7.02        
Germans in Total 102,553        66.34        
Kreuzberg in Total 154,543        100.00        
Source: Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister
Kreuzberg is surrounded by the districts of Neukölln in the south,
Schöneberg in the west, Tiergarten in the north, and Mitte in the east.
Traffic connections to Kreuzberg have extensively increased in time.
Traffic has gradually been diverted towards Kreuzberg after the
reunification in order to provide an efficient link between the east and
west. As the youngsters express, Kreuzberg is no more a peripheral
district where the children used to freely play in the streets without
traffic. Now, it is a central place where there is constantly a traffic jam.
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The metro is the main form of public transportation. U1 and U15 are
the regular trains connecting Kreuzberg to the rest of Berlin. The
metro railway crosscuts the district through the bridges built just after
World War I. There are also regular public busses passing through
Kotbusser Tor such as No. 129 and No. 141.
     For the Turkish population, Kreuzberg, or Berlin, is better con-
nected to Turkey than to the other cities of Germany. Kreuzberg is
full of Turkish travel agencies offering both regular and charter flights
to various cities in Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Trabzon,
Antalya and Adana. Onur Air, Pak Tur, Pegasus Air, Öger Tur, Turk-
ish Airlines, and Türk Tur are some of these agencies. Sometimes, it is
possible to find a return ticket to Istanbul with a price of 250 DM
(approximately £ 100). This price may well rise to 800 DM in the
summer vacation periods. Since the internal war commenced in the
country once called Yugoslavia, these agencies have also provided
ferryboat tickets to people who want to travel to Turkey by their own
private cars. The boats generally depart from the Italian harbours in
the Adriatic and arrive at the Turkish harbours in the Aegean Sea. As
far as domestic transport is concerned for the Berlin-Turks, Kreuzberg
is not efficiently connected to the other parts of Germany. It is almost
out of question for them to travel by German Railway because it is not
easily affordable, or by cheaper travel alternatives such as coaches and
2Mitfahrzentralen. Turkish migrants, from time to time, visit their
friends and/or relatives who live in the west. Almost all the members
of the family join these kinds of visits; it is like a reaffirmation of
family rituals. As this is a kind of family ritual, they prefer driving to
their destination using their own cars.
     Berlin-Turks have multiple links with their country of origin. The
growth of modern communication and transportation networks has
given rise to the Berlin-Turks’ orientation to Turkey. TV channels,
video tapes, newspapers, Internet facilities and charter flights facilitate
and increase the pace of the communication between Germany and the
homeland. To give an example: a commercial in the window of a travel
agency in Kotbusser Damm was advertising “Weekend Shopping in
Istanbul: 395 DM, 3 Days + Hotel.” These modern constituents of
globalism allow the Turkish migrants to construct a local network,
which is sustained by the images of homeland. At first glance, Kreuz-
berg is like a very condensed copy of Istanbul. Restaurants, banks,
mosques, cafés, music shops, döner kebab kiosks, graffiti, tagging and
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billboards on the walls, dressing style of the residents, and the faces
around the district, they were all reminiscent of the atmosphere of
Istanbul. On the walls of Kreuzberg one can see all kinds of political
graffiti from various groups, radical left to radical right. Also one can
witness various political organisations’ buildings standing side by side,
although they are ideologically quite oppositional in their groupings.
While playing tavla (backgammon) in one of the traditional Turkish
cafés in Kreuzberg occupied by the middle-aged and elderly males, I
had the impression that I was in a time tunnel that took me back to the
Turkey of the sixties. The clothing type of the men, the way they
shave their moustache, and the way they speak reminded me of a very
secular section of people raised by the young republic of Turkey. That
was an unchanging view in Berlin since the beginning of the migration:
a frozen moment, or a picture in time.
     Turkish migrants have set up their own community networks in all
respects. They not only have döner kebab kiosks and bakeries, but also
many other special services such as dentists, accountants, printing
houses, TV stations etc. The bilingual telephone guide is an indication
3of such a community network. From catering to mechanics, from
pet shops to doctors, the 190-pages of the Berlin Yellow Pages (Altin
Sayfalar) provides a wide variety of services to the Turkish-origin
residents of Berlin. Another indication of the community network is
the Turkish Guide for Advisory Centres (Türkçe Danisma Yerleri Ki-
lavuzu) that was published by the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Bran-
4denburg (Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Community) in 1996. The
guide provides an extensive network of advisory centres where Turk-
ish residents of Berlin could apply in case of necessity. From employ-
ment to housing, from anti-racist initiatives to sheltering for women,
the guide aims to compensate for the lack of information for the Turk-
ish migrants and their children.
‘Kleines Istanbul’ (Little Istanbul)
Most of my research took place around Kreuzberg 36 and Kotbusser
Tor, which literally constitute the centre of the Turkish ethnic enclave
in Kreuzberg. Thus, in this section, I will precisely concentrate on the
social-cultural mapping out of this quarter rather than the other parts
of Kreuzberg. A mix of late 19th century Gründerzeit houses and post
5war ‘modern’ buildings surrounds Kotbusser Tor. Leaving the train
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at Kotbusser Tor U-Bahn station, the first thing that confronts one is a
newsagent whose owner is Turkish. A journey then starts through the
heart of Kreuzberg. At the U-Bahn exit to Adalbertstraße, is another
Turkish store selling flowers. Stepping out on the Adalbertstraße, one
faces the Mevlana Camii (mosque) on the right hand, and a Turkish
open market on the left hand. Mevlana Camii is quite different from
6the classical mosques in that it does not have a minaret. It is located
just over the Kaiser’s shopping centre, which is popular among the
Turks due to its lower prices. Mevlana Camii is the factual centre of
the Berlin Milli Görüs Vakfi (Berlin National Vision Foundation),
which has organic connections with the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
7in Turkey. On the left side is the open market selling food, vegeta-
bles and fruits, mostly imported from Turkey. Further on, a passage-
way under a building permits the Adalbertstraße to continue. This
‘bridge’ is called Galata in remembrance of the historical Galata Köp-
rüsü (Bridge) in the old centre of Istanbul. Above the passage there are
situated two ‘traditional’ Turkish cafés: the centre of the conservative
Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, and the meeting point of the extreme
left wing ‘Emek, Baris ve Özgürlük Blogu’ (Labour, Peace and Free-
dom Block). This corner of Kreuzberg mirrors the diversified nature
of the Turkish population. While the small café is the meeting point of
the adult Alevi community, the big one is popular for men of every
age. Under the passage there are two döner kebab kiosks (Imbiss), a
Turkish bakery called Misir Çarsisi, and a Turkish bookstore. Misir
Çarsisi literally refers to Egyptian Bazaar. The name again springs
from the historical Misir Çarsisi, which is located near the Galata Köp-
rüsü in Istanbul.
     Another stimulating phenomenon was previously represented by the
posters and billboards stuck onto each leg of the Galata Bridge. Most
of the posters were political slogans from the far right to the far left.
The left wing slogans mostly denounced the illegitimacy of the politi-
cal order in Turkey which bans the existence of Marxist, Leninist and
Maoist organisations, which remained silent about the ‘massacre’ of
the Alevis, and which had no peaceful alternative solutions to the
Kurdish question. On the other hand, the right wing slogans consisted
mainly of the messages of the Turkish Grey Wolfs and religious
groups. Sometimes, some concert and festival posters might have been
seen here as well, e. g. ‘Live Music: Trio from Istanbul at Kestane Bar,’
or ‘Concert: Baris Manço and Cartel at Tempodrom.’ Lately, the
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Kreuzberg Municipality renovated the Galata Bridge: the form of the
legs was so restyled that it is no longer possible to stick any poster on.
In doing so, the Municipality aims to ban the announcement of those
political messages.
     Walking along through Adalbertstraße, one comes across many
döner kebab kiosks, travel agencies, groceries, bakeries, banks, glass-
ware stores, and music stores; they are all Turkish. The classical Berlin
buildings facing each other around an inner courtyard surround the
street. In Kreuzberg, a particular form of building structure was erect-
ed to serve the working and living needs. This multi-layered, structur-
ally dense and complex configuration was known as the Hinterhaus
(back/rear house, or building), designed around a series of Hinterhöfe
(back/rear courtyards). This living/working arrangement distinctly
delimited a highly stratified social ordering, in brick and mortar, of
classes and functions. The rear buildings, unlike those in front, were
built of plain brick, lacked direct access to the street and sunlight, had
no private toilets, and were invariably noisy and crowded (Mandel,
81996: 149). The courtyards are the playground of children and the
meeting place of youngsters when the youth centres are closed.
     Adalbertstraße previously used to terminate at the Berlin Wall in
the northern part. The street is cut across by three streets, i. e. Ora-
nienstraße, Naunynstraße and Waldemarstraße. The first, Oranien-
straße, is a quite popular place both for German and Turkish young-
sters. On the left side of the street many modern cafés run by Kurds
and Turks may be found. The customers of these cafés are very mixed,
which is not the norm in Berlin generally. On the right side of the
street, there are many German stores selling books, trendy clothes,
tapes and CDs for the German rockers, hip-hop fans, and techno
youngsters. Sometimes, in this corner of the street, a few multicultural
carnivals and festivals are organised by either Haus der Kulturen der
Welt, or SFB4 Radio Multikulti. These carnivals have recently reached
extensive populations. The latest one in the Summer of the year 2000
had almost half-a-million people all around Germany. In these organ-
isations, Turkish music groups also perform their pieces, such as the
rappers Islamic Force and Azize-A. In such festivals, it is common to
see some Turkish faces around, interacting with Germans, but most
Turks prefer watching the festival through the windows of their
houses facing the street.
     The second street cutting across Adalbertstraße is Naunynstraße
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where the Naunyn Ritze youth centre is located. Opposite the youth
centre is Ballhaus where some small size concerts and theatre plays are
put on stage. This street is mainly occupied by the residents them-
selves. They are mostly Turkish and Kurdish Alevis from Erzincan
and Erzurum. The third street is Waldemarstraße, which is also com-
posed of Turkish and Kurdish residents. On the right part of the street
is a kindergarten in which there is one Turkish youth worker. The
kindergarten, Çivili Park, is combined to Naunyn Ritze. Next to
Çivili Park, is Bethanien that is a monumental building with yellow
bricks. The building, which resembles a Middle Ages feudal castle,
used to be a hospital, but is now composed of various sections provid-
ing public services for the Kreuzberg people. The Bethanien consists
of a Casino, a Künstlerhaus (art school), a Turkish language library
called Namik Kemal Kütübhanesi, a music school, and a print house.
The library is quite essential for the Turkish residents. There are daily
papers, magazines and quite new scientific and literary books from
Turkey in the library.
     Taking the other exit at the tube-station, one arrives at Kotbusser
Damm and Reichenberger Straße, which are parallel to each other and
cut across by the Landwehrkanal. Kotbusser Damm is also surround-
ed by houses, a Turkish bank, Turkish stores and offices. Orient Bazaar
is the most popular of the stores. It faces the U-Bahn station. It con-
sists of a bakkal (Turkish mini market), a bakery, a music store, a jew-
ellery store and an Imbiss (small kiosk). Kotbusser Damm leads to Neu-
kölln, which is a neighbouring district where there is also a dense Turk-
ish population (Table 3). Further on, the Maybachufer cuts across the
Kotbusser Damm just after the bridge on the canal. There is an open
Turkish market in this street on Fridays. It is very similar to its equi-
valents in Turkey. The sellers advertise their mostly Turkish goods
through various screams. There is a large variety of goods in the
market from vegetable to sea foods, and from glassware to clothing.
Right across the open market in the Kotbusser Damm, there is a Turk-
ish shopping centre opened in August 2000. On the other hand,
Reichenberger Straße is dominated by the residents whose ethnic ori-
gins are Turkish, Kurdish, German, Lebanese and Portuguese. Unlike
Naunynstraße, it is an ethnically mixed neighbourhood. Chip, which is
the other youth centre where I conducted my research, is located in
this street.
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Table 3: Turkish Population in Berlin District, 30.06.1996
District Population District Population
Mitte 440     Tempelhof 4,752     
Tiergarten 8,623     Neukölln 26,904     
Wedding 24,332     Treptow 361     
Prenzlauer Berg 523     Köpenick 158     
Friedrichshain 527     Lichtenberg 304     
Kreuzberg 28,913     Weißensee 76     
Charlottenburg 7,547     Pankow 340     
Spandau 8,829     Reinickendorf 6,499     
Wilmersdorf 2,176     Marzahn 175     
Zehlendorf 845     Hohenschönhausen 106     
Schöneberg 12,051     Hellersdorf 106     
Steglitz 3,087     Total 137,674     
Source: Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister
The social-cultural mapping out of Kreuzberg 36 is very similar to that
of some other townscape examples which exemplify a different kind of
diasporic space such as Southall, London (Baumann, 1996), Rinkeby,
Stockholm (Ålund, 1991, 1996), and 32nd Street, Chicago (Horowitz,
1983). Diasporic characteristics of a particular townscape mainly
spring from the way cultures are reified by its sojourners. Diasporic
communities tend to reify culture at the same time as making and
remaking it. Departing from the critical judgements of the youngsters
about, for instance, the way their parents dress up, one could conclude
that there is a strong ‘cultural conservatism’ amongst the first genera-
tion migrants living in Kreuzberg. Knowing both modern Turkey and
Kreuzberg, the youngsters imply that some people are still living a life
of twenty years ago. Looking at the dresses of the people going to the
Friday Turkish bazaar in Kotbusser Tor, it is highly possible to see
many women wearing very colourful eastern Anatolian clothes includ-
ing traditional scarf, or black veil, and shalvar (baggy trousers); or else
to see many men wearing religious robes with full sleeves, long skirts
and turban.
     For many in the Turkish diaspora, the cultural baggage brought
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from home is an absolutely vital element in the negotiation of identity,
but it comprises a renovated set of practices and discourses, too.
Reification of culture serves as a social strategy for the diasporic
individual. There is no doubt that Turkish migrants are better off in
Germany compared to their pre-immigrant social-economic status in
Turkey. Representing pre-immigrant lifestyles as in their dressing
styles and recollecting the hardships of the past as in their daily dis-
courses, immigrants tend to justify their act of immigration as the right
option. By reifying culture, maintaining pre-immigrant social net-
works (hemsehri bonds) and familial connections, those immigrants
attempt to adopt themselves in the diasporic context where they find
themselves alone and without the traditional support systems they
were brought up with.
     As stated before culture is a continuous process of change, whereas
the first generation immigrants transform it into a heritage in the
diaspora. In other words, as Baumann states in Southall (London)
example (1996: 192), for diasporic communities cultural processes
become transformed into cultural heritage, that could be reified in
order to enculturate the young generations and to construct a cultural
fortress of their own in relation to that of the majority culture. The
process of cultural reification among the first generation Turkish
migrants is also strengthened by the Turkish media. What follows in
the next section is the impact of the Turkish media on the construction
of a distinct Turkish diasporic identity, which partly invests on the
preservation of culture as a heritage.
Interconnectedness in Space
For at least a decade, the presence of Turkish language mass media in
Germany, and particularly in Berlin, has become so salient that the
Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs, Barbara John, even
spoke of the dangers of ‘3T’: easy access to Turkish language televi-
sion, cheaper costs in telecommunication, and long-distance travel
(Faist, 2000a). The Commissioner raised her concerns that the perma-
nent spread of transportation and communication facilities between
diaspora and homeland contribute to hinder the integration of immi-
grants in Germany. As seen from the statement of the Berlin Commi-
sioner, the volume of the Turkish language media has reached an
extensive level. The development of tele-communication technology
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has made the reception of almost all the Turkish TV channels and
newspapers in Berlin possible. Turkish media in Berlin have achieved a
remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the Turkish diaspora. To
understand this one has to examine the rising interest of the Turkish
media industry in the Turkish population living in diaspora. The major
Turkish TV channels have had their own European units making
special programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT International
(state channel) is the first of these channels. Then come Euro Show,
Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7, HBB and Satel. All
these TV channels apart from the TRT International can be received
via satellite antennas. TRT Int is already available on cable (Table 4).
Table 4: Turkish TV Channels in Germany and the Rate of Audience
Turkish TV Channels Percent
TRT-INT 47.0     
Euroshow 22.0     
HBB 0.5     
Eurostar 7.0     
ATV 2.0     
TGRT 1.0     
Kanal 6 0.5     
Others 20.0     
Source: Türkiye Arastirmalar Merkezi – Zentrum für Türkeistudien,
Bonn 1995
The programme spectrum of all these channels may differ greatly from
each other. TRT Int tends mainly to give equal weight to entertain-
ment, education, magazine, movies and news. Since it is a state owned
channel, it tries to promote the ‘indispensable unity of the Turkish
nation’ by arranging, for instance, money campaigns for the Turkish
armed forces fighting in the South Eastern part of Turkey. There are
also many programmes concentrating on the problems of the Europe-
an Turks. This channel can also be widely received in Turkey. Thus, in
a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the happenings of
the European-Turks, mainly that of the German-Turks, whilst con-
necting the modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland.
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     Euro Show, Euro D, Euro Star and Euro HBB are private channels
making secular based programmes. The majority of the programmes
are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy
programmes, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sport pro-
grammes, reality-shows and news. On the other hand TGRT and
Kanal 7 are the religious based TV channels. Besides the actual pro-
grammes, these channels give priority to the dramas and movies with
religious motives. Traditional Turkish folk music programmes are also
a part of the policy of these two channels. Satel is another channel
giving the Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel
of the Turkish youngsters who have satellite antennae.
     Apart from these satellite channels, there are a few more local
Turkish TV channels in Berlin. TD1 is one of them. Turkish video
movies, local news and sport programmes are the major components
of the programme. It also provides news and some dramas from
Turkey, previously copied from Turkish channels. There are also some
other channels, which can be watched on the Offener Kanal (Open
Channel) and Spree Kanal. They are both free channels to rent. Aypa
TV, TFD (Türkisches Fernsehen in Deutschland), Alcanlar TV, Ehli
9Beyit TV are some of these TV associations. Recently, there is also a
new radio channel broadcasting 24-hour in Turkish: Radio Metropol
94.8. This channel was founded in the year 2000, and has a wide
variety of programms ranging from local and international news to
Turkish music.
     Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also printed in Germany
to be distributed in Germany as well as in the rest of Europe. Hürri-
yet, Milliyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet and Evrensel are some of the Turkish
papers printed in Germany. There are also many other sports and
magazine papers from Turkey. Although the content of the papers is
extremely limited in terms of the news about the homeland, they offer
a wide range of news about Turkish diasporic communities in Europe.
Hürriyet has its own Berlin supplement each Wednesday, providing
10community news (Table 5).
     Cultural hegemony of the Turkish media partly shapes the ‘habitats
11of meaning’ of the diasporic subject living in the West. Turkish me-
dia mostly attempt to provide a stream of programmes, which is con-
sidered to suit the ‘habitats of meaning’ of the diasporic subject. For
instance, the German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media in-
dustry as a group of people who resist cultural change. This percep-
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12Table 5: Turkish Newspapers Printed in Germany
Newspaper First Publish-
ing Date
Tirage (pcs)
in 1995
Tirage (pcs)
in 1997
Hürriyet 1971     107,634     107,000     
Milliyet 1972     25,000     16,000     
Sabah 1996     -     25,000     
Türkiye 1987     40,000     40,000     
Cumhuriyet* 1995     -     5,000     
Milli Gazete 1973     11,000     12,000     
Zaman 1990     4,000     13,000     
Tercüman 1972     19,000     -     
Yeni Günaydin 1991     14,000     -     
Özgür Gündem 1993     8,000     -     
Emek-Evrensel* 1996     -     8,000     
Dünya* 1991     2,500     2,500     
Ordadogu 1996     -     3,000     
Total 231,134     231,500     
*   Weekly newspaper
Source: Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Bonn 1995 and 1997
tion, for instance, is the main rationale behind the selection of the
movies and dramas. A high number of the films on each channel are
the old Turkish films, which were produced in the late sixties and
13seventies. The performance of the old Turkish movies, which touch
upon some traditional issues such as Anatolian feudalism, bloodfeuds,
migration (gurbet), desperate romance and poverty, reinforces the
reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora. As Michel Foucault
noted such films attempt to ‘re-programme popular memory’ to
recover ‘lost, unheard memories’ which had been denied, or buried, by
the dominant representations of the past experienced in the diaspora
(Quoted in Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Hence, identity is also a
question of memory, and memories of home in particular (Morley and
Robins, 1993: 10). Before the private TV channels were opened, it was
the VCR industry, which used to provide the Turkish diaspora with
14those kinds of movies.
     Berlin-Turks, whose ‘habitats of meaning’ have been extensively
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nurtured by the Turkish media, have also a different sense of place
within the diaspora. The Turkish media play a very crucial role in the
formation of a more complex form of belonging for the Turkish
diaspora. The media create, for the diasporic communities, a symbolic
bond to the homeland, a symbolic bond to various diasporic Turkish
communities in Europe, and conversely also persuade the diasporic
subject to become a sojourner in the country of settlement. Feeding
the ethnic flame of Turkishness and Turkish culture, the Turkish
media tend to create a distinctive Turkish identity in diaspora. The
construction of such a distinct identity is indeed quite relevant to what
the discourse of multiculturalism aims to do in Berlin. In the coming
section, I will elaborate some of the Turkish ethnic organisations in
Berlin and their discourses prior to the institutions and dominant
discourse of multiculturalism. Subsequently, I shall expose the impact
of the official ideology of multiculturalism on the culturalisation and
minorisation of the Alevi community in Berlin.
Major Turkish Ethnic Associations in Berlin
The conventional notion of diaspora presupposes the existence of a
homogenous community that had been forced to leave the homeland.
This relatively homogenous community tends to exclude the majority
society rather than diffusing into it. In fact, it would be misleading to
name the Turkish communities living in Germany as a homogenous
diaspora. While there are some communities such as the religious
groups of Süleymancis, Nurcus and Kaplancis that might suit the
definition of old diasporas as a social category, most of the Turkish-
15origin sojourners in Germany contradict this old notion. Turkish
religious communities (cemaat) having fundamentalist beliefs are built
around what Salman Rushdie (1990) calls ‘the absolutism of the Pure.’
“The apostles of purity,” he argues, are always moved by the fear that
“intermingling with a different culture will inevitably weaken and ruin
their own.” What they believe is that communicating with the ‘unbe-
lievers’ does not strengthen their spiritual belief system. A seventy-
year-old Turkish Sunni hodja (religious leader, teacher, or preacher) of
the Rufai sect in the Mevlana Camii, hints at the rationale behind the
construction of a Islamic diasporic identity:
We [Muslims] prefer the company of the believers (mümins). It is not enough
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to be Muslim. Muslim means to surrender to the will of God, but surrendering
does not prove that someone is a trustful believer who has faith in God. There
are three strata in an Islamic community: Avam (ordinary people), Has
(Faithful people) and Hasin Hasi (most faithful people). The Holy Book,
Koran, says we must stick together with the believers to strengthen our faith in
God, and to progress spiritually against the material world. Thus, we tend to
distance ourselves from the Avam. It gives us spiritual inspiration to be togeth-
er with the trustful believers (Personal interview, 25 January 1996).
The Islamic man whom I talked to was a retired carpenter, and was
not able to speak German at all, although he had come to Germany
almost twenty-five years ago. His main concern has always been to
keep the Islamic purity without intermingling with the majority
society, most of whom he called unbelievers. The interview was ac-
companied by a German researcher friend of mine for whom I was
doing simultaneous translation. In the end of the interview, the hoca
fulfilled his mission by inviting my friend to convert to Islam (irshad).
Like many other Turkish Sunnis his main intention is to remain in
Europe until the last European Christian has been converted to Islam.
     The elite of those religious groups had to immigrate to Germany
after the 1960 military coup d’état in Turkey. The practice of migration
has gained a mystical meaning for these religious groups. They con-
structed a resemblance between their experience and that of the
prophet Mohammed. The prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina in
order to be able to free his Islamic community from the oppression of
the non-believers. It is believed that the experience of migration (hijra)
gave the believers the chance to test their faith in God. Thus, by doing
so, the Muslim immigrants believe that the act of migration has strength-
ened their faith (Atacan, 1993: 57). These groups have formed their
own cultural and religious islands in Germany. What they form is a
16kind of relatively homogenous Islamic Diaspora (with a capital ‘D’).
     These separate religious groupings resemble archipelago islands,
which do not have surface connections to each other. They spring
from various schools in Islam and always have different interpretations
of the holy book Koran, but their common denominator is their rela-
tion to the receiving Christian society. They prefer sticking together
within their own closed religious communities and distance themselves
from the Christian society. Although most of the religious communi-
ties are loyal to the universal Islamic binarism between Dar’ul Islam
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(Land of Islam) and Dar’ul Harb (Land of War), they are not able to
free themselves from their particularist and national understanding of
the Islamic religion. For instance, religious Turkish communities do
not consider the Indian-origin Wahabbis a valid form of Islam.
     The conflict between various Islamic schools prevents the existence
of a homogenous Islamic Diaspora: it is extremely diversified. Some of
the groups have an universalist vision of Islam that is, to a certain
extent, independent of nationalist connotations. Süleymancis, Nurcus
and Kaplancis are the Islamic sects (tarikat) having a relatively univer-
salist discourse. They attempt to disconnect themselves both from the
country of origin and settlement. On the other hand, some other
groupings have a powerful orientation to Turkey in their understand-
ing of Islam, e. g., Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilati, AMGT (Association
17of National Vision in Europe). AMGT has a wide network in Berlin
as well as in Europe. The organisation has a modern youth cultural
centre in Kreuzberg, where some of the Turkish youngsters go for
leisure activities such as watching religious plays, playing billiards and
watching cable TV. The group also opened an officially recognised
public school in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg in 1981. They run the
school covertly, since they are still considered an illegal organisation.
Recently they succeeded to get financial support for the school from
the Berlin Senate. The School of Islamic Sciences consists of primary
and secondary schools. German is the medium of education in the
school, Turkish, Arabic and English are the other languages the stu-
dents are supposed to learn. The organisation also covertly runs some
Koran teaching courses in its own mosques.
     All of these religious organisations are considered illegal in Germa-
ny. The only official religious organisation is Diyanet Isleri Türk
Islam Birligi, DITIB (Turkish-Islam Union, Religious Affairs). DITIB
is the official religious representative of the Turkish government. It has
the biggest Islamic audience in Berlin. DITIB has a nationalist vision
of Islam. It has a community school in Kreuzberg, where the students
are taught Turkish history, Turkish geography, Turkish and Arabic.
DITIB has thirteen mosques in Berlin out of almost fifty. In these
mosques, Koran courses are conducted. Deriving from various sources
of Islam, all these religious communities have separately constructed
18Islamic Diasporas as a social practice and category.
     Besides the religious-based ethnic associations, Turks have founded
some other ethnic organisations in Berlin that are based on the ideo-
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logical and political cleavages in Turkey. The first group of organisa-
tions can be gathered under the umbrella of the Türkische Gemeinde
zu Berlin (TGB). The concept of Türkische here means ethnic Sun-
ni-Muslim-Turk, so it excludes other Anatolian peoples like Kurds,
Alevis, Circassians and Assurians. These groups have a conservative,
nationalist and religious basis, and have attachments to the right-wing
political parties in Turkey such as the True Path Party (Dogruyol
Partisi, DYP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), the
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), and the Nationalist Action Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). They also have connections with
the conservative parties in Germany like CDU and CSU. Their prefer-
ence for the conservative Christian parties stems from their traditional
opposition to the left in Turkey, and from their political choices in the
homeland. As an ethnic organisation they have two principal discours-
es, i. e. culture discourse and minority discourse.
     These groups celebrate the authentic and mythical Turkish culture
that they trace back to the very early ages in Central Asia in contrast
to the relatively new German culture which can only be traced back
two hundred years. The former head of TGB, Mustafa Çakmakoglu,
for instance, underlines the cultural difference between Turkish and
German societies:
We [Turks] have got a strong culture, which goes back two thousand years,
whereas Germans have a two hundred-year culture. Their history consists of
unification [in the nineteenth century], nationalism, enmity towards France,
warfare, Marshall Plan and power. But we have culture (Personal interview, 2
February 1996).
By saying so, Çakmakoglu attempts to reify Turkish culture as a
discrete unity. His use of the notion of culture resembles what Clive
Harris (1997) calls CULT(ure). This holistic and essentialist notion of
culture grants a privilege to cultural authenticity, which is a process of
self-awareness arising from the discovery and recognition of tradition-
al local-cultural formations in their own historical settings. His dis-
course also underlines the conventional differentiation between ‘cul-
ture’ and ‘civilisation’ in a way that celebrates the former.
     TGB also claims to be the most important representative of the
Turkish minority in Berlin before the other German and Turkish
bodies. The largest Turkish ethnic-political grouping apart from TGB
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is Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB). Some other groups
of people have come together through their own nuclear organisations
under the umbrella of the TBB. These nuclear organisations are, for
instance, some specialised organisations like doctors, academics,
students, students’ parents, Alevis and some left-wing organisations
etc. Here, the concept of Türkische literally refers to ‘Türkiyeli’ (peo-
ple from Turkey) in Turkish. It is an attempt to include both the
left-wing and Kurdish-origin people that feel themselves in a kind of
exile. Although they have a more universalist vision compared to the
other Turkish communities, they also have a visible political orienta-
tion to the homeland. They run some political activities showing that
these groups of people have become the sojourners and have interest in
the internal politics of the receiving country. For instance, in the
parliamentary elections in Berlin (October 1995) three Kurdish-origin
Turkish citizens were elected for the Berlin Provincial Parliament (2
from the Grünen and 1 from the PDS), and 10 other Turkish citizens
were elected to the municipality parliaments. These groups of organi-
sations are also in favour of the acquisition of German citizenship for
the Turkish citizens. Yet, the elite of the TBB is against the acquisition
of an ethnic minority status in the German society because they
believe that such a political shift would increase the xenophobic senti-
ment in Germany towards the Turks. So they are quite sceptical about
the notion of ethnic minority.
     Whatever their political orientation is towards the country of
residence or to the homeland, it is very clear that each type of organi-
sation tends to form interest groups that can mobilise Turkish minori-
ty in social, political and economic respects. The setting of the earlier
Turkish migrant organisations in Berlin used to be defensive: in order
to resist the feeling of exclusion and loneliness they constructed a local
solidarity network. Whereas the contemporary ethnic organisations
seek to promote the political participation of the Turks in a way that
leads to a bridge formed between the majority and the minority. Thus,
while these groups in contrast to the religious groups prefer interac-
ting with the majority society, it is misleading to believe that these
diversified groups constitute a homogenous Turkish diaspora.
     All these organisations indicate that the diversified Turkish ethnic
minority, apart from those segregationist religious groups, prefers
incorporating into, and interacting with, the majority society. They
tend to incorporate themselves into the political interest groups like
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political parties and labour unions. This is the indication of the con-
struction of a Gesellschaft network, rather than a traditional Gemein-
schaft network. The institutionalisation of the Turkish minority in the
form of Gesellschaft can be observed in the economic sphere (free
enterprise, investment in Germany), the political sphere (political
organisations which are oriented to Germany, to Turkey, or to both),
and the leisure time activities (music courses, family tea gardens,
folklore courses). While the Turkish minority attempts to mobilise
itself by means of interest groups formed to interact and negotiate
with the German political institutions, Berlin administration has
recently produced some multicultural organisations to answer the new
incorporatist demands raised by the Turkish minority. Accordingly, I
will now briefly explore these multicultural initiatives, and scrutinise
the dominant discourse of multiculturalism in Berlin.
Institutional Multiculturalism in Berlin
Multiculturalism is one of the prevailing notions and/or institutions of
the present time. Parekh defines multiculturalism as numerical plurali-
ty of cultures that is creating, guaranteeing, encouraging spaces within
which different communities are able to grow up at their own pace. At
the same time it means creating a public space in which these commu-
nities are able to interact, enrich the existing culture and create a new
consensual culture in which they recognise reflections of their own
identity. According to Parekh, “multiculturalism is possible, but only
if communities feel confident enough to engage in a dialogue and
where there is enough public space for them to interact with the dom-
inant culture” (Parekh, in Parekh and Bhabha 1989: 27). One way of
promoting this ideal is to provide forms and manifestations of ethnic
diversity with greater public status and dignity.
     In Western European context, for instance in Great Britain, Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Sweden, the ideology of multiculturalism
serves as a new way of public incorporation, which the modern na-
tion-state has put into play vis-à-vis migrants and their descendants.
The form of multiculturalism, which was put into words by Parekh
remains to be an ideal. As I will demonstrate below, the dominant
ideology of multiculturalism aims to imprison minority cultures in
their distinct boundaries, even closing up the channels of dialogue
between cultures.
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     Berlin is one of the world cities where there is an extensive infra-
structure promoting multiculturalism in one way or another. Berlin
has always been a world city, which has housed various cultures.
There are some initiatives attempting to embody a pluralist and multi-
cultural city in which all the constitutive components of Berlin could
co-exist in harmony. Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats (Commis-
sioner for Foreigners’ Affairs), das Haus der Kulturen der Welt
(House of the World Cultures), SFB4 Radio Multikulti and Werkstatt
der Kulturen (Workshop of Cultures) are some of these multicultural
initiatives.
     Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats is an office that was founded
in 1981 as a part of the Berlin Senate administration to co-ordinate
policies in the areas of the health, family, housing, education, welfare
and police departments, and to take care of the groups with particular
19problems. Its primary function, though, is to act as a liaison agency
between the local government and various ethnic associations estab-
lished in the city. The other function of the office involves public rela-
tions including publishing a monthly, 100-page magazine (Top-Berlin
International: Ein Informationsforum), and offering an extensive list
20of videos and publications on specific ethnic communities in Berlin,
legal procedures and material encouraging children’s and youth activi-
ties, vocational guidance for youth and etc. Recently, the office has ini-
tiated a set of poster-billboard campaigns with slogans such as ‘Mit-
einander leben in Berlin’ (‘live together in Berlin’) and ‘Wir sind Ber-
lin: wir sind Helle und Dunkle!’ (‘We are Berlin: We are light and
dark!’) in order to be able to recapitulate the ideas and perceptions of
the Berliners on the co-existence of differences (Vertovec, 1996a).
     Haus der Kulturen der Welt serves as an exhibition venue, confer-
ence and seminar centre, concert and festival venue. It was built in
1957 as the Congress Hall (Kongreßhalle). In 1989, it was given a new
name. It is the stage where the non-European cultures have been
introduced to the Berliners by means of exhibitions, conferences,
movies, concerts and festivals. It aims to strengthen the roots of multi-
cultural Berlin. Since Turks and Kurds compose approximately more
than one third of the minority population living in Berlin, recent
developments in Turkey have always been on the agenda of the Haus.
Islam is at the core of contemporary interest. Berlin is trying to under-
stand the current revival of Islam through the prism of Turkey.
     SFB4 Radio Multikulti was founded in September 1994 as the fourth
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station of Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), which is the local public broad-
casting corporation. “The whole world is at the end of the scale: FM
106.8 Mhz” is the motto of the non-stop radio channel. It was initially
planned to be a three-year-project financed by SFB and Federal Minis-
try of Employment and Social Services, whereas the radio is still broad-
casting. It broadcasts ethnic music programmes in eighteen different
mother tongues, including German as a foreign language (Vertovec,
211996a). The channel broadcasts none of the western music forms.
Turkish is one of the languages represented amongst the ethnic music
samples. Turkish pop music, Turkish rap and Turkish art music cover
the biggest space in the Turkish language programmes. The pro-
grammes are set up by three producers of Turkish-origin. Aras Ören,
who is a popular novelist and has been living in Berlin since the sixties,
is the supervisor of the Turkish programmes for the SFB. However, a
recent public survey carried out among the Berlin-Turks indicates that
12 percent of the Turks are aware of Radio Multikulti, and only 4 per-
cent of them regularly listen to it. The same survey also depicts that
the radio could not be received well in Kreuzberg and Wedding (Mes-
eth, 1996).
     SFB4 also organises cultural carnivals and festivals in collaboration
with Haus der Kulturen in Kreuzberg and in some other parts of
Berlin. In these carnivals, all the ‘ethnic’ components of Berlin are re-
presented with their music and folk dances. These carnivals and festi-
vals might give us some clue about how the state attempts to represent
the ‘ethnics’ to the ‘dominant’ culture. Carnival-type activities define
‘ethnics’ as possessing ‘folk culture’ and not the culture of distinction.
It can also distract attention away from the central problem of struc-
tural inequalities in access to resources (Bottomley, 1987: 5).
     Werkstatt der Kulturen was opened in October 1993 in the district
of Neukölln where there is a large Turkish population. It has been de-
signed as a Begegnungszentrum (encounter centre). It is financially
supported by the Ausländerbeauftragte of the Berlin Senate and
governed by a board of trustees elected every two years from local
organisations. The Werkstatt attempts to promote understanding be-
tween the cultures of the area and to try new ways of togetherness
(Miteinander), especially among youth. It promotes exhibitions and
conferences; coordinates projects, training courses (photography,
painting, ceramics, video-making and music-making) and seminars
concerning matters surrounding expressive arts, inter-cultural dia-
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logue, the plight of refugees, and violence against minorities in the city
(Vertovec, 1996a).
     Despite the existence of such strong multicultural initiatives in
Berlin, it is quite doubtful to claim that the minorities living, for
instance, in Kreuzberg or Wedding are widely aware of them. When
asked, most members of the Turkish minority reply that they are not
aware of the existence of these initiatives and their works. On the
other hand, those who are aware of these initiatives, do not trust the
‘multicultural’ policies. What they believe is that, these kinds of ini-
tiatives are nothing but a ‘face-saving’ effort by the Berlin government.
Yet, this does not mean that these initiatives do not have any impact
on the ethnic minorities. Those diasporic subjects, who are attached to
Turkish ethnic organisations in one way or another, are culturally
being shaped by these initiatives. In what follows, this issue will be
raised.
Essentialising and ‘Othering the Other’
In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-western cultures in
the form of music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the recon-
firmation of the categorisation of ‘the west and the rest.’ The rationale
behind the representation of the cultural forms of those ‘others’ in
these multicultural initiatives inevitably contributes to the broadening
of differences between the so-called ‘distinct cultures.’ The ideology of
multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise the cultures. It also
assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured
wholes attached to ethnic groups (Çaglar, 1994: 26). Essentialising the
idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism
risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their
boundedness and mutual distinctness; it also risks overrating the
internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise
repressive demands for communal conformity.
     Furthermore, all these so-called multicultural institutions appar-
ently embody a process of culturalisation. Culturalisation – a culture-
related smoothing out of social inequality, social anomalies and
discrimination – occupies a prominent place in the process of change
currently affecting European society (Ålund, 1996; Ålund and Schier-
up, 1991). Social differentiation, segregation, institutional racism, dis-
crimination and class differences are all reduced to, and legitimised in,
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culturalisation of differences. Thus, actual multiculturalism in both
Germany and Europe happens to represent a form of integration of
cultural diversity into a system of structural inequalities (Ålund and
Schierup, 1991: 139).
     This type of constructed multiculturalism in Berlin permits the
supposedly ‘distinct cultures’ to express themselves in some public
platforms such as Haus der Kulturen der Welt. Multiculturalist meta-
narrative might, at first glance, seem to be a ‘friend’ as John Russon
(1995: 524) stated. These multicultural platforms, in a way, sharpen the
process of ‘othering the other’ in the imagery of self, or in other
words, leads to a form of ethnic ‘exotification.’ Russon (1995: 524) ex-
plains that:
Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to insist that we
treat others as others, and accept their ways as, perhaps, ‘interesting,’ ‘private’
to them, and especially not the same as ours. [T]his exotification which ‘toler-
ates the other’ is another product of the alienating gaze of the reflective ego,
and it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of lesser en-
tity open to our patronising support, despite our complete rejection of its value
as analysing other than the cute contingencies of someone else’s culture; thus
there is an inherent power relation here in which the other is made subordinate
to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it fails to acknowledge that,
just as our program of tolerance has implications for the other – it contains that
other in its view – so too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-
called ‘democratic’ and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic expression as that
of the other is an ethnicity […].
Russon’s remarks on ‘tolerance’ remind us of the way in which public
and private spheres are highly differentiated by the ideology of multi-
culturalism. This ideology, as John Rex (1986, 1991) has described,
involves nurturing commonality (shared laws, open economy and
equal access to state provisions) in the former and ensuring freedom
(maintain the traditions of ethnic minorities) in the latter. Russon,
first, prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to promote the
confinement of cultures in their own private spheres with a limited
interaction with other cultures. In other words, the distinctions be-
tween private and public, or between politics and culture “can relegate
the contentious differences to a sphere that does not impinge on the
political” (Taylor, 1994: 62).
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     The differentiation between public and private has always contribut-
ed to the reinforcement of dominant class or group’s hegemony over
the subaltern groups. The cultures that hardly interact with other
cultures are tempted to become a static heritage. Thus, Russon, here,
draws our attention to the point that the official discourse of multicul-
turalism contributes to the reification of cultures by the minority
communities. Secondly, he underlines the issue of power relations
between the dominant culture and the others. This is the clientelist
side of the policy of multiculturalism – a point to which I shall return
shortly. Clientelism tends to petrify the existing social conditions
without making any change in the power relations between ‘master’
and ‘disciple.’
     Renato Rosaldo also raises what Russon attempts to criticise by the
notion of ‘tolerance’ in a slightly different way. Searching the correla-
tion between culture and power, Rosaldo (1989: 198-204) rightly
claims that power and culture have a negative correlation. In saying so,
he refers to the examples of the Philippines and Mexico. In the Philip-
pines and Mexico, for instance, full citizens are those who have power
and lack culture, whereas those most culturally endowed minorities,
such as Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power respec-
tively. Thus, having power refers to being postcultural and vice versa:
“the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys; and the more
culture one has, the less power one yields. If they [minorities] have an
explicit monopoly on authentic culture, we [majority] have an unspo-
ken one on institutional power” (1989: 202).
     Rosaldo takes the discussion further, and concludes that making the
‘other’ culturally visible results with the invisibility of the ‘self.’ Thus,
the policy of multiculturalism attempts to dissolve the ‘self’ within the
minority. Dissolution of the ‘self’ is also related to the celebration of
difference by minorities because the notion of difference makes culture
particularly visible to outside observers. Hence, not only the multicul-
turalist policies, but also minorities themselves contribute to the
process of dissolution of the ‘self’ as well as of the institutional power
within the minority. In the following section, as an attempt to illus-
trate this theoretical framework I will explore the construction and ar-
ticulation of Alevi ethnicity and culture in Berlin, in relation to the
dominant discourse of multiculturalism.
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The Case of Manifest Alevism in ‘Multicultural’ Berlin
Alevism is a heterodox religious identity that is peculiar to Anatolia. It
is practised by some Turkish and Kurdish segments of the Anatolian
society. Turkish Alevis used to concentrate in central Anatolia, with
important pockets throughout the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal
regions and the European part of Turkey. Kurdish Alevis were con-
centrated in the north-western part of the Kurdish settlement zone
between Turkish Kurdistan and the rest of the country. Both Turkish
and Kurdish Alevis have left their isolated villages for the big cities of
Turkey and Europe since 1950s.
     Alevism itself is the main source of identity for the Alevi young-
sters. Previously, the Alevi youngsters of Turkish ethnic origin in
Germany, used to identify themselves with their Turkishness. They
used to carry Turkish ethnic symbols to express their ethnicity as a
response to the rising racial attacks and discrimination in Germany:
e. g. a Turkish flag on their belt buckles. Although most of the urban
Alevis have always had to dissimulate their identities due to the su-
premacy of the Sunni order in the public sphere (Takiyye), they con-
tinued with their rituals in their private spheres. Their children had to
play with the Sunni children in the streets without giving out any clue,
which might reveal their Alevism. In a way, they had to assimilate to
the dominant ideology of Sunni-Turkism. And then what happened?
Why did they suddenly need to express their Alevi identity publicly?
While they were celebrating their Turkishness against the racial at-
tacks, why did they turn to celebrating their Alevism?
     Alevis have started to radically declare their religious identity pub-
licly after the recent tragic incidences in Turkey, like the massacre of
37 Alevi artists in Sivas (July, 1993) and of 15 Alevi people in a dense-
ly-Alevi-populated neighbourhood of Istanbul (Gaziosmanpasa,
March 1995). When the Alevi-leftist-oriented Pir Sultan Abdal associ-
ation organised a cultural festival in Sivas – a central Anatolian City
that is historically divided between Sunnis and Alevis – in July 1993,
numerous prominent Alevi-origin artists and authors, including Aziz
Nesin (not an Alevi), attended. The festival was picketed by a large
group of violent right-wing demonstrators who were clearly keen on
killing Aziz Nesin. The author, Aziz Nesin had previously provoked
the anger of many Sunni Muslims by announcing his intention to pub-
lish a translation of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. Throwing stones
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and burning rags through the windows of the hotel where the partici-
pants of the festival were staying, the demonstrators succeeded in set-
ting fire to the hotel. Thirty-seven people were killed in this fire, due
to the indifferent attitude of the police forces of the ‘Sunni’ Turkish
state. This was a very crucial incident leading to the radicalisation of
the Alevi movement in relation to the sluggishness of the state appa-
ratus.
     Relations between Alevis and the Turkish state reached even lower
depths with clashes between the police and Alevi demonstrators in the
Gazi neighbourhood of Istanbul in March 1995. Gazi Mahallesi is a
ghetto that is dominated by Alevi residents. The hostilities started
when an unknown gunman in a stolen taxi fired a number of shots
against a group of men sitting in a café, killing one Alevi. Police were
remarkably slow in taking action, and the rumour soon spread that the
local police post might have been involved in the terrorist attacks. The
day after, thousands of Alevi people from the Gazi neighbourhood
went on to the streets to protest about the murder. The police and the
demonstrators clashed, and the police killed fifteen Alevi demonstra-
tors (Bruinessen, 1996b: 9-10). These incidences have opened a new
era in Alevi revivalism both at home and in the diaspora.
     Similarly, the diaspora context, to a certain degree, alleviates the
already deep-set antagonisms, suspicion, and animosity between Sunni
and Alevi youths. In fact, many Sunnis become still more hostile to-
wards Alevis. The unchecked politicisation of mosque-centred reli-
gious preaching that proliferates in Germany is often directed against
‘infidel’ and ‘immoral’ Germans, communists, and by extension, Alevis
(Mandel, 1996: 157). The separate Sunni and Alevi value systems and
histories are, to a large extent, reproduced among the diasporic youth
in a way that reflects different patterns of socialisation in each group.
These different patterns of socialisation influence the overall future
orientations of Sunni and Alevi youths towards Turkey and Germany
(Mandel, 1990: 167).
     Diasporic Alevi youngsters have experienced something different
from their Alevi counterparts living back home. After those crucial
incidents happened in Turkey, their Turkishness, which they used to
celebrate in reaction to the notorious racist incidents in Mölln and
Solingen, no longer offered a refuge for them. The homeland Turkey,
which has become a land of repression and sorrow, has turned into a
‘lost homeland’ for Alevi youngsters. The orientation of the Alevi
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youngsters to homeland differs from that of the Sunni youngsters.
While the Sunni youth may keep alive their orientation to the home-
land, the Alevi youngsters may well be in search of homing in Berlin.
Another aspect reminding them of the ‘bitter’ reality of homeland is
the conditions of their counterparts in Turkey. Since the milieu they
visit in the summer vacations is either in the ghettos of the big cities or
in the small towns and/or villages, they have a restricted vision of
youth in Turkey. What they describe, when asked, is mainly the
working-class youth in the homeland. They suppose that all the
youngsters in Turkey are suffering, and have to work all the time.
     The incidents of Sivas and Gazi Mahallesi have become the pillars
of the political Alevi revivalism both in and outside Turkey. They have
recently founded some political-cultural organisations in Berlin and
Germany. Anatolian Alevis’ Cultural Centre (Anadolu Alevileri
Kültür Merkezi, AAKM), Democratic Alevis Association (Demokra-
tik Aleviler Birligi), Ehl-i Beyt Path (Ehl-i Beyt Yolu) are just some of
those organisations established in Berlin. The AAKM is the most
popular one of those Alevi organisations centred in Berlin. This organ-
isation was founded in 1989. It is run by a committee of people and
financed by the Berlin Senate and the Alevi population in Berlin. A
mix of Zaza-Kurdish Alevis and Turkish Alevis constitutes the mem-
22bers of the AAKM. The centre is located in Wedding that is another
Turkish enclave in Berlin. There is a ‘Cemevi’ in the centre. Cemevi
literally means communion house where the co-religious people meet
up and have their religious ceremonies. The religious ceremony is
called ayn-i cem (Mass), which springs from the word cemaat (com-
munity).
     The authentic style of the cem rituals taking place in the Anatolian
Alevi villages are very small-size social and religious gatherings where
the Alevi residents of the village meet up, worship and solve their
mutual social problems in the presence of a holy communal guide. The
spiritual guide is called Dede, or pir. The Dede is considered to be de-
scending from holy lineage. They typically wander much of the year,
travel from one group of his talip followers to the next, and lead ayn-i
cems. In these mystic ayn-i cems, love of god, which is reflected on the
human being, is celebrated. According to the teachings of Alevism,
human being is the reflection of the beauty of God. Unlike the Sunnis,
who turn towards the Kaaba during the pray, the Alevis face each
other in a circular position. Human being is the Kaaba in the Alevi
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teaching. Facing the other refers to seeing the spiritual light of saintli-
ness (nur), which is considered to be appearing on the other’s face.
Besides being the platform of worship, Cem is also the place where the
public court (halk meclisi) is organised to solve communal and indi-
vidual problems in a very democratic and egalitarian way. In the court,
everybody has equal right to speak.
     There are two other very important elements of the Alevi teaching.
The first one is ‘ser ver, sir verme!’, which literally means ‘better die
than give away a secret.’ This element of Alevism is not only an ethical
value. That is also a political manoeuvring that springs as a result of
the need for takiyye (dissimulation). Another determinant of the Alevi
matrix is ‘eline, beline, diline sahip olmak’, which means ‘to control
one’s hands, tongue and sexual needs.’ This is the very ethical motto of
23the Alevi teaching that is inevitably taken in childhood. Alevism has
a strict set of social control norms and rules, which defines the frame-
work of ‘correct behaviour.’ In case of violation of these rules, sect
members might be penalised by exclusion from all group activities and
payment of fines. No one could escape from the judgement at the
major annual rites called görgü or ayn-i cem where the Alevi creed is
renewed and reviewed, and serious offences are admitted publicly
before the community. The Dede, in these communal gatherings, aims
to maintain peace and harmony between sect members by helping
them reconcile their differences. These rituals have always been carried
out in closely-knit village units throughout history. After the migra-
tions from rural to urban areas in Turkey and abroad, Alevi communi-
ties faced the danger of losing those rituals. Recently, new Alevi or-
ganisations have been set up in the urban spaces to provide the Alevi
people with community services. By doing so, Alevis tend to restruc-
ture their rituals and institutions in accordance with the urban needs.
     Other activities conducted by the AAKM include the organisation
of sema dance courses for the Alevi youth and public concerts. Sema
dance is a ritual signifying the love of God. The audience dances sema
in small mixed groups, an atmosphere of dignity and restraint prevails.
Each dancer takes his or her place according to traditional choreog-
raphy with an air of detached, deep concentration and without any
suggestion of bodily contact. The sema dance is accompanied by an
authentic Turkish musical instrument with strings, called saz or
baglama. The sema courses have a social function besides being a
cultural teaching. These courses attempt to get the children of the
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community away from the ‘dangerous’ streets, and to give them
self-respect.
     The Centre also organises public concerts for the Alevis in Berlin.
‘Alevi Cultural Night’ is one of those gatherings. This organisation is
very illustrative for the purposes I want to scrutinise further. This is
why it will be beneficial to expose the main features of this festival.
The gathering was held on the 28th of September 1996 in the Berlin
Erika-Hess-Stadion, Wedding. It was a huge event with approxi-
mately two thousand people in the audience. Most of the participants
were Alevi folk singers who were invited from Turkey for this special
occasion. They sang Alevi poems (Degis) from the Turkish folk poets
(halk sairi). Amongst the guests were Barbara John (Commissioner for
Foreigners’ Affairs), Hans Nisblé (mayor of Wedding, SPD), Franz
Schulz (mayor of Kreuzberg, die Grünen), Ismail Hakki Kosan (mem-
ber of the Berlin Senate, die Grünen), the members of the Türkische
Bund, and the Turkish and German media. The way the AAKM
members represented themselves in the programme was very instruc-
tive. The speakers of the AAKM stressed the killings of the Alevis in
Sivas and Gazi neighbourhood. They reconfirmed, or reconstructed,
the fact that these incidences have become two crucial landmarks of
the Alevi mythology. Since this was a chance for the AAKM members
to represent themselves in front of the high-ranking German politi-
cians and media, they also stressed the difference between Alevism and
24Shiism. They, in a sense, attempt to make a distinction between
themselves and the orthodox version of Shiism.
     The speeches of the German politicians were also very instructive in
their own respects. Barbara John emphasised the pluralist structure of
the city of Berlin, and the place of the Alevis in this scene. She stated
her willingness to see the Alevis freely expressing their cultural identi-
ty in the public space. The dubious culturalist discourse raised by Bar-
bara John tends to relegate social conflicts to the domain of cultural-
ised iconography (Schierup, 1994: 38). Her discourse of multicultural-
ism raises three crucial aspects. Firstly, it reveals the negative correla-
tion between culture and power in the context of minorities, which I
previously touched upon (Rosaldo, 1989: 198-206). Secondly, Alevis as
well as many other minority groups such as Iranians, Kurds and
Chinese are allowed by the institutional power to express their differ-
ence in the ‘public sphere.’ The expression of ‘difference,’ although,
has the advantage of making culture particularly visible to outside
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observers, it posits a problem because such differences are not absolu-
te. Thirdly, her discourse hints that the majority society might benefit
from the appearance of Alevis in the public space, because the Alevis
have developed a stronger subjectivity like many other minorities
living in a permanent turmoil. Thus, she attempts to reproduce and
strengthen the binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘them.’
     Aminor group among the German liberals such as Barbara John
and Hans Nisblé are aware of the differences between Sunnis and
Alevis. They are quick to appropriate the Alevis for their own political
project and to use them as an example of Turks who ‘successfully
integrate’ (Mandel, 1996: 156). Similarly, Hans Nisblé attempted to
place Alevism as a political balance of power against Islamic revival-
ism. In the concert, he called the German people to stand by the Alevis
against the challenge of ‘radical Islam within’ prevailing over Europe
and Germany. Nisblé’s speech was very illuminating in the sense that
he was announcing a general view that is quite dominant in the west-
ern way of thinking. The favourable perception of Alevism by the
German intelligentsia and media is, of course, highly related to the
Western textual reading of the contemporary Turkey, which was, at
that time, governed by a religious based coalition. This view conceives
Alevism as a shield of secularist regime in Turkey against the radical
Islam. Such an interpretation of Alevism has become the dominant
paradigm both in Turkey and Europe. This paradigm inevitably
contributes to the radicalisation of Alevism in political sense. Accor-
dingly, the way Alevis are defined by the German media and politi-
cians also encourages Alevis to form a community discourse.
     It is not only the institutional power of multiculturalism encourag-
ing Alevis to develop a community discourse, but it is also the fact
that, paraphrasing Hall (1992), speaking from margins sometimes
could make more echo. It is evident that Alevi organisations tend to
construct a community discourse by reifying some aspects of the Alevi
culture. Mobilising many Alevi-origin people by those public concerts
and mass ceremonies, for instance, provides, to use Gilroy’s words,
“important rituals, which allow its affiliates to recognise each other
and celebrate their coming together” (Gilroy, 1987: 223). Thus, in
diaspora, highly effective informal networks forge a community of a
sort that has never existed at home, as it attempts to worship and
celebrate in concert (Mandel, 1996: 161). Habitual adherence to the
rituals, as Russon (1995: 514) rightly posits, allows us to recognise
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ourselves as an ‘us,’ as a ‘we.’ Borrowing the Hegelian terminology,
the demand for self-consciousness is met in a dialogue of mutual
recognition taking place in a collective process. Thus, there only
remains a singular space for the individual at the margin to form
his/her self-consciousness, i. e. the communal acts of mutual recogni-
tion. In this communal life, rituals and customs define who ‘I’ is. It is
the Alevi communality offering the individual a ground to achieve
self-consciousness.
     As Mandel (1996: 162) has rightly put it, some Alevi groups in
Germany have taken advantage of Western freedoms to adopt a more
conservative, inward, communal orientation, unfettered by past politi-
cal and social constraints. The highly politicised group of Alevi
Gençligi (Alevi Youth) – a faction in the AAKM – is an illustrative
example for this radicalism. In July 1996, there were many posters on
the walls hung by the Alevi Youth to commemorate the massacre of
the Alevi intellectuals in July 1993 in Sivas to the Alevi residents of
25Kreuzberg. Those posters, which were written in a ‘Kanak Sprak’ –
a point to which I shall return shortly, were overtly interpreted as a
challenge to the ‘others’ who were not Alevi.
     The way the Alevis are represented in the diaspora by themselves,
politicians, and media does nothing but increase the cleavages and the
polarisation among the Turkish minority in Berlin. Such a representa-
tion of Alevism also contributes to the reduction of social problems to
essentialist ethnic and religious clashes. This polarisation within the
Turkish community is also reflected in Turkey because these Alevi
organizations have strong links with their equivalent partners and
political organisations in Turkey. Thus, the rising cleavages and com-
petition between the diversified Turkish groups is directly transferred
to Turkey. This is how diaspora has an influential impact on the
homeland political affairs. To illustrate the case, the AAKM had
organised free flights for Alevis to attend the opening ceremony of an
Alevi-based political party (Democratic Peace Movement) in August
1996, in Ankara. It is an example of the impact of the diasporic sub-
26jects on the homeland politics.
     On the other hand, although the youngsters in Naunyn Ritze and
Chip are quite distant from the political loading of religion, Alevism
and Sunnism have become the main determinants of the matrix of
youth ethnicity (youthnicity). The Alevi youngsters in Naunyn Ritze
rarely talk about the differentiation and conflicts between themselves
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and the Sunnis. On the other hand, the Sunni youngsters usually raise
this conflict by saying that Alevi youngsters are discriminating against
the Sunnis. The girls whom I interviewed in Chip were all Sunnis.
They have Alevi friends from Naunyn Ritze. Although they some-
times meet these friends, they complain about the differentiation that
the Alevi friends have made against their Sunni friends. They argue
that their friends advance this differentiation to exclude them. In fact,
it would not be surprising to hear exactly the same discourse from the
Alevi youngsters vis-à-vis their Sunni friends. It seems quite normal
for the Alevi youngsters to distance themselves from the Sunnis and to
re-establish the boundaries after those incidences in Sivas and Gazios-
manpasa. Thus, they do not think that they are discriminating, where-
as the Sunni youngsters, who have a majority consciousness and who
have been raised by the official doctrine, cannot yet accept the fact that
the Alevi minority is declaring its identity publicly by threatening the
previously existing order.
     Some graffiti samples that I saw nearby Chip in Reichenberger Stra-
ße were giving some essential clues about the conflicting temperament
of the Sunni and Alevi youngsters in Kreuzberg. The first example of
graffiti was
Alevileri S. K. M
that means “I fuck the Alevis.” ‘S. K. M.’ is a kind of hidden expression
of ‘fuck’ in Turkish. Above the same graffiti, there was another exam-
ple that was most probably written by the same person, saying
C
Bozkurt C
C
that means ‘Grey Wolf – three crescent.’ Three crescents are the sym-
bol of the extreme right wing grey wolves in Turkey. The nationalist
Turkish mythology depicts that it is the grey wolf (Bozkurt) that
accompanied and guided the Turkish nation all the way through the
massive migration from Central Asia to Anatolia. The grey wolf is
considered by the Turkish nationalists to be the mythological guide of
the Turkish nation. These two examples of graffiti written on the same
wall are quite complementary. It signifies that Turkish nationalist
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ideology excludes the Alevis. The clash between the Sunnis and Alevis
has also been carried onto the symbolic level. As I shall point out in
the coming chapters, ethnic symbols are extensively used by the
Turkish youngsters as a constituent of their identity.
     As far as the construction of ethnic-based political participation
strategies (migrant strategy and minority strategy) is concerned,
Alevism in the diaspora conveys a similar process to the other Turkish
diasporic communities that I outlined in the previous chapter. Yet,
Alevism nowadays corresponds to a further radicalised community
discourse due to the recent incidences in Turkey. Investing in the
cultural differences, this radical Alevi revivalism can be contemplated
as one of the new social movements in the sense that Alain Touraine
and Alberto Melucci mentioned earlier (Touraine, 1977; Melucci,
1989). The common denominator of contemporary social movements
such as the peace movement and the ecology movement is that they
are not directly involved in struggles focused on production and
distribution of material goods and resources. Instead, they are increas-
ingly concerned with debates about symbolic resources. Moreover,
participation in these movements is no longer simply a means to an
end but it is considered a goal in itself.
     The contemporary metanarrative of multiculturalism has something
to do with the transformation of the recent social movements. Multi-
culturalism tends to transform social conflicts into ethnic and religious
ones. Radtke (1994: 32-37) points out that this transformation takes
place under the hegemony of the state, which forms a kind of neo-
clientelist system:
The clientele of the state are organizations, which have a clientele of individu-
als themselves. In both cases the dependency is reciprocal: The institutional or
individual client will try to present himself as fitting into the programme of the
patron; the patron will only continue to exist if he has the lasting support and
trust of his clientele […] The liberal model of competing interests ends up in
patronage, lobbyism and paternalism […] The effect of Multi-Culturalism in
connection with clientelism is not ethnic mobilisation but self-ethnicisation of
the minorities. As long as they do not have any political rights and as long as
there is no policy of affirmative action, Multi-Culturalism inevitably ends up
in folklorism. Minorities in Germany are kept away from the public sphere
and invited by the legal system to form apolitical communities (Gemeinschaf-
ten) in the private sphere instead of interest groups […] Multi-Culturalism
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translates the concept of plurality of interests into a concept of plurality of
descents […] Multi-Culturalism is only a reversal of ethnocentrism […].
Thus, Radtke identifies the political practice of multiculturalism in
Germany as clientelist and its effects as a ‘folkloric’ self-ethnicisation
of minorities.
     Accordingly, the AAKM can be interpreted as a clientele organisa-
tion fulfilling the requirements of the ideology of multiculturalism. As
an obedient subject of the state, the AAKM, thus, reaffirms the he-
gemony of state whilst reifying Alevi culture and tradition. Further-
more, it seems to imprison the social reaction of a subordinated
working-class group in a cultural cage that is offered by the state.
Multiculturalist metanarrative gives a chance to the masses to repre-
sent, vocalise and narrate their own ethnicities and cultures freely
without undergoing any change in the relations of production and
distribution. The policy of multiculturalism gives ‘space’ to the minor-
ities to express themselves, but not ‘rights’ such as political rights. In
other words, as Gillian Bottomley (1987: 4) stated in the Australian
context, multiculturalism has tended to obscure the primacy of eco-
nomic and political structures in determining the limits of possibilities
for migrants to Germany. They have concentrated on culture and have,
in doing so, made the cultural field an important terrain of struggle.
     Similarly, having restrictive regimes of incorporation for the mi-
grants and ‘foreigners,’ Germany attempts to give the Turks a sense of
belonging by means of multiculturalism. The ideology of multicultur-
alism provides the German government with a form of what Michel
Foucault (1979) called governmentality. Governmentality refers to the
practices characterising the form of supervision a state exercise over its
subjects, their wealth, their misfortunes, their customs, their souls and
their habits. Foucault’s modern ‘administrative state’ is based on the
idea of a ‘society of regulation’ differing from ‘the state of justice’ of
the Middle Ages that was built on the idea of a ‘society of laws’ (Fou-
cault, 1979: 21). According to Foucault the modern state regulates our
bodies, souls, habits and thoughts by giving us a sense of freedom. In
the modern societies freedom has become a fruitful resource for
government. Accordingly, the policy of multiculturalism enables
minority cultures to represent themselves ‘freely.’
*  *  *
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To summarise, Turkish migrants living in Kreuzberg have created a
new home away from their homeland. This diasporic space reflects
various snapshots, discourses, images, rhythms, narratives, social
networks (hemsehrilik) and familial connections from the pre-immi-
grant life-worlds of the migrants. The formation of a diasporic space
through images, sounds, symbols and traditions from the homeland
has served the migrants as a ‘fortress’ protecting them against institu-
tional discrimination, assimilation and racism. The presence of the
networks of transnational communications and transportation con-
necting the diaspora to the homeland has also strengthened the con-
struction of a diasporic identity. Thus, the diasporic identity that has
been built by the migrants as a social strategy has been reshaped and
reinforced through transnational networks extending the official ide-
ology of Turkishness.
     In this chapter, I also claimed that multiculturalism assumes that
cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes be-
longing to ethnic groups. Although having promised to include and
incorporate ethnic minorities into the main stream, the contemporary
ideology of multiculturalism has done nothing but excluding and
imprisoning ethnic minorities in their own isolated cultural islands.
Thus, it would be misleading to argue that multiculturalism serves as a
policy of inclusion vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. Rather, the ideology of
multiculturalism has led to the further minorisation and culturalisation
of ethnic minorities in Berlin. Having been guided by multicultural-
ism, ethnic groups in Berlin such as Alevis have made attempts to
invest in their ‘authentic’ rituals rather than intermingling with the
other cultures. Correspondingly, these various cultures have created
their own static and essentialist cults refusing to infuse with the others.
Thus, multiculturalism, in fact, creates separate ‘CULTures’ that are
distinguished from each other with distinct boundaries. This is a
serious obstacle before the process of cultural bricolage as well as
leading to cultural reification and essentialism. Therefore, it would not
be a mistake to rename multiculturalism as ‘multi-CULT-uralism,’
which means the sum of distinct cultures, or actually of cults.
     The major Turkish ethnic associations in the diaspora have devel-
oped a culture discourse that is based on the holistic notion of
‘CULTure.’ This demotic discourse of the ethnic minority associa-
tions, in fact, parallels the dominant discourse of multiculturalism
aiming to locate the minority cultures within discrete and fixed bound-
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aries (cf. Baumann, 1996). The policies of multiculturalism in Berlin
have mainly encouraged the ethnic minorities to organise themselves
along culture lines. The mobilisation of ethnic associations along
culture lines has limited their prospects in undertaking political initia-
tives for any structural change. This chapter has also outlined the
social, political, economic, ethnic and demographic structure of
Kreuzberg 36 to provide us with a broader perspective in order to
scrutinise the diasporic consciousness of the working-class Turkish
hip-hop youth. The next chapter will examine the sense of place and
‘homing’ for the Turkish hip-hop youth in the diaspora.
Notes
1 Günther Grass (1981) has described Kreuzberg as an ‘utopia’ of
ethnic admixture and internationalisation. In this sense, Kreuz-
berg has exotic connotations with its multi-ethnic demography in
the imagery of left/liberal Germans.
2 Mitfahrzentralen are private travel agencies providing the
customers with a service to travel by private automobiles to many
different destinations, sharing the cost of petrol with the driver.
3 Berlin-Brandenburg Is Rehberi: Altin Sayfalar (Berlin: Karma
Verlag & Werbeagentur, 1995).
4 Türkçe Danisma Yerleri Klavuzu: Beratungsführer für Türki-
sche Berliner/-Innen (Berlin: Karma Verlag & Werbeagentur,
1996).
5 The urban renewal and housing rehabilitation projects in Kreuz-
berg have been carried out with massive public aid and a host of
regulations and laws enforced by the offices of the Senate for
Housing and Construction and the Senate for Social Affairs since
the mid 1970s. All urban renewal and housing rehabilitation
projects have been pursued in close cooperation with private
property owners, the tenants, the State and other public and
private non-profit development cooperatives (Holzner, 1982).
6 Considering the architectural unity and order, the local authori-
ties have rarely permitted the foundation of a mosque with a
minaret in Berlin. Also, the petitions of the neighbourhood are
taken into consideration by the local government in evaluating the
applications of the Islamic groups to construct a mosque. That is
why, the Muslims are allowed to worship in converted mosques,
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which are not supposed to change the original architectural style
of the city. For the discussion about minaret in Berlin and Ger-
many, see “Gebetsrufe? – Ja bitte!” die Tageszeitung (Taz) (7
January 1997); “Einübung in mehr Toleranz” Taz (6 March 1995);
“Gurke des Tages: Moschee in Bobingen” Taz (4 December
1992); and “No Rest in the Ruhr” Time (24 February 1997).
7 The Welfare Party was banned in January 1998 by the Turkish
Constitutional Court. The reason for closing the Party was the
justification that it was based on religious ideology and that its
fundamentalist activities and statements were against the secular
republic. Immediately after the Welfare Party was closed, the
Virtue Party was founded to inherit it.
8 The majority of apartments occupied by Turkish migrants used
to be substandard. For instance, in the district of Kreuzberg as a
whole, seventy-one percent of all housing units were constructed
before 1918, twenty-eight percent had no bath, twenty-seven
percent had neither bath nor toilet, and seventy-four percent had
individual room stove heaters only. Through their insecure status
in Germany most Turkish immigrants preferred to invest in
Turkey rather than spending on housing in Berlin. As a result,
they continued living in the cheapest, oldest and least desirable
apartments. After the rehabilitation of the housing units in
Kreuzberg, Turkish tenants could not, or did not want to, afford
to pay the rising rents. Thus, some of them had to find cheaper
places outside Kreuzberg. A big proportion of those rehabilitated
housing units have attracted the liberal intellectual individuals or
families of upper income levels who consider it chic to live in
modern comfort amidst the charm of 19th century Gründerzeit
housing such as the apartments by the Landwehrkanal, Spree
river (Holzner, 1982). Waldemarstraße and Naunynstraße, on the
other hand, have remained occupied by the immigrants from
Turkey.
9 Aypa TV is a secular-based news channel, combining the news
both from Turkey and Germany; TFD is a religious-based chan-
nel, representing the view of Milli Görüs; and Alcanlar TV and
Ehli Beyit TV are Alevi-based channels, representing different
views.
10 For further information about the reception of the Turkish
language media in Germany see, Heinemann and Kamcili (2000).
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11 The notion of ‘habitats of meaning’ belongs to Ulf Hannerz
(1996). Hannerz has developed the notion in relation to the
co-existence of local and global at once. TV and print media have
an important impact on the formation of our habitats of meaning.
As some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in
the global ecumene, some other people may have rather distinct
and localised habitats of meaning.
12 Yeni Günaydin (liberal) and Özgür Gündem (left-wing) were
shut down afterwards. Sabah and Evrensel have recently entered
the market.
13 Before the hegemony of the American film industry prevailed
over the world market, the Turkish film industry produced a vast
amount of film until the early eighties.
14 J. Knight (1986) states that 80 percent of the German-Turks used
to watch Turkish videos daily.
15 For further inquiry about Süleymancis, Nurcus and Kaplancis,
see Schiffauer (1997).
16 Diaspora with capital ‘D’ implies the form of diaspora in which
the community attempts to preserve its own ‘distinctive’ culture.
17 AMGT is an illegal political organisation in Germany. Accord-
ing to the figures of the Verfassungsschutz-Bericht (1995), they
have 3,000 members in Berlin. AMGT has a wide institutional
network all around Europe. The organisation has organic links
with the Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in Turkey. For the
origins of the Welfare Party, see Toprak (1981) and Çakir (1990).
18 For a detailed explanation on the religious organisations in
Germany, see Trautner (2000). Trautner, in his work, rightfully
claims that Islamic resurgence has rather a stuationalist and
contextualist nature in Germany, rather than having an essential-
ist substance.
19 Barbara John – a member of the Christian Democratic Party –
has held the office since its inception in 1981 through successive
governments of Social Democrat – Alternative List coalition of
1989-1991 and the grand SPD-CDU coalition.
20 Most of the publications and videos are on Turks. Some of the
other ethnic communities on which publications and videos have
been prepared are Indians, Africans, Chinese, and Iranians.
21 These languages are as follows: Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian,
Greek, Italian, Croatian, Kurdish, Macedonian, Persian, Polish,
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Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovenian, Spanish, Turkish, Viet-
namese and German.
22 Kurds are divided into two main tribes: Zazas and Kirmanchis.
Zaza-Kurds are mostly from Dersim, Tunceli. Unlike the Kir-
manchis, they are predominantly Alevi. Kirmanchis belong to the
Sunni Islam, which is the ‘official’ religious school in Turkey.
Although there is an overwhelming Kurdish nationalism blowing
in Turkey and all around Europe, the Zazas have recently tended
to identify themselves distinctively from the rest of the Kurds.
Most of the Zaza populations in diaspora recently have a tenden-
cy to give priority to their Alevi identity rather than to their
Kurdishness. Their identification of themselves might differ,
depending on their political or religious orientations. The domi-
nant ethnic identities that the Zazas employ in diasporic condi-
tions are either Alevi or Zaza, or Dersimli (being from Dersim).
Since the Zazas are mostly centrifugal Kurdish-Alevis, they have
got a peculiar history of their own. Dersim rebellion against the
young Turkish Republic in the late 1930s is considered as an Alevi
and Zaza uprising (Bruinessen, 1996a).
23 This parental teaching is what Bourdieu calls the ‘ideology of
virility’ which adults tend to employ towards young generations
as a way of keeping wisdom – and therefore – power for them-
selves (Bourdieu, 1993: 94).
24 Alevism is also known as Anatolian version of Shiism, but it is a
much more hybrid form of belief consisting of many different
rituals and religious undertones such as Sufism, Shamanism,
Christianity, Judaism as well as Islam. For the heterodox nature
of Alevism see, Ocak (2000).
25 ‘Kanak Sprak’ is the creole language spoken and written by the
working-class Berlin-Turkish youth.
26 Another example would be the religious based Milli Görüs
association centred in Berlin transporting its own audience to
Turkey to vote in the early general elections held in 1995. The
flight was free of charge, and also the vote-goers were paid extra
on top of their travel expenses.
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Chapter 4
Identity and Homing of Diaspora
Kreuzberg as a Turkish ethnic enclave connotes a very particular set of
images, signs, symbols, sounds and associations, which revolve around
its reputation as ‘Kleines Istanbul’ (Little Istanbul). As portrayed in
the previous chapter, Kreuzberg has become a ‘diasporic space’ for the
Turkish migrants who exhibit a cultural continuum between the
homeland and the country of settlement. Kreuzberg, as a diasporic
space, has a crucial impact on the identity formation of the Turkish
youngsters. The way the youths construct their identities in the shift-
ing boundaries of various life-worlds is imbued with the social, cult-
ural and political landscape of this ethnic enclave. In this sense, this
chapter, on the one hand, aims to investigate the main life-worlds of
the working-class Turkish youths, shaping the process of their identity
construction. In doing so, the multicultural competence, which they
develop in the process of negotiating within and between these distinct
social spaces, will be demonstrated. On the other hand, I will also
briefly recite the multicultural discourse of the middle-class Turkish
youth living outside Kreuzberg in order to build, by way of contrast, a
broader view of the working-class youth.
Life-Worlds of the Working-Class Turkish Youth in Kreuzberg
The increasing autonomy of life-world forms, which goes beyond the
boundaries of production, results in a higher level of individual differ-
entiation in everyday life and in a release from traditional family ties.
As Alberto Melucci (1989: 51) has stated, the consequences of such an
autonomy may be as follows: increasing independence felt by individ-
uals from family bonds; increased social mobility at both everyday
life level and occupational level; and multiplication of cultural identi-
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ties and life-styles. Turkish ethnic minority youth in Kreuzberg al-
ways shifts between the spaces of home, street, school and youth cen-
tre. There is always a clear-cut boundary between these social spaces
produced by the diasporic youth. In this section, I will scrutinise the
multiplication of cultural identities in these various highly gendered
life-worlds and how the male diasporic youths manage to construct a
syncretic form of culture by crossing various milieus and discrete
life-worlds. These non-conscious acts of ‘crossing’ or cultural repro-
duction by the youngsters will be explicated by a set of examples on
code-switching.
Life in the Youth Centre
Undoubtedly the youth centre occupies the biggest space in the lives
of the youngsters. The youth centre serves as a refuge from the paren-
tal discipline for the minority youth and acts as a haven from the hos-
tility of the ‘outside world,’ and as a place in which dignity, self-
respect and recognition are internally defined. They live like ‘broth-
ers’ and ‘sisters’ in the centre. The youngsters consider the centre a
substitute ‘family’ environment where they congregate, cook, enter-
tain, communicate and protect themselves against external challenges.
There is always a hierarchy in this ‘family’ setting amongst the youngs-
ters. The elders feel themselves responsible for the younger members;
and the young ones respect the elders. To illustrate the situation of
respect, when the younger members realise that a relatively older
member of the group is arriving into the café, they stop making noise
and become more respectful to each other. Rather than the German
youth workers the youngsters respect better the ‘elder brothers’ whom
they see as a part of ‘their own community.’ This respect from the
youngsters springs from the hierarchical structure behind in-group
relations.
     The ethnic minority youths are stuck with a kind of ‘language of
fatalism’ (Hebdige, 1987: 40), or to an arabesk way of life. The com-
mon lines, which they use to express their state of being, are ‘Ahh ulan
ahh!’ (deep sigh with an inner resistance), ‘Acimasiz dünya!’ (Cruel
world!), ‘Bütün insanlar suçlu!’ (Human beings are all guilty), or ‘Isy-
anlardayim!’ (I am fed up!). Most of the youngsters have no future
prospect in their own eyes. They generally attend the vocational
schools (Berufsschulen) to gain a degree, but they actually do not feel
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attached to those related occupations. Although most of the youngs-
ters have job training such as mechanics, hairdressing, and building
construction, they do not prefer carrying on the profession they had in
the school.
Life in the Street
Street is another space where the youngsters form a different form of
life-world. The streets of Kreuzberg 36, in a broader sense, witness the
struggles of resistance, local political cultures, a particular articulation
of a post-industrial political-economy and urban myths of gang vio-
lence. Street as a ‘public space’ is transformed into a ‘private space’ by
the working-class youths. When the centre is closed, for instance be-
fore 15.00 o’clock, and during Sunday and Monday, the street becomes
the favourite meeting space where the youths congregate and ‘hang
out.’ Streets become essential for the working-class youths in terms of
the ‘production of space’ in the sense that Henri Lefèbvre (1989) stat-
ed. Listening to music in their own sport-cars with high-decibel vol-
ume, having a chat with their own ‘mates’ on some particular street
corners, speaking loudly, and staring at strangers are all the spatial
practices of the youths. These practices are employed by the youths to
produce their own social space and territory as opposed to the stran-
gers and parental discipline.
     Street, which is a safe habitat for the residents, might well be irritat-
ing for some others. The streets in the peripheral space, such as ethnic
neighbourhood, have their own mythified stories. The streets of
Kreuzberg have many such stories as such. Those streets have hosted
many spontaneous riots and uprisings as well as many multicultural
festivals. May Day in the year 1989 witnessed one of these riots in
1Kreuzberg. Taner, one of the participants, narrated the incidences
with nostalgic mimics:
In the May Day we plundered almost everything we saw. We exploded. This
social explosion might happen again. We were plundering the posh shopping
centres and cars in the streets, even the Turkish pilgrims were plundering. Ap-
proximately ten shopping-centres were plundered by Turkish, German, Kurd-
ish, drunk, pilgrim etc. It was like Los Angeles in 92, and Kadiköy in May Day
21996. We were dancing while plundering. I was extremely happy that day, I
was fighting against the system. These incidences happened mostly in Kreuz-
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berg. It was like a ‘revolution.’ We were all together, Turk, Kurd, German,
Fascist and Arab.
Taner’s narrative gives us more clues about the character of the streets
of Kreuzberg. The streets house some united battles of Turkish and
German dwellers in the May Day uprisings as well as in some other
3spontaneous uprisings such as anti-racist demonstrations.
     Previously, the main occupants of the streets were the mythical
gangsta groups like 36ers, 36 Boys and 36 Juniors in Naunyn Ritze.
Taner, who is one of the founders of the 36ers, said that the gangsta
group was providing the younsters with an alternative sense of family:
“My group was my family. We were all together with the younger
ones like a family. For instance we did not let the little kids smoke,
and we used to protect them.” The youngsters roaming around the
streets are aware of the fact that, someday, they might risk imprison-
ment through fighting, carrying guns and drug use. Since they have
been living with this risk for so long in their ethnic enclave, it seems
that they have internalised this risk. The experience of imprisonment
4turns out to be a source of distinction for the boys. This distinction
makes them feel ‘cool.’ It is as if the youngsters, who previously were
jailed, affirm the meaning of the word ‘cooler’ in American slang:
‘cooler’ means jail, a place where someone cools down.
     The youngsters see their elder friends, who spent some time in jail,
as a role model. Bülent (20) was a new face in Naunyn Ritze. He was
previously in jail due to the drug use and violence. For Bülent, the jail
experience has ruined his life. He thought that he had nothing left to
lose or to win. He has been in such a pessimistic state of mind. On the
other hand, as a person who has had a jail experience, he was highly
respected by the youngsters within Naunyn Ritze. Apart from the
other elder ‘brothers,’ he was another symbol of authority in the cen-
tre. Although he was in despair for the prison experience, he had the
tendency to use this experience as a distinction, or the symbolic capi-
tal, in his relation with the community youngsters.
     Another source of distinction that the ethnic minority youths tend
to have on the street is the mobile phone. Almost all the guys have a
mobile phone, which is a symbol of masculinity. They have no money
but they have ‘handy’ (mobile phone). It gives a ‘cool’ style to the
youngsters. Sitting in a Turkish café, such as Café 1001 in Charlotten-
burg, many mobile phones could be seen on the tables. It is as if the
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phones are in a symbolic battle on the table. Gülsen (16) explained that
if she quits smoking, her elder brother promised to buy her a mobile
phone.
     Friendship is also a vital constituent of the life-world in street.
Turkish youngsters express that after a certain age it becomes easier to
communicate with the co-ethnics because the mimicry counts to a
wider extent in the age of adolescence. It becomes difficult for them to
have a silent communication with the Germans through mimics, and
to have serious talks with them. They see it as a cultural difference
between their German friends and themselves. Thus, they tend to give
up ‘hanging around’ with the German friends. They imply that at this
age they need mature and satisfactory talks with their friends, whereas
their German ‘mates’ seem very childish to them. They cannot have a
proper ‘muhabbet’ (in-depth talk) with their German ‘mates.’ The
difference between diasporic Turkish youths and their German ‘mates’
springs from the fact that they have a rather different mimicry and
subjectivity. Raising the difference in mimicry as a reason of not ge-
tting on well with German ‘mates’ is, in fact, a way of representing dif-
ference in the process of identity construction. Bhabha’s definition of
mimicry is quite illuminating in finding out its importance for the
identity formation and articulation:
Mimicry is at once resemblance and menace […] In mimicry, the representation
of identity and meaning is rearticulated along the axis of metonymy. As Lacan
reminds us, mimicry is like camouflage, not a harmonisation of repression of
difference, but a form of resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by
displaying it in part, metonymically (Bhabha, 1994: 90).
Mimicry attempts to include some while excluding some others. What
really matters in mimicry is the expression of resemblance with the
co-ethnics as well as expressing difference from ‘others.’ The discourse
of mimicry constructed by the Turkish youth is “a form of defensive
warfare, which marks those moments of civil disobedience within the
discipline of civility: signs of spectacular resistance” (Bhabha, 1994:
121). Raising mimicry as a difference provides minority youths with
an instrumental ground, where they could develop a form of resistance
against the dominant regimes of representation.
     On the other hand, subjectivity is also an essential element of inter-
ethnic friendships between Turkish and German youths. Migrants’
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children or grandchildren have a permanent negotiation between the
world of youths and the world of grown-ups due to their particular
subjectivity. For instance, being able to summarise or translate the key
points of a news story engage in dialogue with adults, form opinions,
take a stand on issues, and even challenge and attempt to change el-
ders’ views makes a young person feel ‘grown-up’ and encourages
others to perceive them as such (Gillespie, 1996: 118).
     Courtship is another constituent of the street life to be mentioned.
Going out with a German girl is quite normal for the Turkish boys. In
the Naunyn Ritze youth centre, there were some boys going out with
German girls, and cohabitating with them. Nevertheless, both the
Turkish boys and girls held a strong belief that the Turkish boys’ rela-
tionships with German girls would not result in marriage. One of the
Turkish girls stated “the reason why ‘our’ guys are going out with the
German girls is just to use them and to do that thing, which they can-
not do with the decent Turkish girls.” Claire E. Alexander’s classifica-
tion of ‘private women’ and ‘public women’ in mapping out the modes
of courtship of the male black Londoners (Alexander, 1996: 157-186)
is also applicable to the working-class Turkish youth in Berlin. Turk-
ish boys generally consider Turkish girls to be ‘our’ women. It is sig-
nificant that when the boys encounter Turkish women in Kreuzberg,
or in other districts of Berlin, they rarely enter into interaction with
them. Having been contemplated as sexually inaccessible, at least for
casual encounters, by the Turkish youth, the Turkish women have
their own place in the private sphere of the Turkish boys, whereas the
German women belong to the public space that is easily accessible.
The association of the German women with the public space allies Turk-
ish boys more closely to the power relations reflected in wider society.
     The youngsters have also been used to living together with the
presence of police in the street. They call the police officers ‘amca’ that
literally means ‘uncle’ in Turkish. Neco says, “we are so close to the
police officers, so we consider them our relatives.” The youngsters can
easily recognise the civil police officers ‘hanging out’ or driving
around in the street. Since there is drug traffic around Kotbusser Tor
and the youth centre, the police always inspect the district. While the
presence of police in the streets is tolerated by the youngsters, they are
seriously disturbed by the police occupying their own space in the
youth centre because the youth centre is considered somewhere safe
from police interference.
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Life in the School
School is also one space, which is quite distinct from the other social
spaces in regard to the differentiation of the people with whom the
youths interact. The youngsters who attend the high school always
complain about their teachers. They believe that the reason behind
their failure is the racist and discriminatory behaviours of their Ger-
man teachers to whom they have to be subject. Be it male or female,
never-ending discussions with the teachers are the common problem.
They always tend to blame the teachers, but not themselves, for the
failure they experience.
     A remarkable amount of the youngsters were raised in Turkish
classrooms where there were almost no Germans. The children of the
migrants have been subject to certain regulations with regard to educa-
tion. The official policy in most of the provinces of Germany requires
that ‘foreigners’ in the classroom should not exceed 20 percent of any
5school class (in Berlin the quota could be extended up to 50 percent).
This regulation is considered to be one of the factors behind the pre-
sence of high numbers of Turkish children in Sonderschule (Table 6).
Sonderschule is a different kind of primary school having special
classes for children who are believed to have ‘learning difficulties.’
Most of the immigrants’ children are asked to attend these schools
because of their ‘impotence’ in German language. Depending on their
success, the students of Sonderschule have a chance to switch to the
other schools. Then, these students most likely encounter some other
problems such as the incompatibility of the previous Sonderschule
curriculum to the new curriculum. The hierarchical structure of the
German educational system, in a way, tends to imprison the children
6of immigrants who are in rather disadvantageous position.
Table 6: The Number of the German and Non-German Students
in Kreuzberg
A. Grundschulen
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 1 803     866     52.9     
Class 2 924     942     50.5     
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Class 3 856     892     51.6     
Class 4 948     763     44.6     
Class 5 815     752     48.0     
Class 6 751     747     49.9     
B. Hauptschulen
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 7 158     262     62.4     
Class 8 159     270     63.0     
Class 9 192     180     48.4     
Class 10 151     198     56.7     
C. Realschulen
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 7 64     74     53.6     
Class 8 58     53     48.0     
Class 9 61     69     53.1     
Class 10 103     118     53.4     
D. Gymnasien
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 7 191     59     23.6     
Class 8 171     46     21.2     
Class 9 154     41     21.0     
Class 10 183     57     23.8     
E. Gesamtschulen
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 7 289     189     39.5     
Class 8 297     167     36.0     
Class 9 263     210     44.4     
Class 10 262     201     43.4     
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F. Sonderschulen
Classes German Foreigner Foreigner %
Class 1,2 67     29     30.2     
Class 3 36     17     32.1     
Class 4 21     17     44.7     
Class 5 14     12     46.2     
Class 6 33     20     37.8     
Class 7 20     16     44.4     
Class 8 25     11     30.6     
Class 9 16     --     --     
Class 10 8     --     --     
Source: Der Bezirksbürgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg, October 1996
German and middle-class Turkish families do not prefer sending their
children to the primary and especially to the secondary schools in
Kreuzberg, because they believe that children raised in these schools
with the working-class migrants’ children, become more violent and
less academically able. Being raised in these classrooms, Turkish chil-
dren often display a lack of confidence in their interaction with the
majority society due to their inadequate German language and their
deficient empathy with the Germans. The consequence of the lack of
interaction could overtly be seen in the common playground of the
Turkish and German children. The Naunyn Ritze youth centre has a
park and playground for the children in Waldemarstraße. There is
always a youth worker in the park, dealing with the children. What
was striking for me was to see that Turkish and German children (6 to
12-year-old) hardly interacted in their games. Sometimes, this lack of
interaction might also lead to violent acts between children. For
instance, once the German children built a little wooden-house under
the supervision of the Turkish youth worker in the children’s play
park of the Naunyn Ritze youth centre, then the Turkish children
silently came to the park at night and destroyed it.
     It seems that the official authorities are reluctant to do something in
order to open the channels of communication and interaction between
the children of the ethnic groups. In an interview, I asked Barbara
John, Commissioner of Foreigners’ Office, whether she was trying to
135
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S. 127-153) T01_05 Chapter 4.p 297863215674
Chapter 4
change this picture. She said “we cannot force the people to do this or
that; all we are trying to do is to convince the Turks to leave Kreuz-
berg to live in better conditions.” The rationale behind this official
discourse seems to be aiming to disseminate the Turkish enclave in
7Kreuzberg.
Life in the Household
8Family is another space where the youngsters live. The general
assumption within and outside the Turkish community concerning the
nature of the Turkish family is that working-class Turkish families are
relatively more crowded than their German equivalents. The number
of the members of the families ranges from six to ten for the twenty
youngsters whom I interviewed in Naunyn Ritze and Chip. Most
mothers are either housewives or manual workers. On the other hand,
most fathers are manual workers on either construction sites or
assembly lines. Some parents have retired and a significant number are
unemployed. The ones who are retired have the chance to switch be-
tween Turkey and Germany.
     Discipline within the family is the primary aspect. Those young-
sters, who are very relaxed and self-confident in the public space,
suddenly turn out to be very silent and ‘respectful’ under the power of
a father. Parents try to keep their children away from the streets and
the youth centres. They believe that interacting with ‘deviant’ German
and Turkish youth in the streets and youth centres will make their
children disrespectful. Thus, they encourage their children to go to
some community associations such as Alevi associations, hemsehri
(fellow-villager) associations, community centres and/or mosques.
     Another assumption about the Turkish family structure in Berlin is
that the familial bonds within the Turkish community are more pow-
erful than in German society. Although these bonds become weaker in
comparison to working-class family culture in Turkey, the children are
still expected to live with their parents until they get married. The
parental culture is still quite influential in choosing a marriage partner.
Parents still have their say in the selection of a spouse. The criteria of
selection are usually very simple: the potential spouse should prefera-
bly be from the same ethnic and religious origin. For instance, a
German spouse is not preferred unless s/he converts to Islam; and
there is also a strong boundary between Sunnis and Alevis in terms of
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marriage. Hitherto, arranged marriages from Turkey were quite
widespread. The youngsters have recently come to terms with the
ever-lasting wish of their parents to go for arranged marriages. Al-
though I have no statistical data indicating the decreasing pace of
arranged marriages from Turkey, the radically resisting statements of
the youngsters were quite instructive in understanding the new trend.
The girls are the ones who used to extensively suffer from arranged
marriages. When their ‘age of marriage’ came, their parents used to
arrange a marriage for them during the summer vacation (izin) spent in
Turkey.
     Another aspect worth mentioning in its relation to the familial life
of the youngsters is represented by the conversations about the
relatives, friends and immovable belongings back in Turkey. The
family members talk either about relatives they miss or the immovable
belongings they left behind or recently bought. Daily, by means of
those in-family-conversations and collective memories, youngsters
revisit living relatives; or they watch the videotape they previously
recorded in a wedding ceremony in Turkey; or else they watch the
videotape showing the summer cottage and/or house they bought in
the previous visit to Turkey. Each of those ritualised practices signifies
an imaginary journey back home for the youth in the diaspora.
     No one, neither parent, nor teacher, nor youth worker has a com-
plete knowledge about the youngsters’ life worlds. The youths always
switch between these different spaces. They should negotiate and
compromise between various social-cultural scapes in order to find a
way through. What they construct in these shifting spaces is a kind of
cultural bricolage leading to the formation of a Third Culture. The
third culture, to which I will shortly return in the following chapter,
“is a bricolage in which elements from different cultural traditions,
sources and social discourses are continuously intermingled with and
juxtaposed to each other” (Çaglar, 1994: 33).
     The production of the third culture by the Turkish diasporic youth
is a production going beyond the conventional Hegelian and Marxist
understandings of production. Stereotypically it is believed that
working-class diasporic youths do not produce anything, they just
‘hang around’ and do nothing. This is a common opinion amongst
parents, majority society, formal institutions and scholars. Such a
stereotype is bound to the ideology of productivism. As Henri Le-
fèbvre (1989) has rightly posed, production does not necessarily
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require either product or labour. His notion of production is quite
different from that of economism:
[W]ords, dreams, texts and concepts produce labour on their own account; […]
This leaves us with a curious image of labour without labourers, products
without production processes, or production without products, and works
without creators (no ‘subject’ and no ‘object’ either) (Lefèbvre, 1989: 72).
Turkish diasporic youth in Kreuzberg produces a web of social spaces
composed of youth centre, street, school and household. This is a
social space constituting a locus of communication by means of signs,
symbols, images and objects, a locus of separations and a milieu of
prohibitions (insiders-outsiders). Furthermore, this is a space giving
rise to the production of a postcultural youth culture in the ‘border-
lands’ of ‘various cultures.’ All these life-worlds are imbued with the
diasporic space in Kreuzberg. In what follows I shall describe the
major constituents employed by the working-class Turkish youths to
construct a new home in Kreuzberg.
‘Sicher in Kreuzberg’: The Homing of Diaspora
Modern diaspora identities inscribe a homing desire while simultane-
ously creating syncretic cultures in the borderlands. The question of
desiring home in diaspora is precisely linked to the processes of exclu-
sion operating in the given circumstances. The discourse of home in
the diaspora is an essential need to challenge the existing regimes of
exclusion and subordination. In this sense, the youngsters refer to
Kreuzberg as ‘Little Istanbul.’ As it was explained above, all the
images, signs, symbols and objects in Kreuzberg contribute to the
mystification of Istanbul and Turkey in the imagery of the Turkish
minority. The use of familiar signs and symbols in the diaspora is, in
fact, a quest for homing. All the youngsters without any exception use
the word ‘sicher’ in explaining how they feel in Kreuzberg. The word
‘sicher’ literally means ‘sure’ and ‘secure.’ Being sure of what, and
feeling secure against what? Kreuzberg is the new home for them,
where they are always sure of their moves and positions.
     Kreuzberg is literally a Turkish ethnic enclave providing Turkish
migrants and their descendants with a web of solidarity, security and
confinement. Yüksel (26) expressed how they rarely go outside
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Kreuzberg, apart from those places where their schools are located.
When they leave Kreuzberg, they have the feeling that they have gone
outside their home:
If Kreuzberg did not exist, then Germany would be unbearable to live in for
us. Here the water and the climate are awful. Nothing has taste here, but
wherever I go outside Kreuzberg I am longing for, let’s say, a woman going
back home from shopping with a full bag in her hands. Kreuzberg is a habit.
Kreuzberg no longer marks an international frontier for the Turkish
youth. They navigate between their worlds, not only when they make
an annual vacation trip to Turkey (izin), but also “daily when they
leave the Turkish inner sanctums of their cold-water flats, their Tur-
kophone families and neighbours, their Kleines-Istanbul ghetto to
enter the German speaking work world and marketplace, where the
characteristic economic relations between First and Third worlds are
linguistically, socially, and culturally reproduced” (Mandel, 1996: 151).
     Kreuzberg is their very own living territory, they feel secure there
and they do not have any feeling of alienation. It is the Germans from
other districts, according to Neco (25), who feel alienated in Kreuz-
berg, not the Turks. No youngster feels attached either to Germany or
Berlin, but they are attached to Kreuzberg. The youths identify
themselves with Kreuzberg. Kreuzberg provides them with a sense of
security, behavioural certainty, assurance and confidence as it previ-
ously did, and still does, to their immigrant parents (Çaglar, 1994: 53).
     The feeling of being simultaneously ‘home away from homeland’ or
‘here and there’ reveals a form of ‘double consciousness’ and ‘aware-
ness of multilocality’ in the imagery of the diasporic youth. The
awareness of multilocality or ‘double consciousness’ becomes a crucial
aspect of their identity formation and articulation. When the young-
sters have been asked about where home was for them, they all hesitat-
ed to pose clear boundaries between Turkey and Kreuzberg. When I
asked Ayhan (20) from Naunyn Ritze about his feelings on Kreuzberg,
he said:
The moment when you asked the question, my hair stood on end. I love
Kreuzberg. I feel myself secure here. Everything is normal here; the rest of
Berlin is like a dead-land. On the one hand, it is making us suffer, on the other
hand there is always someone here helping you. For instance I learned graffiti
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and break-dance here. It has brought some things to us as well as taking away
some other things from us. It is cool. Seriously speaking, for me home is
Kreuzberg. Home is where we live in. Some people might think that I have
become conceited and that I am in vain, but here is my home. I have not been
brought up in Turkey.
The youngsters are highly attached to their own local boundaries.
Owning the district they live in, they place a boundary between
themselves and the majority society. Their own street is a kind of
protective wall for them; they hardly leave the street. Kreuzberg is a
‘fortress,’ which they and their parents have constructed in the span of
time. The streets of Kreuzberg give the warmth of home to the
youngsters. For instance, while their German ‘mates’ meet in each
other’s house to converse or to entertain, the Turkish youths prefer
meeting in the street. When the centre is not open in the holidays, they
meet in front of the youth centre.
     Although they have strong local identifications, they may also vary
in their identification depending on the context. Neco said: “When we
are asked where we are from in Berlin, we say we are from Kreuzberg;
but if the same question is asked to us outside Berlin we say we are
from Berlin. We say we are from Berlin, because we know that Berlin
always seems exotic to the other Germans. Berlin is Kreuzberg.” By
doing so, Neco and his ‘mates’ seem to be aware of their situational
local identification, which prompts them to play with the images of
the townscape in the imagery of outsiders.
     “Berlin is Kreuzberg.” This narration of Neco refers to the fact that
the youngsters realise that Kreuzberg used to be previously conceived
by the west Germans as the major exotic and enigmatic quarter of
Berlin. Referring to this perception, Kreuzberg youngsters tend to
have a strong pride with their own territory. Neco’s narration about
Kreuzberg seems to be complementary to what Yüksel (26) said:
Once upon a time, Kreuzberg was like a battlefield. Everything was falling
apart here. Some of the families didn’t even have a toilet of their own; they
used to share the common toilet with the other families in the courtyard of the
building. Some of the houses had neither electricity nor water. We grew up in
such an environment. Everything has changed along with the reunification. Be-
fore the reunification, the West German tourists often used to visit Kreuzberg
just to have a quick look without getting off the tourist bus. They were afraid
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of us. It was as if they were visiting a zoo, and the bus was like their cage
protecting them from the dangerous animals. Then, when they got back home,
they expressed their enthusiasm and happiness to their friends in visiting
Kreuzberg.
Kreuzberg gives the youngsters a sense of security, not only because it
is a space they were born into, but also because it is a place they can
socially control. The social control of the living space is based on
mainly ethnic and hemsehri (fellow villagers) bonds. Hemsehrilik is a
network of solitary interpersonal relations based on regional ties. It is
thought of as a primordial tie like kinship (Çaglar, 1994: 159). Al-
though the hemsehri bonds have recently become weaker, they are still
crucial instruments, which the youngsters play with. For Eyüp, a
22-year-old-boy in Chip youth centre, hemsehrilik is still a very
important concept: “I automatically fancy my hemsehris from Aksaray
(a middle Anatolian city). For instance, I don’t like the people from
Samsun and Konya, whereas my hemsehris are worthy for anything.”
Bagdagül, an 18-year-old-female from Naunyn Ritze, is also very
sensitive about the issue of kinship and hemsehrilik: “Hemsehrilik is
very important here. Almost all Kreuzberg belongs to us.” Here, ‘us’
refers to the Turkish residents from Erzurum – a city in the eastern
Anatolia. Then, she added that she did not bother about hemsehrilik.
There is a contradiction in her narration. On the one hand, she is
internalising the category of ‘us,’ on the other she posits a distinction
between herself and the rest. In fact, she is aware that hemsehrilik is a
crucial social capital for herself as well as for the rest of ‘us.’
     However, there are some aspects of this ethnic enclave that the
youngsters dislike. These aspects are basically related to their privacy.
Gossip is an important institution in the Turkish enclave of Kreuz-
berg. Almost all the residents know what is going on in Kreuzberg.
Yüksel (manager of the rap group Islamic Force) has brought a yellow
aluminium window from Turkey for his music store in Adalbert-
straße, the very next day almost everybody in Kreuzberg heard the
news, even found out how much it had cost Yüksel. He stated that the
kiosk at the opposite side has already ordered the same aluminium
from Istanbul just after he fixed his window.
     The community culture of the neighbourhood also has a great
impact on the gender relations as well as on the institution of gossip.
Boys say, “Kreuzberg girls are our sisters.” They can easily determine
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which girl is a stranger in their own district. They chase the ‘stranger
girls’ in the streets and make insolent remarks to them without looking
at their nationality. Elif, youth worker, described how she had some
problems in the very first days when she started to work in the Nau-
nyn Ritze youth centre. Firstly, she was chased by the youngsters in
the street; and then the boys in the centre started to compete between
themselves for her attention without knowing that she was a youth
worker in the centre.
     Gossip is also an influential instrument for the parents to keep their
children under control. There is always a social control on both boys
and girls, so that they must be careful in their relations with the other
sex. The girls, for instance, are always afraid of getting caught by some
familiar eyes when they ‘hang around’ with boys. They are concerned
of being given the label of ‘nasty girl.’ Most of the girls in the centre
also refrain from smoking in public, because they fear their elder
brothers or parents. Thus, they tend to smoke secretly in the toilet, or
outside the centre. Smoking at such an early age gives them a feeling of
freedom. It is a symbol of freedom, which they consider against the
authority of parental power and male dominance. The role of gossip is
not also very different for the boys from the parental perspective.
Ayhan (20) says,
If one of my relatives sees me hanging around with a German girl, then the
next day everybody here and in Turkey hears this ‘unacceptable’ thing. They
start making gossip about my family and me. They accuse my parents of not
having been able to raise good children.
Ayhan’s statement underlines the fact that gossip is a strong means of
social control. As Marie Gillespie (1996: 154) stated, gossip that focus-
es on violations of moral codes, norms and values serves to reinforce
them. Furthermore, gossip reinforces the boundaries between insiders
and outsiders in the process of inter-ethnic relations as well as in that
of intra-ethnic relations, i. e., German-Turkish and/or Alevi-Sunni.
Thus, gossip strengthens the sense of living in a secure community
space as opposed to the hegemonic culture, and also provides the
subordinated masses living in the margin with a source of positive
identity.
     However, the youngsters are well aware of the limitations of
Kreuzberg; feeling secure is not enough for the youngsters. From time
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to time, the youngsters express their willingness to move out. Kreuz-
berg indeed ‘has a bad name,’ as I have heard expressed in many
conversations I had with the youngsters. Most of the youngsters have
no thought about their future prospects. Yet, they are not content with
their expectations. They complain about the stereotypical perception
of Kreuzberg held among the German employers and school adminis-
trations. Devrim (17) made many job applications to do his obligato-
ry praxis (Praktikum) as a student. He had no positive response: “Of
course, they don’t accept me, because I am from Kreuzberg. I will
keep applying.” Mehmet (18) is another youngster trying to study
social pedagogy:
I am trying to be registered in one of these schools. I call them to get some in-
formation. In the beginning of the conversation, everything goes fine. I speak
as good as the Germans without any accent. Then they start asking questions
about my background to get informed. When I tell them my name and that I
am living in Kreuzberg, suddenly the conversation changes. The person who is
on the other side of the line hesitates for a while; it is like a silence for a second.
Then he tries to find some excuses to explain to me that I am not eligible for
their school. Kreuzberg has a bad reputation. I am not eligible for their school,
simply because I am a Turk living in Kreuzberg.
These examples as well as some others, which have been described to
me, indicate that a Kreuzberg address by itself is a handicap when
looking for job. I have not been able to confirm this impression statis-
tically, but I was convinced by those youngsters, who were hopelessly
applying for jobs, that this impression has some truth in it.
     The youngsters are also aware of the fact that moving out of
Kreuzberg is very difficult. Mehmet (18) and his parents moved out
for two years, and then came back again: “it was very difficult for us to
live outside Kreuzberg. All my friends and relatives are living here.
Here I feel much better although there are many obstacles to living
here.” Affirming the importance of close ties is the fact that many of
those who can afford to move to a ‘nicer’ area do not. They stay and
repair their homes, reasserting the image of the community as a good
place to live. The expression of the wish for moving out, for social
advancement, is predominantly a class issue. It is the class difference
that makes some people express their wish to move out of this ethnic
enclave more readily than the others are. Hikmet (30), a final year stu-
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dent of medicine, spoke of his intention to move out for the future of
his children. Ferat’s (18) father who has a university degree and a
small-scale private enterprise also expresses his wish to move out for
the future of his only son.
     Kreuzberg is a diasporic space for the working-class Turkish youth.
It gives the youngsters a complex sense of homing. On the one hand,
as long as these youngsters are surrounded by the signs, music,
rhythms and major issues of Turkey in the diaspora, they tend to have
an ‘imagined sense of belonging’ to the homeland Turkey, which has
been ‘deferred’ as a spiritual, cultural and political metaphor. On the
other, they develop a strong sense of homing to the ‘Turkified’ Kreuz-
berg due to the same reason.
Middle-Class Turkish Youngsters and the Question of Identity
A good understanding of the social discourses of the working-class
Turkish diasporic youth partly depends on the incorporation of the
class aspect into the analysis. In this section, I will reflect upon the
question of identity as it is expressed by a middle-class Turkish youth
group living outside Kreuzberg. As I pointed out before, this is the
group of youngsters who constituted the third group of the research,
BTBTM youth. At the end of their group discussions, which they
undertook within their own group under the supervision of Nurdan,
they organised a youth festival (Jugendfest) where they presented their
views on various issues such as xenophobia, racism, hostility in the
media, generation conflicts, and specially the question of identity. The
festival was held in one of the multicultural venues of Berlin, Werk-
statt der Kulturen, on the 18th of May 1996. Barbara John, commis-
sioner of Foreigners’ Office, Ingrid Staumer, senator of cultural affairs,
Hayrettin Erkmenoglu, Turkish counsellor in Berlin, German and
Turkish media were in the audience.
     The festival was primarily set up in order to present to the audience
how ‘multicultural’ and cosmopolitan the Berlin-Turkish youth was.
The sense of being ‘multikulti’ in all the spheres of daily life is a crucial
symbolic capital for these youngsters. Multiculturalism becomes a
principal source of identity politics for them. The multicultural capital
provides them with a sense of recognition by German society. This is
the way they gain access into the mainstream culture. They extensively
use the term ‘multikulti’ in expressing their music taste, friendships,
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life styles, and their neighbourhood. In this sense, the selection of the
folklore, dance and music performances for the festival was made to
underline their multicultural image: a Jewish music group, an amateur
German dance company called ‘Multikulti’, a Turkish folklore group,
and a Kurdish folklore group. BTBTM youths were also very curious
about not calling the festival as ‘Türkische Jugendfest’, because they
were keen on showing their cosmopolitan and multicultural identity.
     Besides the discourse of multiculturalism, which became apparent
in the festival, another crucial point was displayed by the youngsters:
the correlation between representation and the question of identity.
These are the youngsters who are mostly represented in both German
and Turkish media in Berlin. Berlin-Turks are proud of them, because
these youngsters are the ‘good’ representatives of the Turks living in
Berlin, and they are the ones who have been able to integrate into the
German society ‘without losing their Turkishness.’ Germans are also
proud of them because these youngsters represent ‘how well’ the
German integration policies have been working.
     It is evident that contemporary discussions on identity are partly
related to the dominant regimes of representation in the media. It was
striking for me to realise in the course of the research that it was the
middle-class youth that attempted to draw attention to the ‘question
of identity’ rather than the working-class Turkish youth. The work-
ing-class youths that are relatively away from the manipulation of
media, seem to be quite content with their identity without problemat-
ising it. On the other hand, since the middle-class youths have been in
a dialogical relation with the media, they tend to conceive the ‘iden-
tity question’ as granted. The way these youngsters raised the issue
of identity was, in fact, a reflection of their representation in the
media.
     The question of identity is mostly problematised by the media in a
way that influences the identity formation process of ethnic minority
youth. The middle-class youths give response to their own representa-
tion in the media. What they discussed in the Jugendfest was not their
own identity problems. What they did was, in fact, having a ‘chatter
about the chatter’ about their identity. The chatter about their identi-
ty, which they chattered was the chatter, made up by the media. This
is like the chatter about the sport that we chattered about, not the
9sport itself as a practice (Eco, 1986: 162-163). Thus, we rather tend
to discuss about what is represented to us by the media, but not about
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the event itself. In addition to their difference from the working-class
youth in terms of their problematisation of the identity issue, the
middle-class youngsters also have a different sense of place in the
diaspora. Unlike the working-class Turkish youth, they do not feel any
attachment to the places they are living in. They rather attach them-
selves to the ‘multikulti’ city of Berlin. In what follows, I will shortly
examine their sense of place and home in the diaspora.
Middle-Class Turkish Youth: Cosmopolitan Self and ‘Heimat’
The middle-class Turkish youth has rather a cosmopolitan under-
standing of home. They mainly express that they long for Turkey
when they are in Germany, and yearn for Germany when they are in
Turkey. They rather feel an affinity with Berlin rather than with their
neighbourhood and Germany. What strikes them in Berlin is its multi-
cultural character. Multilocality is very influential in their identifica-
tion of themselves as well. Gülten (17) expresses her feelings about
home in such a way:
Home is where you are living, and where your friends are. For the time being,
home is both Germany and Turkey for me, I do not want to define home
actually. Home itself should attract you. I am still in search of home. Home
should be something, which depends on your way of life. I miss Germany
when I am in Turkey. Mine is something cosmopolitan, something which I
will never be able to define: Both Turkish and German. We take the good parts
of both. This is richness.
The middle-class youths all either have dual citizenship, or are in the
process of gaining it. They see dual citizenship as being equal to the
Germans, and having a cosmopolitan identity. For instance, if they
have a problem with the police, they state that the police have a toler-
ant behaviour towards the Turks having German passport, and that
“they can’t ask you stupid questions like ‘Where are your residence
documents?’” This group of youngsters is much more mobile com-
pared to the working-class youth. They sometimes prefer going to
other countries for vacation such as the USA, Morocco, Spain and
France. Another advantage of German citizenship appears in this case,
i. e. there is no need for a visa to go to other European Union coun-
tries. However, some youngsters insist on not having German citizen-
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ship. Dilek (18) is one of them. She does not want to have German
citizenship, she states:
[T]he Germans want to assimilate us. If I have German citizenship, then I will
be doing what they want me to do. I don’t want to. As a Turkish citizen who
was born here, I must have the same rights as the German citizens. This is
discrimination and racism, and I am fighting this. I am against a given identity.
As long as they don’t accept dual citizenship, I won’t get the German citizen-
ship.
Having a cosmopolitan identity, the middle-class youth, in fact, seeks
social change in their country of settlement. On the other hand, the
disadvantaged working-class youth, as Brake states, “is not anti the
prevailing social order, but seeks a place within it” (Brake, 1980: 26).
By raising the question of identity, the middle-class youths aim to
negate the way they are presented by the German media, which
homogenises the German-Turkish youth. In the context of Turkish
diasporic youth, another crucial difference between the two youth
cultures is that the form and style of the working-class youth culture is
mediated by the local neighbourhood whilst that of the middle-class
youth culture is mediated by the translocal class orientation. Apart
from the fact that Berlin-Turkish youths have a multicultural compe-
tence, there is also another general aspect worth mentioning, i. e., their
linguistic competence that enables them to switch codes, as they find
appropriate.
Language and ‘Code-Switching’
Berlin-Turkish youth, be it working-class or middle-class, undoubted-
ly manifests relationships of ‘boundary transgression’ by means of
linguistic competence. Turkish youths have a peculiar language of
their own. They speak a creole language. It is a mix of Turkish, Ger-
man and American-English. This new form of city speech in the
migrants’ suburbs is a verbal celebration of ghetto multiculturalism,
twisting German, Turkish and American slang in resistance to the
official language. Leaving aside the American slang, which they pick
up, from the movies and songs, they habitually switch between Turk-
ish and German, and sometimes between three languages Turkish,
Kurdish and German. Although imperfectly, the youngsters tend to
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use all these languages at once in order to express themselves. In
linguistics, this is called code-switching. S. Poplack (1980: 588) defines
code-switching as “the alternation of two [or more] languages within a
single discourse, sentence, or constituent.” Poplack states that there
are three major types of switching: i. intra-sentential switching; ii.
inter-sentential switching; and iii. tag-switching, or emblematic switch-
ing.
i. Intra-sentential switching: This type of switching includes the switch-
es made within a sentence.
Example: Nezaman Fahrprüfung yapacaksin?
(When are you going to get the driving test?)
This type of switching may well be made by all the youngsters from
each segment of the community. It does not really require a full com-
petence in both languages. This is the common switching type that the
working-class Turkish youngsters mostly repeat.
ii. Inter-sentential switching: These types of switches occur between
sentences. Each clause or sentence is uttered in one language or anoth-
er. Proficiency in both languages is the precondition of this switching
mode because major portions of the utterance must conform to the
rules of both languages.
Example: Ben bir zamanlar çok kitap okurdum.
Ab und zu hab’ ich mal so’n Drang, was zu lesen.
(Once upon a time I used to read a lot.
Time to time I feel a desire to read something.)
The BTBTM youngsters, who were in the Gymnasium, were often
repeating the inter-sentential switching in their mutual conversations.
On the other hand, the working-class Turkish youths were not capa-
ble of switching inter-sentially as well as the others, since they had a
lack of grammatical knowledge on Turkish and German.
iii. Tag-switching, or emblematic switching: This type involves the
insertion of an exclamation. Poplack (1980) calls this type of switching
‘emblematic switching’ because it serves as an emblem of the bilingual
character in a monolingual sentence. Emblematic switching is also
quite common for any youngster.
Example: Ich meine, ben de kitap okumasini seviyorum.
10(I mean, I like reading too.)
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Sociolinguistically code-switching may well have some functions for
the bilingual utterer. Rene Appel and Pieter Muysken (1987: 118) have
pointed out the following functions of code-switching. Firstly it has
referential function for the utterer to fill in the lexical gaps of one
language. Since the speaker does not know the exact equivalent of a
word, s/he consciously tends to switch to the other language. Second-
ly, it has directive function for the speaker to involve and/or to ex-
clude a person from a part of the conversation. Thirdly, it may have an
expressive function for the speaker to express her/his transcultural
identity. Fourthly, it may have a phatic function for the utterer to
emphasise something in his/her utterance by changing the speech-tone
and the language. In the fifth place, code-switching may have a meta-
linguistic function for the speaker who wants to impress the others by
showing his/her linguistic skills. Finally, it may also have a poetic
function in switching puns and jokes.
     Apart from these types of code-switching, the youth may make
other mix-ups between Turkish and German due to the different
grammatical character of the languages. Turkish language springs from
the Ural-Altaic language family like Finnish, Hungarian, Mongolian
and Korean languages. Turkish is from the Altaic group as Mongol
and Korean. All these languages share three common features. These
features are namely agglutination, vowel harmony and lack of gram-
matical gender. Turkish is a language without any article and with
many suffixes. This is the reason why the Turkish youngsters tend to
adopt German nouns without any article, and they sometimes add
suffixes for case – and plural-marking.
Example a: Burada Grundschuleden önce Kindergarten’e gitmek
sart.
(It is obligatory here to attend the Kindergarden before
the primary school.)
-den : Ablative case in Turkish
-e : Dative case in Turkish
Example b: Yasak yerlere grafiti yaptigin zaman Ruhmun oluyor.
(When you make graffiti on the illegal places, you get
fame.)
-un : Genitive case in Turkish
Example c: En çok Action-movieleri seviyorum.
(I like the action-movies most.)
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-ler : Plural marking +
-i : Accusative case in Turkish
They also sometimes mix verbs by paraphrasing with the Turkish
verbs. They usually use the German infinitive verbs in combination
with the Turkish auxiliary verbs of yapmak (to do, to make), etmek
(e. g. devam etmek: to carry on), and olmak (to be).
Example a: Kimleri einladen etmek istiyorsun?
(Whom do you want to invite?)
Example b: Ceketini neden abmachen yapmiyorsun?
(Why don’t you take off your jacket?)
Example c: Dün olanlari gördügüm zaman überraschen oldum.
(When I saw what happened yesterday, I got surprised.)
The language, which is used by the working-class Turkish youth, is
11basically called Kanak Sprak. Kanak sprak should, in fact, be written
as ‘kanake sprache’ in German, but this is the way the Turkish
youngsters vernacularise it like many other examples. They quite often
spell the words in the way they are pronounced. The words that are
written on the cover of the tape of rap group Cartel are quite illustra-
tive in this sense. The group have written the Turkish vernaculars of
the English and German words such as ‘existira sipesiyal tenks’ instead
of extra special thanks, ‘ekistira gürüse’ instead of extra Grüße (greet-
ings), ‘Asiyatik Variyors’ instead of Asiatic Warriors, ‘Getobilaster
Tiim’ instead of Ghettoblaster Team, and ‘Kiroyzberg 36’ instead of
Kreuzberg 36.
*  *  *
To summarise, having to practice various life-worlds, the working-
class Turkish youth in Kreuzberg acquires the competence to behave
appropriately in a number of different arenas. There are linguistic,
social and cultural boundaries between their life-worlds (youth centre,
street, school and household). The youngsters always have to translate
and negotiate within and between these rigidly defined boundaries.
The way they behave in these life-worlds is imbued by the conditions
of the diasporic space in which they have been living. As far as it
constitutes a symbolic bridge and cultural continuum between the
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diaspora and the homeland, Kreuzberg, ‘Kleines Istanbul,’ turns out to
be the new home for the youngsters. Kreuzberg provides the work-
ing-class youth with a ‘fortress’ protecting them against the destabi-
lising effects of racialisation, rising unemployment, misrepresentation
and discrimination. To put it differently, Kreuzberg serves as a securi-
ty valve for the youngsters to soften the firm strokes coming from the
external world. The youngsters in Kreuzberg also develop a ‘demotic’
discourse against the dominant discourse of the majority society (cf.
Baumann, 1996). Their multiculturalism developing in response to the
dominant ideology of multiculturalism (a form of high-culture) springs
from their own form of resistance.
     This chapter has been concerned with the question of identity and
how it is predominantly related to representation and dominant dis-
course. In this sense, it was noted how the middle-class Turkish youths
are highly influenced by their representation in the media. The Ger-
man media tend to represent the Turkish youth as a homogeneous
group suffering an identity crisis while wedged between two cultures.
The media problematise the process of identity construction and
articulation by the Turkish youngsters. As depicted above, these
youngsters, who are responsive to the media, take their representation
in the media as a starting point to redefine their identity. Taking the
‘identity crisis’ as granted, the youngsters tend to ‘chatter about the
chatter about their identity.’ It was also stated that the multicultural
discourse of the middle-class youth was essentially shaped by their
concern about integrating into the mainstream multiculturalism. This
is why their discourse of multiculturalism that is defined in relation to
the dominant discourse of multiculturalism is, by and large, different
from that of the working-class Turkish youth. Thus, this chapter has
provided a ground for the investigation of the working-class hip-hop
youth culture in particular by portraying the cultural identity forma-
tion and articulation processes of the working-class minority youth
has been portrayed in relation to that of the middle-class youth. The
following chapter will elaborate the primary features of the expressive
hip-hop culture among the Turkish youths living in Kreuzberg.
Notes
1 For further information about the 1989 May Day demonstra-
tions, see “Steine in die Senatskosmetik,” Taz-Berlin (2 May
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1989); “DGB zählte 610.000 beim Tag der Arbeit,” Taz (2 May
1989); and “In Kreuzberg kommandieren wir,” Der Spiegel
47/1990.
2 In the May Day demonstrations of 1996, a youth was killed,
many others were wounded and the underclass people living in
the margins in Kadiköy, Istanbul plundered many shopping
centres, banks, and offices. The riot was partly organised and
partly spontaneous. To put it differently, spontaneity in this
occasion was the metalanguage of the peripheral space and/or
marginality.
3 Here, paraphrasing from Antonio Gramsci (1971: 198), it should
be stated that ‘spontaneity is the characteristic of the history of
subaltern classes and indeed of their most marginal and peripheral
elements.’
4 I am using the term distinction in the sense that Pierre Bourdieu
used it. Bourdieu, in his work Distinction (1984), calls attention to
how different kinds of capitals (social, cultural, symbolic and
economic) have been put into play by members of each social
class and group in order to create a difference or distinction.
5 Article 35a of the Berlin-Brandenburg Education Act required a
30 percent quota for the ‘foreigner’ students. If the number of
foreign students exceeded the 30 percent quota, and then either
this quota could be extended to 50 percent under the condition
that all the foreigner students spoke fluent German, or the ‘fo-
reigner classrooms’ could be formed. Article 35a was declared
void in September 1995 through the initiatives of the Association
of Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Parents (ABBTP). According to
the figures of the ABBTP, the percentage of the Turkish students
who have been educated in the ‘foreigner classrooms’ in Berlin
was 20 percent for the Grundschule and 50 percent for the Haupt-
schule. For further information, see 10 Jahre Elternarbeit 1985-
1995: Eine Documentation des Türkischen Elternvereins in Ber-
lin-Brandenburg e. V.
6 According to the figures of the Statistische Veröffentlichungen
der Kultusministerkonferenz, Dokument No. 119 (Dec. 1991),
55.8 percent of the foreigners in Sonderschule in Berlin was made
up by the Turkish students (Table 6).
7 A regulation, which was issued in 1975, has already forbidden
foreigners from taking up residence in some districts of Berlin.
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These restrictive zoning laws, enforced by the Ausländerpolizei
(Aliens Police), identify three quarters of the city – Kreuzberg,
Wedding and Tiergarten – as off-limits to the last desirable fo-
reigners (those from the Third World). These are the districts with
the highest percentage of Turkish residents, with 21.2 percent, 17.6
percent, and 6.2 percent respectively. It seems that the zoning laws,
regulating the whereabouts of foreigners, went successful because
the Turkish population of some new districts such as Neukölln
and Schöneberg has become more than that of Wedding and Tier-
garten, with 19.5 percent and 8.7 percent respectively (Source: Sta-
tistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister, 30.6.1996). The further
stage of this process also seems to be convincing the Turks to leave
Kreuzberg and settle down in some other districts of Berlin.
8 Although I have had limited material on households, due to the
nature of my research, the family, as a principal constituent of the
diasporic space needs to be taken into consideration in order to
understand the diasporic consciousness.
9 Umberto Eco attributes to the ‘chatter about chatter about
sport’ in order to express the impact of the press on the interpre-
tations which we consider as our own.
10 The examples for code-switching were taken from the unpub-
lished paper of Hasim Anik and Fügen Sengün (1995).
11 ‘Kanak Sprak’ is also the title of the book that has been written a
Turkish writer, Feridun Zaimoglu (1995). In his book, he has
edited many brief articles written by some Turkish youngsters in
a wide variety from the rappers to the Islamic fundamentalists. He
attempts to explore the street German used by the Turkish youth
with their own vernaculars. He ironically calls the world of the
young Turks ‘Kanakistan.’
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Chapter 5
Cultural Identity of the Turkish Hip-Hop
Youth in Kreuzberg 36
The previous chapter portrayed the prevalent life-worlds of the dias-
poric Turkish youth in order to demonstrate the major constituents
of their identity formation processes. This chapter primarily sets out
to delineate the process of cultural bricolage and the cultural sources
that shape the processes of identity formation of the working-class
Turkish hip-hop youth. Being subject to a kind of structural outsider-
ism, the working-class ethnic minority youths tend to celebrate their
past and cultural authenticity. This tendency becomes apparent in
their rising orientation to their homeland, religion and ethnicity,
which thus become their main cultural sources. Secondly, I shall de-
scribe both the particularist and universalist constituents of the Turk-
ish hip-hop youth culture in Kreuzberg. The particularist components
of their leisure culture are ‘âlem’ (meeting with friends), dügüns (wed-
ding ceremony) and arabesk music, while the universalist ones are rap,
graffiti, dance and ‘cool’ style. Turkish hip-hop youngsters tend to ex-
press themselves by means of these expressive forms of culture as they
are seldom represented positively in the German media. In mapping
out the main framework of the cultural identity formation process and
leisure culture of these youngsters, I shall demonstrate the multicul-
tural competence of ethnic minority youths.
Cultural Sources of Identity Formation Process
Among the Turkish Youth
As it was outlined in Chapter 1, the modern individual has recently
become subject to the simultaneous interplay of the global and the
local (glocal). In the age of glocalism, individuals and groups tend to
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form new identities by going back to basics. In this process of cultural
identity formation, ‘authentic’ culture, ethnicity and what is related to
the homeland become an important source of identity politics. Next, I
shall examine these sources in order to display the particularist ele-
ments of the cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth.
Orientation to Homeland
Orientation to the homeland can be perceived as one of the primary
sources of identity for the diasporic youth. The diasporic youth tends
to see Turkey as a shelter to protect themselves from their exclusion
and ghettoisation in the public sphere, and to feel a sense of belonging.
The symbolic bridge between the country of settlement and the home-
land is built by means of regular summer vacations (izin), by listening
to pop and rap music originating both in Germany and Turkey, and
by an interest in famous football players like Tayfun playing in Euro-
pean level teams like Fenerbahçe. All three are examples of how the
advancement of the means of transnational communications and
transportation multiplies the diasporic communities’ orientation to
their homelands.
     Orientation to the homeland is a never-ending issue for the Turkish
communities in Berlin. Although there is a broad typology of different
communities among the Turkish minority, orientation to the home-
land is practically identical within almost all the communities. An ob-
vious example is religious groups, who form various kinds of diasporic
communities separated by strong boundaries from German society.
These groups survive with the cultural and religious baggage they
brought from Turkey, and prefer not to interact with the majority so-
ciety. However, nationalist groups and left-wing secular groups, too,
although they prefer interacting with the majority society, are also
largely oriented to homeland affairs such as Turkey’s internal politics
and economic situation, which are often discussed in the traditional
Turkish cafés, meeting places and leisure time activities.
     The mythified summer vacations (izin) remain the main aspect of
orientation to the homeland. The annual journey to Turkey has always
been a great source of amusement for the youngsters. Previously, the
rationale behind the izins was mainly to visit relatives. Nowadays, the
vacations have mainly become a journey to the land of sun and beach-
es. Before the Yugoslavian war, driving by car all the way through
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Eastern Europe from Germany to Turkey was the most convenient
way of travel. Most of the youngsters now talk about those days with
nostalgia: The fun they used to have on the way with all the other fam-
ily members and relatives; the enthusiastic impatience to arrive at the
Turkish border, Kapikule; leaving the land of ‘oppression’ and ‘disci-
pline’ behind; and living the journey with a feeling of ‘full freedom.’
Now, the children of those days have grown up, and they prefer going
to Turkey with their own friends by plane as quickly as possible. The
dreamy journeys of the past have only remained in the pictures taken
during travels, in the nostalgic thoughts and conversations within the
family.
     Music is another primary aspect of the youngsters’ orientation to
Turkey. The rapidly growing market of pop music in Turkey has also
influenced the young generation of Turkish pop-music singers in
Germany. Recently, the music market in Turkey has become a signifi-
cant career opportunity for a large number of pop and rap music sing-
ers in the Turkish diaspora. Accordingly, many Turkish-origin singers
returned to settle in Turkey in order to have a share in the Turkish
1music market. For instance, Cartel, a German-Turkish rap group to
which I shall return in the next chapter, sold more than 300,000 cop-
ies of the album, called Cartel, in Turkey in 1995. There are dozens of
Turkish music stores in Kreuzberg selling Turkish pop, arabesk, rap
and folk music albums and arranging public concerts with the singers
coming from Turkey.
     In the Turkish discos of Berlin, the youngsters listen to these Ger-
man-Turkish singers as well as the ones from Turkey. Listening to
Turkish music, drinking Turkish Efes beer, and remembering the
summer loves and vacations in Turkey, the youngsters construct a
kind of imaginary journey back to Turkey. The infusion of Turkish
pop music into the Turkish discos in Germany, and dancing to the
rhythm of the Turkish pop singer Yonca as well as to Madonna, also
gives the youngsters self-esteem – one which grows with one’s own
cultural capital (Trauffetter, 1995). The dancing spaces in the discos,
which are dominated by what is Turkish, serve as a kind of imaginary
remigration to the homeland and to the past. This imaginary remigra-
tion is the precondition of the solidarity network among the youngs-
ters. This group setting also resembles a part-time diasporic communi-
ty formation that excludes what is German. What these youth groups
form in these spaces is a kind of part-time communitarianism that pro-
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vides them with a political response to their exclusion from the public
space in Germany.
     Football is another crucial aspect of the orientation of the diasporic
Turkish youth to their homeland. Most of the youngsters fanatically
support one of the leading Turkish teams. When I was conversing with
some of the youngsters in the Naunyn Ritze youth centre, talking
about football warmed up the conversation quite rapidly. A thirteen
year-old boy, a fan of Galatasaray, asked me which team I supported.
When I said I was a fan of Fenerbahçe, the traditional rival of Galata-
saray, we had a very lively conversation revolving around football. For
a considerable number of Turkish youths, playing football provides a
chance for social mobility. Although they may now play for a Berlin
youth team, these youngsters aspire to playing in one of the first
league teams of Turkey (Table 7).
Table 7: Major Turkish Football Teams in Kreuzberg
Football Team Foundation
Year
Total
Members
Turkish
Members
Altinordu 1995       100       100       
Berlin Türkspor 1965       524       503       
BSC Agrispor 1984       319       255       
Hatayspor 1981       130       130       
Hilalspor 1987       211       211       
Karadeniz 1987       78       78       
SG Anadoluspor 1978       343       211       
Türkiyemspor 1978       455       441       
Source: Der Bezirksbürgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg, 1.1.1996
Religion and Ethnicity
Apart from the orientation to homeland, there are other forms of
cultural sources that shape the cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop
youth: religion, ethnicity and their reception in Turkey. Religion is a
particularly influential cultural source of identity for the diasporic
Turkish youth. The celebration of Islam among the diasporic Turkish
youth springs, in part, from the German society’s perception of them.
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The majority society tends to employ Islam as a symbolic instrument
to define the Turkish youth; and it is used in turn by the youngsters
themselves. For instance, one of the rap groups, to which I shall return
shortly, calls itself Islamic Force, although they have nothing to do
with radical Islam. This kind of identity manifestation seems to indi-
cate a growing kind of what Vertovec (1995: 13) calls ‘cultural Muslim
2identity’ among young Turks.
     The stress on religion is usually something they adopt from their
parental culture as part of their negotiation with the majority society.
The way the youth employs religion as a source of identity is quite
distant from essentialist. This is a form of what Herbert J. Gans (1979:
6) calls ‘symbolic ethnicity’:
[A]s the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes
the primary way of being ethnic, ethnicity takes on an expressive rather than
instrumental function in people’s lives, becoming more of a leisure-time
activity and losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family
life. Expressive behaviour can take many forms, but often involves the use of
symbols – the symbols as signs rather than myths. Ethnic symbols are fre-
quently individual cultural practices that are taken from the older ethnic
culture; they are abstracted from that culture and pulled out of its original
mooring, so to speak to become stand-ins for it.
Gans’ expression of symbolic ethnicity is quite applicable to the
situational use of ethnicity and religion by the Turkish hip-hop youth
in Berlin. As a response to the extreme right-wing German militancy,
arson attacks and governmental integration policies towards the privi-
leged Aussiedler and Übersiedler (ethnic German expatriates), work-
ing-class Turkish youths began to politicise themselves to win space
in the urban landscape. In the process of politicisation, the youngsters
have extensively invested in ethnic symbols such as religious and
national days, ethnic foods, attachment to homeland, return to the
history of homeland and religious and/or ethnic figures.
     There are some other sources of identity for the diasporic Turkish
youth i. e., ethnic symbols appearing in the form of either ornaments
or tattoo. These symbols usually refer to a covert way of communica-
tion amongst the youngsters. Kreuzberg is a place where a stranger
could gain the trust of the youngsters in a short while by means of
ethnic symbols. Ethnic symbols make communication easier, since
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they express the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ But one should
be careful in mapping out the symbolic meanings of these ornaments
because they might be put on for fashion as well as for ethnic and
political identifications.
     Ethnic symbols are diversified according to ethnic and political
allegiances. In this sense, the most popular ethnic symbols for right-
wing Turkish nationalists are Turkish flag, grey wolf with a crescent
moon, and Koran necklace; and for the Alevis the forked sword (Zül-
fükâr), the picture of the Chaliph Ali and/or Pir Sultan Abdal (Alevi
3patron saint, 16th century) holding a baglama in his hands. Before
the Sivas affairs in 1993, Alevis used to keep these symbols in the form
of picture on the walls of their rooms. Now, those symbols have
become one of the main sources of identity for the Alevi youngsters.
Previously Alevi youngsters also carried Turkish flags on their belt
buckles, for instance. After the arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen,
the Alevi youngsters used their Turkishness as the main base to articu-
late their reaction. Subsequently, in response to the killings of the
Alevi intellectuals and people in Sivas and Gazi Mahallesi, they quali-
fied this articulation by symbolically highlighting their Alevism.
Reception of Diasporic Youth in Turkey: German-Like (Almanci)
The identity formation of the diasporic youth results in a permanent
dialogue between the country of settlement and the homeland. For
instance, the reception of the Turkish diasporic youth in Germany and
Turkey has an impact on their daily politics of identity. The over-
whelming orientation of the Turkish youngsters to the homeland is
both accelerated and disrupted by the official and popular discourses
in Germany and Turkey. Considering how they are alluded to by the
official German discourse (‘Gastarbeiter’, ‘Ausländer’, ‘Mitbürger’),
they are always represented either through their ‘otherness’ or through
their ‘displacement’ (Çaglar, 1994: 97).
     Turkish migrants and their children in Germany are officially
defined in Turkey as either ‘gurbetçi’, or ‘Almanya’daki vatandaslari-
miz’ (our citizens in Germany). German-Turks are stereotypically
defined by the Turkish people in Turkey as either ‘Almanyali’ or
‘Almanci’. Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey.
The major Turkish stereotypes about the German-Turks are those of
their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germa-
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ny, losing their Turkishness, and becoming more and more German.
Çaglar (1994: 98) defines those stereotypes as:
[t]he heavily overloaded cars packed with household goods that they bring
from Germany for their houses in Turkey; their pretentiousness and readiness
to pay any price when shopping; their different styles of dress and such details
as the way their girls walk; […] [their] readiness to pay more than local inhabi-
tants for land, apartments, and brides.
Implicitly derogatory in its markedness, in its explicit differentiation
from a non-emigrant Turk, the label bears witness to a combination of
difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection (Mandel, 1990: 158). Their
Turkish language and the way they dress are also influential in the
construction of an ‘Almanci’ image. The youngsters are also subject to
this labelling. Mehmet (18) explained one of the memories he had from
Ankara:
I was buying some clothes in a shopping centre in Ankara. When I was talking
to the salesperson, a girl whom I did not know suddenly approached me and
asked a question. “Excuse me, are you from Germany because I bet with my
friend over there that you come from Germany.” I did not understand how
they realised. I think because of the way I spoke to the salesperson, or the way
I dressed up. I do not really know. I mean, here we are called yabanci (foreign-
er), and there in Turkey, in my own country, they call us ‘Almanci’. I am
depressed about that moment.
“[H]ere we are called yabanci (foreigner), and there [in Turkey] […]
they call us Almanci.” Such a line remains a very common discourse
amongst the German-Turkish youth. Almanci designates someone
who has adopted Germany, and yabanci refers to being a foreigner in
the country of adaptation. The youth considers these two given dis-
tinctions in the process of their identity formation.
     The orientation to the homeland of the children of Turkish immi-
grants has always been a concern for scholars. Some of them argue that
decreasing contact with the homeland will result in the loss of home
(Kagitçibasi, 1987; Abadan-Unat, 1985). Explaining the alienation and
exclusion of the first and second generations by the majority society,
Kagitçibasi (1987: 199) differentiates the two generations:
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The first generation hangs on to his traditional culture and identity, often as a
defensive reaction to rejection by the dominant culture. This tendency is
further strengthened by frequent visits to the country of origin and continuing
close ties with family and kin. He carries his original national cultural identity
with him. The second generation ‘foreigner,’ born in Europe, however, does
not really have such a distinct identity (at least not to the same degree) to hang
on to. He may even lack the language of the original country being thus
deprived of meaningful interpersonal ties through visits home. There is, in fact,
no ‘home’ for the deculturated or culturally impoverished second generation in
a state of alienation [italics mine].
Kagitçibasi, in her statement, seems to disregard the increasing impact
of the global interconnectedness and symbolic links between the
subject and homeland. What emerges out of all these symbolic bonds
is an ‘imaginary homeland.’ What is more, she also tends to essentialise
culture as a practice by defining the youth as ‘deculturated’ and ‘cul-
turally impoverished.’ Furthermore, she seems to reduce the cultural
identity of the diasporic youth to an essentialist form of ‘Turkish
culture.’ Here, cultural identity is not seen as a process but as being
something fixed and essential. In fact, cultural identity is rather acqui-
red and renewed in a continuous dialogue between self and external
world. It is a dialogical process in which self is constructed collectively
in relation to the ‘other.’ Contrary to what Kagitçibasi claimed, the
orientation of the Turkish diasporic youth to Turkey has not declined,
rather increased. The growing cultural interaction between Turkey and
the diaspora has undoubtedly facilitated the orientation of the diaspo-
ric communities to the homeland.
Working-Class Turkish Youth Leisure Culture
The leisure culture of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters
consists of various components originating either from their parental
culture or from global hip-hop youth culture. These constituents are
namely ‘âlem’ (meeting with friends), dügüns (wedding ceremony),
arabesk music, rap, graffiti, dance and ‘cool’ style. ‘Alem,’ dügüns and
arabesk are those leisure time activities deriving from their working-
class and/or rural-origin parental culture. These events are the other
forms of orientation to the homeland, whereas rap, graffiti and dance
are the main constituents of the global hip-hop youth culture which a
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considerable number of diasporic Turkish youth have internalised. In
what follows I shall describe both the particularist and universalist
constituents of leisure culture among the working-class Turkish hip-
hop youth living in Kreuzberg.
     The working-class Turkish youngsters mostly ‘hang around’ to-
gether and entertain themselves in the group meetings taking place in
one of the youngsters’ house. They call these meetings ‘âlem’ and
themselves ‘âlemci.’ ‘Alem’ is a ritual that has been carried from ‘sila’
(home) to ‘gurbet’ (diaspora) by the migrants. In these ritualised
meetings, they drink alcohol, listen to arabesk music, and experience
4imaginary journeys back home. These events, organised among
close circles of friends, provide the male youth groups with a ground
for the construction of a ‘part-time communitarianism.’ Listening to
arabesk music, talking about summer vacations, and drinking ‘Raki’ or
‘Efes,’ the youngsters recreate the homeland in their imagination.
     Another aspect of their leisure culture is the wedding (dügün)
ceremonies taking place in the specially designed Turkish wedding
saloons such as Dedem (Wedding) and Burcu (Kreuzberg). Turkish
wedding ceremonies in Berlin are not so different from their equiva-
lents in Turkey. Both are very working-class oriented rituals and
similar in terms of the performances of the folk music singers, arabesk
singers, and folk dances with a double-sided drum (davul) and a
5double-reed instrument (zurna). This type of wedding ceremony is
a ritual brought by the rural migrants to the urban space. Dancing on
davul-zurna for the migrants is, in fact, an imaginary journey back
home and back to the previous rural life. The ritual is itself authenti-
cally performed in the open air in the villages and rural towns of
Anatolia, because davul-zurna is such a combination of musical
instruments that it should preferably be performed in the open air due
to its high-volume. Thus, davul-zurna performances, which are ac-
companied by guests’ folk dances in the wedding saloons, mostly
bring about a kind of chaos. Urbanisation has transformed some
rituals. Wedding ceremonies, which used to reproduce the communal
pride in the rural space, have now been carried into the urban space.
     There are some main reasons why the guests go to wedding cere-
monies. Firstly, they want to entertain themselves; secondly, they
conceive it as a duty to go to the weddings and to give a gift (mostly
6money and/or gold) to the new couple with the consideration that
their own children will get married some day; and sometimes to meet
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friends and/or relatives who live a long distance away. In one of the
weddings, to which Yüksel, the owner of a music store in Adalbert-
straße invited me, what was remarkable was the golden jewellery worn
by the youngsters. It was an Alevi wedding of a couple originating
from the city of Erzincan (eastern Anatolia), and the gold necklaces of
Zülfükâr sword and of Pir Sultan Abdal in various sizes were obvious-
ly the most popular ornaments among the Alevi youngsters, reflecting
their allegiance to ethnic symbols. Apart from symbolising the
ethnic/religious/peer group values, gold is also a dramatisation of
wealth.
     Another crucial aspect of the wedding ceremonies worth mention-
ing is the selection of the singers and groups by the hosts. The selec-
tion of famous and popular groups and/or singers by paying big
amounts yields a distinction to the parents of the couple, especially
that of the groom. In most weddings, although the parents of the
groom are not able to afford big expenses, they do their best in order
to gain a superior social status within the community.
     Folk dance is an indispensable part of the wedding ceremonies both
in Turkey and in the diaspora. In modern urban Turkey, the circle folk
dances (halay) are closely identified with the countryside and almost
everywhere seen as a devaluation of country living. However, diaspora
populations perceive these dances as bearers of ethnic identity. In Ber-
lin, elegant and urban Turks take pleasure in dancing circle dances,
whereas in Turkey, city people might prefer not to identify with this
type of folk dancing. It seems that in the diaspora populations, the
question of rural origin may be less significant than ethnic identifica-
tion, and the positive and valued aspects of it, including dance, music
and food. Besides providing a cultural distinction, circle dances also
offer a sense of collectivism to the diasporic communities. Collectiv-
ism is literally embodied in the shape of the dance and the shared code
7of communication between the dancers.
     So far in this chapter I have outlined the particularist aspects of the
working-class Turkish hip-hop leisure culture. Next, I shall outline the
common aspects of the global hip-hop culture, which serves to inte-
grate a significant number of working-class Turkish diasporic youths
into the mainstream youth culture.
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Hip-Hop Youth Culture and Working-Class
Diasporic Turkish Youth
Hip-Hop is a youth culture that enables ethnic minority youths to use
both their own ‘authentic’ cultural capital and the global transcultural
capital in constructing and articulating their identities. It provides the
diasporic youth with a ground where they can use their ethnicity as a
strategising tool to articulate their identities in response to the majori-
ty nationalism and racism. It also serves as a mechanism to incorporate
the ethnic minority youth into the global youth culture. The youngs-
ters’ use of ‘authentic’ culture as a strategising tool in the process of
identity formation principally springs from their need to come to
terms with the unpleasant present pervaded by racism, unemployment,
exclusion and poverty. As Clifford (1988: 5) has rightly stated, the
diasporic groups who are alienated by the system and swept up in a
destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local
futures; what is different about them is that they remain tied to tradi-
tional pasts and ethnicities. Remaking, or recovering, the past serves at
least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way
of coping with the conditions of the present without being very critical
about the status quo. Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of
self not dependent on criteria handed down by others – the past is
what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40).
     However, Turkish youngsters, while having a sense of looking
backward, also tend to transcend the exclusionist policies of the
German nation-state by exhibiting a transnational articulation of
culture. In fact, what makes these youngsters hip-hop youth are not
those particularist cultural sources, but universalist constituents. There
are various ways in the global hip-hop culture through which ethnic
minority youths can resist the dominant regimes of representations
and incorporate themselves into the mainstream. Rap, graffiti, dance,
and the ‘cool’ look are some examples. All these particular aspects of
hip-hop culture attempt to localise power and to create a distance
between the already-excluded youth group and the legitimate forms of
institutions such as police, education and media. These are the at-
tempts by the youngsters to get away from the limited boundaries of
the ‘ghetto’ life. This is a chance to broaden the living boundaries in a
way that leads to the incorporation of the youth into the mainstream
culture. By doing graffiti, rap, or breakdance, they all want to be ‘da
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King’ (‘da’ is the vernacular of article ‘the’). Roaming around the city,
trying to discover the outskirts of the urban landscape, painting and
tagging (signing) graffiti, attending break-dance competitions and
parties, and fighting against rival youths, they do all these things with,
and within, the gang.
     Hip-Hop culture has become very popular among Turkish youngs-
ters since the late eighties. Especially, Turkish youngsters living in
Kreuzberg at around that time switched from gangsta group formation
8to hip-hop group formation. Taner (26) is one of the main figures of
the Turkish hip-hop scene in Berlin, who experienced this transforma-
tion:
Before the wall came down there were American discos where the American
soldiers used to go to. They brought the life from America to Berlin. They
brought here all those DJing, break-dance, white dancing gloves, and all those
sorts of things. Hip-Hop started with the Americans here, with dance and mu-
sic. Then we, the Turks, have found ourselves in this culture. We have grown
up with two different musical tastes: arabesk at home and hip-hop in the
American discos.
Hip-Hop has provided these youths with a ground to incorporate
themselves into the mainstream global youth culture. In what follows I
shall describe the common constituents of the global hip-hop youth
culture as much as they relate to the Turkish hip-hop youth in Kreuz-
berg. As there will be a separate chapter on the rap music and the
rappers, I shall leave rap out for the time. Graffiti, dance and ‘coolness’
are the aspects to be examined in the following section.
Graffiti
The word ‘graffiti,’ taken from Italian, served originally as the name of
inscriptions scratched on walls. The word is related to the name of a
particular technique of mural painting, that of ‘sgraffito.’ Today, other
techniques are used apart from scratching and/or carving: felt tip pens
are used inside and on small areas, aerosol spray cans are used outside
and on large areas. Regina Blume (1985) has defined the motives for
producing graffiti as:
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(a) a proof of existence – scribo, ergo sum (I write therefore I am);
(b) a need to express oneself;
(c) a sense of belonging to a group;
(d) a pleasure in aesthetic, creative and physical acts; and
9(e) an expression of boredom.
Having all these motives, graffiti, or tagging, becomes a way of resist-
ance against the formal life, sanctions of the adults, and the legitimate
world of the institutions. The world of graffiti is the youngsters’ other
world because grown-ups do not read them, and also this is the world
in which the minority youth can express itself with its own vernacular
language without any restriction or questioning.
     Graffiti is a way of expression of the poverty of the urban ‘ghetto,’
of youngsters’ territorial claims, and of their power. It is the freedom
of writing ‘Kanak’ instead of ‘Kanake,’ or ‘masaka’ instead of ‘Mas-
saker.’ Writing graffiti on the forbidden walls like the metro stations
is a kind of covert war waged against the official authorities. Sneaking
in the dark of the night with the spray cans and masks without being
captured by the police sounds like the accomplishment of a ‘mission
impossible.’ Graffiti, for the subaltern ethnic minority youngsters,
refers to the ‘bombing’ of the institutional space. Constructing a
counter-hegemonic space, the graffiti makers wage a war against the
power of state. These youngsters are the ‘spray warriors,’ or the ‘street
heroes,’ who fight against the official authorities for the localisation of
power. The youth localise their power in their graffiti and street fights
providing them with a sense of recognition by the public. This Hegeli-
10an sense of subjective recognition could have a ‘productive’ context:
a youngster, for instance, could come to transform himself as a think-
ing and active subject; and he could also achieve his self consciousness
in a dialogue of mutual recognition with the public.
     Recently, the local authorities have tried to legitimise graffiti by
using it as an educational tool for the kids and youngsters. For in-
stance, the graffiti on the walls of the Admiralstraße is an attempt to
warn the youngsters against the dangers of drug and violence and to
strengthen the feeling of neighbourhood (Figure 1, see p. 235).
     Graffiti is also a source of distinction for the youth. To become fa-
mous, a graffiti marker must go beyond his local boundaries in the
city. The more tags (personal signs) you have all around Berlin, the
more popular you become within the hip-hop community. ‘Slai’ is a
167
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S. 155-177) T01_06 Chapter 5.p 297863215754
Chapter 5
tag which I have seen almost all around Berlin, in Schöneberg, Wed-
ding, Kreuzberg and Tiergarten. ‘JFK’ is the most popular graffiti
group in Berlin.
They always prefer making graffiti in the most dangerous places: the
walls of metro stations or high buildings. It is also quite normal to see
a graffiti like ‘36 Boys’ all around the city, so that the group called ‘36
Boys’ may well be popular amongst the youngsters, and of course
constitute a threat to the police force, who are the ‘enemy’ for these
youngsters. Eyüp, a 22-year-old boy in Chip, quit making graffiti
when he was let off by the police officers after his apprehension:
I was tagging around four o’clock in the morning in Kotbusser Tor metro
station. After I finished my work, the police caught me on my way home. I
mean, I was pissed off with myself, because they didn’t see me tagging. They
just saw the spray can in my hand. I should have better hidden it. Anyway,
they took me to their car. I was extremely afraid that they were gonna beat me
and tell my parents that I was tagging. Then I was surprised because they did
not harm me; they just gave me a speech about the violation of the rules, and
then gave me a lift up to my apartment. They even didn’t tell my parents. I got
shocked really. Then I decided to quit doing these things. But, I tell you, if the
police had beaten me, I would carry on tagging much more than I used to.
The Berlin graffiti scene is composed of Germans as well as the minor-
ity youngsters. They have a bilingual graffiti magazine (German-
English) called BackJumps. The magazine consists of written and
figurative form of graffiti samples from Berlin and other urban centres
such as New York, Paris, London and Melbourne. The graffiti artists
also have a transnational connection with the hip-hop scene in the
other European cities like Paris, Amsterdam and London. The lan-
guage of graffiti is usually English. By using English as the graffiti
language, the Turkish hip-hop youngsters have both the feeling of
sharing a code of communication with the outside world, and of
sustaining a resistance movement against the supremacy of the Ger-
man language. On the other hand, in figurative graffiti, the common
rule is to imitate others’ figures, TV-cartoons, and comics. All the
figures in the graffiti made in many different countries look like each
other, with big eyes (as in the globalised Japanese TV-cartoons) and a
style of dressing similar to that of the American-black hip-hop scene
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11(Figure 2, see p. 236). Adapting various aspects and colours from
their ethnic arsenal, the youngsters make their own additions to the
globalised style of figurative graffiti, and build up their local style of
graffiti. Then, graffiti turns out to be a field where culture is construct-
ed on the basis of bricolage and hybridity with the global and local
motives.
     Sometimes the graffiti artists might go further and have their own
peculiar style. This peculiar style provides them with the possibility to
switch to painting. Erhan, or Gino, is one of them. Erhan used to be a
graffiti artist. Now, he is a painter. Although he is just 18 years old, he
has held many exhibitions in Germany. He works in a workshop in
the attic of the Naunyn Ritze youth centre. The titles of his works are
all English, e. g., ‘Jump to the Future,’ ‘Disappearing Footsteps,’ ‘Eagle
Eyes,’ ‘Birth of Virgin’ and ‘Dedicated to Hasan.’ The use of English
gives him a sense of being incorporated into the global culture. It is
amazing to see the shift in his work from the figurative graffiti to
painting. This artistic switch has given his work a postmodern look.
What he is providing the audience with is a hybrid art composed of
two distinct artistic forms: graffiti and painting.
Dance
Break-dance is another constituent of the hip-hop youth culture. The
dance-floor has a threefold function for the diasporic youth. Firstly,
the dance-floor provides the Turkish youth with a substantial ground
for the homing of the diaspora because they appear to be the ‘hosts’ in
the dance-floor. Secondly, the dance turns interethnic confrontations
from fighting to dancing. As Özcan (19), a Turkish youngster in
Naunyn Ritze, said ‘there were previously fights in the streets, now
there is dance, we compete on the stage. I show my superiority by way
of dancing.’ In doing so, hip-hop youth affirms the “sublimation of
fight into dance, of conflict into contest, of desperation into style and a
sense of self-respect” (Hebdige, 1988: 216). Finally, the dance is also
another source of distinction that the boys tend to use against ‘others.’
Previously, breakdance as a distinction was convertible to economic
capital: some of the Naunyn Ritze youngsters have made some money
from participating in the break-dance competitions organised in Ber-
lin.
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‘Cool’ Style
‘Cool’ is an American word which has become a very crucial motto of
the contemporary hip-hop youth culture. It literally means “(2) not
affected by passion or emotion […] (3) lacking enthusiasm warmth of
interest; lacking in cordiality […] (5) (of jazz music, a jazz musician)
restrained or relaxed in style […]; characteristic of those who favour re-
12laxed music; good, excellent, admirably up to date, stylish […].”
Recently, especially since the early 1980s, the word ‘cool’ has been
extensively used in hip-hop youth culture by blacks and Latinos living
in the United States. Ruth Horowitz (1983: 87-88) has defined ‘cool-
ness,’ in the context of Chicano youth in Chicago, as the ability to
stand back from certain situations and rationally evaluate others’
actions. The contextual use of ‘cool’ posits a distance between the
object and the subject who is using the word. Being cool, looking cool,
or staying cool has a critical connotation in itself. It is a way of expres-
sing a transcending reality for the youngsters.
     In hip-hop culture, a critical gaze is very crucial. It requires posi-
tioning oneself at a reasonable distance to the external world, so that
one can keep the critical look. Unlike the recent techno, punk, or
grunge cultures, one is never supposed to get lost in the artificial world
of entertainment, and s/he should always keep her/his ‘coolness.’ An
example is the way the rappers and their groupies move in the con-
certs, or in their daily lives, which looks very serious and masculine.
This masculine posture symbolises resistance against subordination. It
gives the impression that these ethnic minority youngsters have been
consciously positioning themselves against cruelty, hostility and
inequality springing from capitalism. Their cool style is a challenge
against the hegemony of the dominant regimes of representations. By
looking so, the youngsters are also challenging, at a symbolic level, the
stereotypes of the outsiders about their indifference to life, which may
come from both the majority society and from middle-class Turkish
communities. The German society may have stereotypes about their
violence and vandalism; on the other hand the middle-class Turkish
groups may treat them as troublesome, lazy and non-integrationist.
Thus, their cool style is, at the same time, a response to the stereotypes
of both Germans and Turks.
     The cool style which is performed in accordance with a critical
posture has also something to do with the way the youngsters dress.
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The clothes are chosen to represent both a sense of freedom and an
‘authentic’ working-class backlash. Wide and comfortable outfits are a
major part of the cool style. It symbolises freedom and comfort as
opposed to the traditional tight and stiff outfit. The way the rappers
and the break-dancers dress also represents the celebration of working-
class origin. Wearing wide overall trousers they resemble the mine
workers, or the construction workers. Hebdige (1987: 123-124) previ-
ously defined the difference between the early youth cultures and their
relation to each other in terms of class:
[P]unk style was perhaps interpreted by the teddy boys as an affront to the
traditional working-class values of forthrightness, plain speech and sexual
puritanism which they had endorsed and revived. Like the reaction of the
rockers to the mods and the skinheads to the hippies, the Teddy boy revival
seems to have represented an ‘authentic’ working-class backlash to the prole-
tarian posturing of the new wave.
Departing from the statements of Dick Hebdige concerning the youth
‘subcultures’ of the earlier periods, hip-hop may well be considered
the new form of youth culture representing an ‘authentic’ working-
class backlash to the proletarian posturing of the ‘new wave.’ Yet, it
goes beyond the notion of ‘subculture’ because the formation of ethnic
minority hip-hop culture seems to retain a more complex process,
which is characterised by globalisation and modern diasporic con-
sciousness.
     The word ‘cool’ has become a transcultural notion and the motto of
a distinct youth style. It is evident that this word has quickly been
adopted in many languages. Since culture is becoming more and more
global and transnational, the national languages become incapable of
creating new words to comply with such a rapid cultural change.
German, French and Turkish are some of the languages to which the
word, ‘cool,’ has infused without any resistance. German language has
even produced the antonym with the prefix of ‘un’: ‘uncool.’
     Although ‘cool’ is a very global word, it might have many local
connotations in itself. The Turkish rappers’ use of the word is, of
course, a cultural translation. Thus, the word might lose some of its
content as well as gaining some other connotations. MC Ünal, pro-
nouncing the word with a very American accent, states that “what is
cool in Berlin might not be considered cool in München, for instance.”
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Here, ‘cool’ refers to the acceptability of something within hip-hop
youth culture in a local sense. It intimates a local cultural code depic-
ting what might suit hip-hop culture. Incidentally, the word ‘hip’ is
another American word, which likewise has an extensive use in the
world. In slang, it literally means “(1) following the latest fashion in
13especially popular and jazz music, clothes, etc., stylish […].” ‘Hip’ is
also a new word that has entered the German language. It depicts
trendy and stylish, such as a ‘hip concert,’ ‘hip colour,’ or ‘hip movie.’
Hip-Hop Youth Style: A Cultural Bricolage
German-Turkish youngsters, at first glance, might seem as if they are
practising a conventional and essentialist form of cultural identity that
they have taken out of the ready-made package of cultural attributes
carried across from homeland by their parents. Such a conclusion
would be misleading because the formation and articulation of cultural
identity is a process, which is not free from the constant intercourse
between various social groups, classes and cultures. As Czarina Wil-
pert (1989: 21) accurately states:
The significance of the concept of cultural identity within this framework
derives from the assumption that, in the construction of a collective ethnic
identity, culture becomes a resource. It is not that culture, which may be in
continual transformation, is viewed as something static and fixed, nor that an
immigrant ‘community’ is considered to live as a homogenous closed cultural
entity within a foreign society. Rather, elements of culture, its signs and
symbols, may be transformed or filled with new meaning and take on a new
significance in this process. This is accomplished in a particular context at a
specific moment in history in interaction with the conditions and principles
which structure the lives of the immigrant descendants, and with reference to
the resources they have at hand for understanding the world around them […].
Hereby, Wilpert reminds us of two significant points. The first point
to be considered is that reification of culture in the diaspora is a vital
instrument to be employed in the process of identity formation. The
second point to bear in mind is that the community culture formed in
the diasporic space is not immune to the allure of the culture of the
wider society, unchanging, or always clear and unambiguous. Kreuz-
berg is not a traditional little village cut off culturally, socially, and
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ecologically from the majority society; its community culture cannot
be equated with that of Gemeinschaft (Töennies, 1957).
     In this sense, there are at least three main landmarks that shape the
cultural identification of the German-Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin:
a) ‘authenticity’ which is the expression of imagined Anatolian culture;
b) global culture which is mainly the imitation of urban Black Ameri-
can symbols; and
c) German culture which refers to the life styles of German peer
groups to which the German-Turkish youngsters desire to adapt
themselves.
For instance, as outlined in the previous chapter, the language used by
the German-Turkish youth in Berlin reflects a mixture of their Turk-
ishness, Germanness and cosmopolitan identity. This refers us to the
14‘multiple cultural competence’ of the descendants of migrants.
Modern diasporic communities like the Turkish diaspora in Europe
should learn to inhabit at least two identities, “to speak two cultural
languages, to translate and negotiate between them” (Hall, 1993: 310).
People belonging to such cultures of hybridity tend to gravitate either
to ‘Tradition’ or ‘Translation.’ Gravitating to tradition is an attempt to
restore the former purity and authenticity which are felt as being lost,
whereas choosing translation acknowledges that identity is subject to
the play of history, politics, representation and difference rather than
being subject to purity (ibid.: 309).
     What German-Turkish youngsters construct is a form of cultural
bricolage, or creolization, which literally means the interruption of the
monolithic structure of the nation-state in a way that leads to the
emergence of a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994), or a ‘third culture’ (Feath-
erstone, 1990). Cultural bricolage is also what Homi Bhabha calls a
‘differential communality,’ and what Felix Guattari (1989: 14) refers to
as the ‘process of heterogenesis.’ By the ‘processes of heterogenesis’
Guattari negates the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics whose aim is the
‘resolution’ of opposites. He argues that “our objective should rather
be to nurture individual cultures, while at the same time inventing new
contracts of citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singu-
larity, exceptions, and rarity coexist under the least oppressive condi-
tions” (ibid.: 14). He describes this formation “as a logic of the ‘includ-
ed middle,’ in which black and white are indistinct, in which the beau-
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tiful coexists with the ugly, the inside with the outside, the ‘good’ ob-
ject with the bad” (ibid.: 14).
     Cultural bricolage is, in a sense, constitutes a ‘third space’ that
enables other positions to emerge (Bhabha, 1994: 211). This creoliza-
tion process brings about the emergence of a transnational identity, or
what Gilroy (1987: 13) calls a ‘syncretic culture.’ As Gilroy (ibid.)
states, “culture does not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in
complex, dynamic patterns of syncretism.” Cultural identity is not
something fixed and permanent, “it refers to becoming as well as
being, and is never complete, always in process” (Hall, 1991: 47). Thus,
cultural identity of the German-Turkish youth is formed on the basis
of continuous dialogue between past and future, between homeland
and country of residence, between different worlds of meaning,
between various life-worlds, between global winds and local resist-
ance, between ‘roots’ and ‘routes,’ and between ‘here’ and ‘there.’
Gilroy’s (1987, 1993) definition of a kind of duality of consciousness –
with direct reference to W. E. B. Du Bois’ notion of ‘double conscious-
ness’ underlines diasporic individuals’ awareness of multilocality
which derives from their attachments to those given continuous
dialogues. The ‘double consciousness’ of diasporic subject serves to
bridge the gap between the local and the global.
*  *  *
To summarise, this chapter has indicated particularist and universalist
aspects of the Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg. It was
concluded that the Turkish hip-hop youth has simultaneously devel-
oped a form of cultural nationalism and a syncretic ‘third culture.’ The
sources of their cultural nationalism are twofold: the first one is the
majority nationalism that has recently been quite hegemonic and even
coercive in Germany. This point is enormously important in view of
what I will argue in the following pages because it shows that ethnic
identities are not simply the product of ‘traditional mores,’ but the
result of an unequal conversation between majority and minority
groupings. Sandra Wallman (1978) suggests that boundaries and social
definitions are always the result of an encounter between at least two
social agents. She puts the focus on the ethnic majority – not on the
minority populations – because it is [majority] ethnicity, according to
her, which determines the boundary of ‘them’ and ‘us.’ The second
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source of this cultural nationalism is the media, both German language
media and Turkish language media. In Berlin, one will immediately
realise that Turks, or other ethnic groups, are excluded in the German
print media or radio-TV. In that way, the feeling of exclusion and
segregation for Turks may increase. They are, in a sense, forced to get
back to their own cultural and local settings by the structural adjust-
ments. On the other hand, as explained in the third chapter, interna-
tional Turkish media and Berlin-Turkish media insist on the notion of
Turkishness to sustain the particularist ethnic sentiments of the Ger-
man-Turks.
     The syncretic ‘third culture’ of the Turkish hip-hop youths derives
from their multicultural competence, which enables them to switch
between various cultures such as minority culture, majority culture
and global culture. To put it differently, they form their cultural
identity through the hybridity of ‘tradition’ and ‘translation,’ authen-
ticity and syncreticism, heritage and politics. The practice of cultural
bricolage fosters a relationship among heterogeneous elements in a
meaningful ensemble, which displays both harmony and tension.
(Clifford, 1997: 12). This multicultural competence is acquired by
means of transnational communications and transportation, sustaining
the pace and density of relationships of the diasporic youth with the
homeland and the entire world. The ‘third culture’ that is formed by
the diasporic youth, at the same time, has a progressive nature. This
syncretic culture, as Melucci (1989: 14) has correctly stated, is “the
journey into unfamiliar territory […] [which] teaches us to recognise
ambivalence, encourages us to acknowledge different points of view,
and thereby stimulates awareness of potential freedoms […].”
     Hip-Hop culture has emerged as a source of alternative identity
formation and social status for the Turkish diasporic youth living in an
ethnic enclave whose older local support institutions have been demol-
ished. Alternative social identities were formed in fashions and lan-
guage, and in establishing neighbourhood crews or posses. These
crews, who are composed of hip-hop fans, artists, musicians, and
dancers, are new kinds of families providing insulation and support in
a complex and unyielding environment and may, in fact, contribute to
the community-building networks that serve as the basis for new
social movements (Rose, 1994: 34). As this chapter was an attempt to
interpret the discourses of Turkish hip-hop fans, artists and dancers in
Kreuzberg, I will explore those of the rappers in the next chapter.
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Notes
1 Tarkan, Candan Erçetin, Özcan Deniz, Azer Bülbül, Sibel Sezal,
Can Kat, Cartel, Erci-E, Karakan, Bay X, Rafet El Roman,
Ahmet and Ünlü are some of these singers and/or groups. There
are also some other singers coming from other countries such as
BenDeniz (Switzerland), and Cemali and Özlem Tekin (USA). It
is ironic that not only Turkish origin singers and/or groups are
coming to Turkey to seize a share in the expanding Turkish pop
music market, but also some non-Turkish singers are coming into
the market with Turkish lyrics such as ‘Endi ve Pol’ (Andy and
Paul are English pop singers and they print their names with
Turkish vernacular). For further information, see Greve (1996,
1997) and Köhne and Kepenek (1997).
2 In his research on the young Muslims in Keighley, West York-
shire, Vertovec (1995) drew our attention to two Asian football
teams called ‘Keighley Young Muslims’ and ‘Keighley Muslims’
in order to expose the construction and articulation of ‘cultural
Muslim identity’ among young Muslims.
3 Baglama is a musical instrument having a guitar-like body, long,
and strings that are plucked or strummed with the fingers or a
plectrum. Baglama has always been one of the main symbols of
the Alevi culture.
4 The word ‘âlem’ literally means amusement and/or entertainment.
5 Zurna is a kind of authentic Turkish musical instrument having a
flute-like body with shrill pipe usually accompanied by a drum.
6 Çaglar (1994: 196) states that ‘although the hemsehris of the
bride and groom do not feel obliged to pin gold on the bride any
more, the amount of gold Turkish brides receive in Germany is
higher in comparison with Turkey.’ For the hemsehris of the
bride and groom, it is a symbolic capital to have gold pinned on
them in public.
7 Gillian Bottomley (1987) touches on a similar tendency amongst
the Greek diaspora in Australia. She points out that Greek
kalamatianos (a circle folk dance that is very similar to Turkish
folk dance halay) danced by young people in a Sydney club is not
that danced by villagers in Greece. This is because, she states, such
a traditional ritual gives a positive distinction to the diasporic
youth from dominant Anglomorph population.
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8 Gangsta groups in Kreuzberg drew great attention from both
Turkish and German media in Berlin. For further information, see
“Ghetto Sisters,” Brigitte 19 (1990): 125-132; “Vereint Jagd auf
Skinheads,” Der Tagesspiegel Nr. 13562 (6 May 1990); “Der Haß
darauf, als Nichts zu gelten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung Nr. 184 (11/12
August 1990); “Die Barbaren kommen!” Zitty 4 (1993); and
“Türk Kizlari Çetesi,” Tan (9 March 1990 – Turkish).
9 In her work on graffiti, Blume (1985) has explored the historical
aspects, sources, forms, functions and addresses of graffiti.
10 The notion of ‘productive’ is free from its Marxist connotations,
which imprison the subject into an ideology of productionism.
The term has rather a Lefèbvreian meaning transcending crude and
brutal economism.
11 For further information, see Henkel et al. (1994).
12 See The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993.
13 See The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993.
14 Ålund (1992: 75) mentions ‘double cultural competence’ in the
Swedish context to refer to cultural bricolage of the immigrant
youth simultaneously fitting both into their own parental cultural
identity and Swedishness.
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Chapter 6
Aesthetics of Diaspora: Contemporary Minstrels
In the day time the radio’s scared of me,
Cause I’m mad, plus I’m the enemy,
They can’t c’mon and play with me in primetime,
Cause I know the time, plus I am gettin’ mine.
Chuck D. (Public Enemy)
Hip-Hop as a form of aesthetics of diaspora enables the descendants of
migrants to construct a syncretic culture entwined with diasporic con-
sciousness and transculturalism through the method of collage and by
means of globalism. The Turkish rappers in Berlin present an adequate
example to expose the production of cultural bricolage among a group
of Turkish diasporic youth. Accordingly, this chapter will map out the
social identities and counter-hegemonic discourses of the Turkish rap-
pers in Berlin, and the rise of the Turkish hip-hop community in
Germany. There are many German-Turkish rap groups in Berlin, such
as Cartel, Islamic Force, Ünal, Erci-E, Azize-A. The interviews held
with the rappers will be often quoted in order to expose the way they
narrate their stories as contemporary storytellers of the diasporic
youth in the urban landscape. By doing so, the rappers will have the
ground to express themselves as in a virtuoso verbal performance
through an imaginative excursion. Besides describing the discourses of
those storytellers and/or organic intellectuals, the interviews with the
rappers are also essential to demonstrate the transcultural and transna-
1tional nature of some diasporic youth cultures.
179
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S. 179-207) T01_07 Chapter 6.p 297863215794
Chapter 6
Rappers as Contemporary Minstrels, ‘Organic Intellectuals’
and Storytellers
For someone who grew up listening to a very mixed variety of music
ranging from western classical music to Turkish classical music, some-
one who idealised the sound of Eric Clapton, someone who felt at-
tached to the Turkish protest music of the eighties such as Zülfü Liva-
neli, Yeni Türkü and Ezginin Günlügü, and someone who always
switched between the western and eastern forms of music, rap was not
a natural transition for me. Although Turkey is a land of hybrid forms
of music of any type, rap was a taste that was difficult to acquire at
first. Recently, I have grown to greatly appreciate rap as an opposi-
tional political practice. As it became an academic interest of mine, I
began to be amazed by the narratives, stories and discourses of the
rappers in particular.
     The rappers I worked with during the course of my research in Ber-
lin made me conscious about their own social identities. The more I
analysed their lyrics and narratives, the more I realised that they are
2what Antonio Gramsci (1971) called ‘organic intellectuals’ and/or
what Walter Benjamin (1973) called ‘storytellers’ of their own local
communities. These two terms are quite complementary in essence.
Organic intellectual refers to the intellectual who originates in subal-
tern groups, as in the urban ghetto communities. Gramsci’s (1971: 12)
definition of ‘organic intellectual’ presupposes the existence of a dom-
inant class or group, exercising hegemony and domination on the sub-
altern classes or groups, through the State and juridical government.
The ‘organic intellectual’ serves to raise the interests of his/her newly
organised class or group, who aim to be incorporated into the system
and to take their place in the process of distribution of resources. They
attempt to disrupt the social, political and cultural hegemony of the
dominant groups. The Turkish rappers in Berlin try to contribute to
the formation of a sense of unified community as opposed to the ex-
clusion, segregation, misrepresentation and racism prevailing in the
country of adaptation.
     A storyteller, on the other hand, “is a man [sic] who has counsel
for his readers […] The storyteller takes what he tells from experience
– his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the
experience of those who are listening to his tale” (Benjamin, 1973:
86-87). Benjamin also states that “the storyteller joins the ranks of the
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teachers and sages” (ibid.: 107). Hence, the rapper is an intellectual
storyteller who has counsel for his/her audience and who wishes to
mobilise his/her local community against the power of the hegemonic
and/or coercive group. The rapper also reminds us of what we are
already inclined to forget, i. e., the ‘communicability of experience’
which is destined to decrease. In this sense, rap turns out to be a
critique of the modern urban way of life disrupting the ‘communicabil-
ity of experience.’ In other words, rap helps to communicate symbols
and meanings, articulating intersubjectively the lived experience of
social actors.
     Besides mapping out the rappers with these two terms – ’organic
intellectuals’ and ‘storytellers,’ I will also define some of the rappers as
‘contemporary minstrels’. It is a preferable formulation in the context
of the Turkish rappers because the notion of minstrel also has its
equivalent in the Anatolian cultural context. The medieval Turkish
minstrels (halk ozani) were the travellers who enlightened the masses
with their lyrics accompanied by the sound of a stringed musical in-
strument baglama. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some of
these minstrels used to write and sing poems against the supremacy of
the Ottoman rule over the peasantry. They were the spokespersons of
the degraded and undervalued Turkish popular culture against the Ot-
toman high culture, which was a mix of Byzantine, Persian, Arabic
3and Turkish. Having been raised in a working-class and/or rural-
based parental culture which was pervaded by the Anatolian minstrels’
music and myths, most of the Turkish youngsters in Berlin might well
feel themselves attracted by the educative nature of rap. Besides taking
inspiration from the intellectual teaching of the Anatolian minstrels,
the rappers also tend to borrow their lyrical structure: it is quite com-
mon for the Turkish rappers in Germany to state their names in the
last part of the lyrics as the mythical Turkish minstrels used to. Thus,
having such a cultural tradition makes the Turkish rappers more capa-
ble of contextualising themselves locally within the global hip-hop
youth culture on which they receive an up-to-date flow of information
via MTV, VIVA TV (German local form of MTV), music magazines,
tapes, records and CDs.
     Furthermore, the discursive similarity between the Turkish rap and
Turkish ‘traditional’ folk music in the diaspora context should also be
expressed. As the ethno-musicologist Martin Greve has recently stated
the rap songs and folk songs produced by the German-Turks resemble
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each other. Comparing both music cultures, Greve points out that the
discourses of the lyrics in both some rap songs and folk music songs
4are quite identical. For instance, the discourse analysis of the lyrics
written by Islamic Force, a Berlin based Turkish rap group, and Min-
strel Shah Turna, a Berlin based female traditional minstrel, demon-
strates that the diasporic experience of the Turkish migrants and of
their descendants are perfectly matching.
     German-Turkish hip-hop youngsters, like other minority hip-hop
youth groups, tend to express themselves by means of protest music,
break-dance and graffiti, which fit into the consumerist popular cul-
ture. This kind of expression facilitates the emergence of resisting
identities. The youngsters develop these resisting identities within the
‘areas of conversation’ (Bottomley, 1992: 131) with those who have
anti-Turkish prejudices; and aim discriminatory acts towards them.
The racist attacks on the Turkish community members in Mölln and
Solingen in 1992 and 1993 received an extensive reaction from within
the Turkish diaspora throughout Europe. Turkish rap groups immedi-
ately reacted to the arson attacks in a very radical way. They have
played a vital role in developing the anti-racist struggle by communi-
cating information, organising consciousness and testing out, deploy-
ing, or amplifying the forms of subjectivity within the Turkish diaspo-
ra. In what follows, I shall portray the major rap groups/singers and
delineate their counter-hegemonic discourses.
Cartel: Cultural Nationalist Rap
In summer 1995, a gangsta rap group called Cartel was introduced to
the Turkish audience. Most of the public/private TV and radio chan-
nels and the print media focused their attention on this group, and
their video and CD suddenly became Number 1 in the Turkish pop
charts. These ‘strange-looking’ guys had come from Germany. In the
video, they were walking in German streets with a number of groupies
behind them. Their hit rap song, also called ‘Cartel,’ was sending mes-
sages to the Turkish youth in Germany to unite against the rising ra-
cist attacks and killings. The way they walked in the video was not so
different from its equivalent in American rap (jabbing towards the
camera with their fingers); the anger and hatred in their faces against
the murders of the Turks in Germany were easily readable; and they
were calling everybody to join the ‘movement’ of Cartel: “Gel gel
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Cartele gel / Carteldekiler kankardesler” (Come to Cartel / The ones
with Cartel are bloodbrothers).
     Cartel is a music project initiated by a Berliner producer called
Ozan Sinan. The group is composed of three different rap groups
originating in various regions of Germany: Karakan (based in Nürn-
berg), Da Crime Posse (based in Kiel), and a West-Berliner MC,
Erci-E. The group consists of seven members: five Turkish, one Ger-
man and one Afro-Cuban. They all dress austerely in black, with
Turkish motives on the uniform T-shirts. The design of the CD/tape
resembles the Turkish flag, with a red background and the initial letter
‘C’ of ‘Cartel’ which imitates the crescent on the flag. The name
‘Cartel’ on the cover is also decorated with Turkish ornamental shapes.
The release of the group and the goods (Cartel T-shirts, caps, hats and
coats) was extremely well timed. It was a time in Turkey when popular
nationalism was prevailing. Thus, such a group immediately encounter-
ed a warm welcome from the Turkish audience. The group was also
extensively promoted by the Turkish media to strengthen the hegem-
ony of the state as a measure against centrifugal forces such as Kurdish
nationalism.
     Before the group went to Turkey to give concerts, the media pro-
motion had already been done. Thus, Cartel had already had an impact
on the national pride of a remarkable part of the Turkish audience.
They were greeted by an ardent crowd of youths from the right-wing
nationalist movement, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP, which is active
in both Turkey and Germany, and advocates Turkish and Pan-Turkish
Nationalism.
     This kind of support was present in all the concerts of Cartel, held
in many major cities of Turkey, even in the south-eastern Anatolian
cities. The fact that Cartel’s rap salute was very similar to the ‘grey-
wolf’ salute of the MHP, turned the group into a new totem for the
nationalist crowds. As Robins and Morley (1996: 252) pointed out,
What the ultra-nationalist youths were seeing and identifying with was the
tough and angry mood of rap culture. These were young people who were in-
secure, often in a paranoid way and consequently aggressive, in the expression
of their Turkish identity. These were the ones who were prepared to come to
Cartel, drawn by its talk of bonding and belonging.
Being translated from the German to the Turkish context, Cartel sud-
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denly became one of the main pillars of popular Turkish nationalism.
Such a translation encouraged these crowds to do something about the
‘enemies of the Turkish nation and race’ at a time when the dream of
Turkish Turan (Volk, greater Turkic world) was revisited. MC Erci-E,
to whom I shall return shortly, expressed his surprise and shock at this
enthusiastic reception by the extreme-right wing youths, and complai-
ned about the misunderstanding of the Turkish audience. Yet, whatev-
er way they were interpreted in Turkey, the manager and the produc-
tion company Polygram were satisfied with the result: in 1995 they
sold more than 300,000 copies of the album in Turkey, displacing Mi-
chael Jackson from number one in the album-charts, and more than
20,000 copies in Germany.
5     The rap group Cartel is a form of ‘playful cultural-nationalist rap.’
Cartel infuses rap with Turkish percussion, a blend of Turkish-Ger-
man, English and Spanish lyrics, Turkish folk music sound, and cries
against racists. Cartel rappers assert and construct a distant pan-Turk-
ish diasporic cultural identity while acknowledging the African con-
nections of rap art. Like many other Turkish rap groups, Cartel also
acknowledges its ‘authentic’ Turkish folk music connection in the
form of a lyrical structure which was used by the mythical Turkish
minstrels (halk ozani). By doing so, the rappers also contextualise
themselves both in their ‘own authentic’ culture and in the global
youth culture. By means of hip-hop culture, the youngsters ironically
both convince themselves of their involvement in the mainstream
global culture, and feel attached to their own ‘authentic’ cultural and
ethnic identities. It is a syncretic mode of demonstrating incorporation
into the mainstream and attachment to the roots. As the elements of a
surviving strategy, they are in need of incorporating into the main-
stream culture, because the ‘myth of return’ is over; they are also in
need of going back to their roots, because the past is one of the rare
things they can claim as ‘their own.’ Rap is a resistance movement in
itself, offering a shared code of communication as well as a sense of
collectivism. Above all, rap culture, which is dominated by Cartel,
tends to bridge the gap between the displaced Turkish diaspora com-
munity and the ‘imaginary homeland.’ In other words, it is an imagi-
native journey back home.
     As the intellectual storytellers of their group, the members of the
hip-hop nation form an ‘imagined community’ that is based less on its
realisation through state formation than on a collective challenge to
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the consensual logic of Germany and to the majority German nation-
alism (Decker, 1992: 54). Hip-Hop nationalism as a variant of minority
nationalism should be explored in relation to the majority nationalism.
The use of ethnic symbols resembling the Turkish flag should not
immediately be labelled as regressive, racist or exclusionist. Such a
straightforward judgement would lead us to misinterpret the national-
ist discourse of Cartel, and to underestimate the presence of German
nationalism. Hennayake’s notion of ‘interactive nationalism’ is un-
questionably of good use to understand the major impetus behind mi-
nority nationalisms (Hennayake, 1992). Interactive nationalism simply
refers to a kind of minority ethnic nationalism, which is formed in op-
position to the simultaneous practice of hegemonic politics and exclu-
sionary nationalist politics of the majority nation and/or of the domi-
nant ideology. Paraphrasing John Berger (1972: 11), it is the fear of the
present, which make the Turkish youth celebrate their ‘past’ and ‘au-
thenticity.’ In this sense, the cultural nationalist discourse of Cartel
provides Turkish youth with a ground to acquire a positive and opti-
mistic politics of identity.
     Music is said not only to express differences but also to articulate
them creatively, affecting social and cultural realities while at the same
time being shaped by them (Grenier, 1989: 137). Music-making and
other forms of popular culture serve as a specific site for the creation
of collective identity as well as shaping and reflecting dominant and
subordinate social and cultural relations. In some cases, music might
become a social force attempting to transform the existing social sys-
tem. Rap is very instructive in this sense. Cartel, while being sustained
by the Turkish cultural capital, attempts to construct a ‘pan-Turkish’
diasporic cultural identity. The rappers strongly adhere to a notion of
community, and principally do not assume that this community is
pre-given and exists naturally; rather, they consider that it must be con-
structed and created against all odds, in the face of the threat of deci-
mation (Swedenburg, 1992: 58). In this way cultural-nationalist rapp-
ers can be considered the ‘organic intellectuals’ of their communities.
     Accordingly, Cartel has a political message to announce both to the
Turkish minority and the German majority, besides being the symbol
of cultural pride. The rappers in Berlin aim to mobilise the masses
against arson attacks, racism, xenophobia, exclusion, drug trade, drug
abuse, materialism, capitalism, and antagonism between Kurds and
Turks. They are also intent on praising the family institution, on cele-
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brating the brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish, on presenting Ger-
many as the new homeland, and on criticising the perception of the di-
asporic youth as ‘Almanci’ (German-like) in Turkey and ‘Ausländer’
(foreigner) in Germany. They try to inform the audience about their
own experiences and those of the others. The expression of the black
French rapper, MC Solaar, gives the rationale behind rapping: ‘if you
rebel, you isolate yourself. If you explain, people learn’ (Newsweek,
February 26, 1996). Thus, the rationale behind the hip-hop nation is
the quest for communication and dialogue with the hegemonic social
classes/groups.
Kankardesler
Allahim yine mi?
Kankardes cankardes demek
Gerekirse kardes için ölmek
Canini kanini vermek
Gözünü kirpmadan herzaman iste
Defol dazlak dedik
Biz Türküz deyince fasist bilindik
Yanindayim koçum sonuna kadar
senin
Sana edilen laf ayni anda bize
Oynamaya bakma damarima basma
Söylüyorum sana kaybedersin so-
nunda
Meseleyi fazla uzatmaya gelmez
Hepberaber olursak bizi kimse ye-
nemez
Bloodbrothers
6Oh my God, again?
Bloodbrother is everything
It is to die for your brother
It is to sacrifice
Always tell me what you want
We said, “piss off skinhead!”
When we said we were Turks,
We were labelled as fascist.
I am always with you boy.
Screaming at you means screaming at
me
Don’t dare to fool me,
You will be the loser.
If we get together, no one can beat us
Hadi gülüm yandan yandan
Karakan geliyor çekilin yoldan
Hadi gülüm yandan yandan
Biz korkmayiz ondan bundan
Kan kan kankardesler
Hepberaber bizi yenemezler
Kan kan kankardesler
Hepberaber iste sana Cartel
Üç tane harf kan, alti tane harf daha
kardes
C’mon guys!
Karakan is coming.
C’mon guys,
Nothing can scare us.
Blood blood bloodbrothers
They can’t beat us
Blood blood bloodbrothers
This is Cartel
Five letters ‘blood,’ seven more let-
ters ‘brother’
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Bu ne demek acaba, küçük bir sözcük
Ama anlami büyük
Ne ateslere biz körükle yürüdük
Bazen kaybettik bazen kazandik
Kankardesimizi yalniz birakmadik
Anca beraber kanca beraber
Arkadasin çok olur gelirler giderler
Kankardesim seni hayatinca severler
What is this, a little word
But with a strong meaning
We walked through many troubles
Sometimes lost, sometimes won
We never left alone our bloodbrother
Forever together
Your friends come by and leave
They love you
En kötü gününde bile yaninda
gezerler
Karsinda Cartel, bilmiyorsan eger
sana söylerler
They hang around with you to death
 
This is Cartel, if you don’t know
someone can tell you
Çocuk ögrende gel, ugrasimiz rap
Çünkü pop bize yaramaz
Sarmaz bize yakismaz bizi açmaz
Kursun gibi sözler deler geçer
Refrain
Go and find out, our business is rap
Cos pop is no use for us
It isn’t for us
Words can kill like a bullet
Refrain
Soracaksin kim diye, ben Kerim
Kâbus ilk adim bunu böyle bilin
Kara kemiklerle bizim Alper
Seksi kanakeden nefret eder
Sadece o degil bizim hepimiz
Birimiz hepimiz, hepimiz birimiz
My name is Kerim
I am known as nightmare
Next to me Alper with black bones
He hates sexy ‘kanake’
Not only him, all of us
One for all, all for one
Türk, Kürt, Laz ve Çerkez
Ayrimcilik yaparsak kaybedecegiz
Uyanmak çok kapisinda kahpeler
Toz pembe bakmasin gelecege
Zannettigin arkadaslik bu degil
Daha da öte daha da ileri
Hep beraber olup kiracagiz zincirleri
 
Kankardeslere yakisir bir sekilde
Eger hazirsaniz simdi sira sizde
Refrain
Karakan (Cartel)
7Turk, Kurd, Laz and Circassian
We will lose if we disunite
Lots of traitors behind
Don’t dream
What you think of is not friendship
It is something further, stronger
All together we will break up the
chains
In a way that suits the bloodbrothers
If you’re ready, it’s your turn now.
Refrain
Karakan (Cartel)
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This particular rap song by Cartel demonstrates the need to unite
across the diaspora of the German-Turks that consist of various ethnic
groups such as Kurd, Laz and Circassian. By this song, MC Kerim
(Cartel ) invites his Turkish ‘bloodbrothers’ to fight racist arson at-
tacks. This song also displays that the flow of the lyrical structure re-
sembles that of the Turkish minstrel tradition. In the last part of the
song, MC Kerim first introduces himself, and sharply gives his mes-
sage: “One for all, all for one.”
     The rise of the local rap sound amongst the German-Turks is an in-
dication of the cultural nationalism that is sustained by the processes
of racialisation, assimilation and ‘acculturation.’ The sources of Turk-
ishness which have appeared as components of rising cultural national-
ism have offered the German-Turkish youngsters a positive sense of
identity in the face of negative pressures towards assimilation and rac-
ism. Here, “ethnicity is used as a source in the struggle for social sta-
tus, in particular, to counteract the negative representations of immi-
grant workers, and those with minimal power in their ‘host’ societies”
(Bottomley, 1992: 57). The minority hip-hop youth culture is an at-
tempt to constitute a form of counterculture. What the ethnic minority
youth constructs is no more a kind of passive ‘sub-culture.’ Ethnic
minority youngsters have become aware of the contradiction between
the prevailing ideologies of equal opportunity and the reality of dis-
crimination and racism in their daily lives. This, as Castles and Miller
have stated, can lead to the emergence of countercultures and political
radicalisation (Castles and Miller, 1993: 33). What are the main consti-
tutive parts of the minority youth counterculture and political radicali-
sation? There is not a straightforward answer to this question. It seems
that ethnicity is the primary instrument for the German-Turkish
youth to construct a counterculture and a fruitful sense of identity.
Cartel as a form of gangsta rap presents a form of diasporic cultural
politics; and it also positions itself against cultural displacement, rac-
ism and capitalist exploitation.
Islamic Force: Universalist Political Rap
Islamic Force was founded in 1986 by the self-initiatives of Boe-B
(male Turkish) and the manager Yüksel. Besides Boe-B, there are three
more members: Killa Hakan (male Turkish), DJ Derezon (male, Ger-
man mother and Spanish father), and Nelie (female, German mother
188
14.09.01 --- Projekt: transcript.kaya / Dokument: FAX ID 0123297863215178|(S. 179-207) T01_07 Chapter 6.p 297863215794
Aesthetics of Diaspora: Contemporary Minstrels
and Albanian father). What they make is conceived as oriental rap and
anti-racist rap in Berlin. Boe-B writes the lyrics, DJ Derezon is the
technical expert in mixing melody, beat and rhythm. The name, Islam-
ic Force was chosen to provoke the Germans who have a stereotypical
image of Islam; otherwise the group has nothing to do with radical Is-
lam. Recently, in order to release their works in Turkey, they have
changed their name to Kan-Ak. The reason for this change is the con-
cern surrounding the probability that the Turkish audience in Turkey
might well misinterpret the name Islamic Force. The previous misin-
terpretation of Cartel’s discourse by the Turkish audience in Turkey
has also made them conscious about probable unjust critiques in Tur-
8key.
     By changing their name to Kan-Ak, the rappers believe to have a
more gangsta-type of name for the Turkish market: Kan-Ak literally
means ‘running blood’ in Turkish. On the other hand, the reason for
choosing the new name Kan-Ak is also the acceptance of an offensive
word used by the right wing Germans to identify the Polynesians
(Kanake). There is a parallelism between the use of nigga instead of
the racist word ‘nigger’ by the blacks in the USA and the use of
Kan-Ak, or Kanak, instead of the offensive word Kanake by the
Turks. The choice of such a name, in a way, springs from their feeling
of being ‘white-niggers’. Tommy L. Lott’s analysis of the term nigga
is instructive in this context (Lott, 1994: 246). He rightly claims that
gangsta rap has creatively reworked and recoded the social meaning of
the term in a socially transgressive and politically retaliatory manner.
Similarly, Peter McLaren offers an illuminating explanation for the
revision of the term nigger by the blacks in New York, or Los Angeles:
When gangsta rappers revise the spelling of the racist version of the word nig-
ger to the vernacular nigga they are using it as a defiant idiom of a resistive
mode of African American cultural expression which distinguishes it from the
way that, for instance, white racists in Alabama might employ the term (McLa-
ren, 1995: 37).
The term Kan-Ak is the Turkish vernacular of the original racist ver-
sion of Kanake. “If you take negative racist identifications like Kana-
ke, and make them positive for your own use,” says MC Soft-G, “then
the racist groups have to produce new concepts to insult you. And it is
always difficult to produce new concepts.” It is a term that has very
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specific bounds of acceptable usage – it could only be used by the
9working-class Turkish youth.
     The term Kanak also permits a form of class-consciousness among
the working-class Turkish youth in the sense that it distinguishes
Turkish urban working-class youth from those middle-class Turkish
youths that feel denigrated whenever the term is used. Besides the fact
that Turkish rap has evolved in the binary-coded struggle against the
hegemony of the German nation-state and rising racial attacks, it has
also developed as a relatively independent expression of Turkish male
artistic rebellion against the newly emerging Turkish bourgeoisie and
the Turkish media. In doing so, the youngsters tend to romanticise the
ethnic enclave as the fruitful root of cultural identity and authenticity.
MC Boe-B pointed out that the Turkish media have always represent-
ed the ‘successful’ and ‘well-integrated’ middle-class Turkish young-
sters rather than the working-class youth in Kreuzberg who had no
‘achievement.’ Thus, the working-class Turkish youngsters are to imag-
ine themselves in opposition to the ‘white’ German society, and also
to the other ‘blacks’ who aspire to integrate themselves into the domi-
nant German culture (Robins and Morley, 1996: 249).
     Islamic Force Is the first Turkish rap group to combine a drum-
computer rhythm of Afro-American tradition with melodic samples of
10 11Turkish arabesk and pop music. By mixing some traditional Turk-
ish musical instruments such as zurna, baglama and ud with the Af-
ro-American drum-computer rhythm, they transculturate rap music.
Transculturation is a two-way process whereby elements of interna-
tional pop, rock, and rhythm-and-blues are incorporated into local
and national musical cultures, and indigenous influences contribute to
the new transnational styles (Wallis and Malm, 1984: 300-301). What
happens in practice is that individual music cultures pick up elements
from transcultural music, but an increasing number of national and
local music cultures also contribute to transcultural music. Through
the transculturation process, music from the international music in-
dustry can interact with virtually all other music cultures and subcul-
tures in the world due to the world-wide penetration of music mass-
media (Wallis and Malm, 1990/1984). In oriental rap, the global
rhythm and beat of rap infuse into local Turkish folk music, pop music
and arabesk music. Oriental rap becomes the music of the state of bri-
colage, or hybridity, as in Islamic Force.
     MC Boe-B defines their rap style with an illustrative example: “The
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boy comes home and listens to hip-hop, then his father comes along
and says ‘Come on boy, we’re going shopping.’ They get into the car
and the boy listens to Turkish music on the cassette-player. Later, he
gets our record and listens to both styles in one” (quoted in Elfleim,
1996). Transculturation, in the form of mixing arabesk and hip-hop in
one, is, at the same time, the expression of a ‘double diasporic con-
12sciousness.’ This consciousness stems from the double migration ex-
perience that the migrants experienced both in Turkey and in Germa-
ny. Before migrating to Germany, most of the migrant parents had al-
ready lived a diasporic experience (gurbet) by leaving their villages to
work in the big industrial cities of Turkey. Arabesk has been the ex-
pression of their parental culture. They have been raised in such a cul-
tural climate at home. The pessimism of arabesk music has dominated
their musical taste. What Ferdi – a 16-year-old boy in the Chip youth
centre – has said is very illustrative to understand the impact of
arabesk on the diasporic youth: “When I listen to Ferdi Tayfur I feel that
I am back home, especially that song, you know which one I mean:
‘Hadi gel köyümüze geri dönelim’ (‘Come on, let’s go back to our vil-
13lage’).” On the other hand, they have experienced the problems of
being an ethnic minority in Germany away from their homeland. In
diaspora they have taken hip-hop as an expression of their alienation
and resistance to the capitalist system. Arabesk also provides these
working-class youngsters with a symbol of solidarity, but not in more
than a weak and implicit sense of solidarity against anybody else. Ar-
abesk is not threatening, and so the Turkish diasporic youth can
14keep its mystique meaning to themselves.
     Thus, arabesk and hip-hop are the two musical styles which some
of the youngsters prefer listening to as an expressive form of their
‘double diasporic identity.’ They employ arabesk as a musical and cult-
ural form to express their imaginary nostalgia towards ‘home,’ ‘being
there,’ or the ‘already discovered country of past;’ and, on the other
hand, they consider hip-hop a musical and cultural form to express
their attachment to the ‘undiscovered country of the future.’ To put it
differently, both arabesk and hip-hop represent the symbolic expres-
sion of the dialogue which the diasporic youth have between ‘past’ and
‘future,’ between ‘tradition’ and ‘translation,’ between ‘there’ and
‘here,’ between the local and the global.
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Selaminaleyküm Selaminaleyküm
Köyden Istanbul’a vardilar
Alman gümrügünde kontrol altinda
kaldilar
Sanki satin alindilar
Bunlari kullanip kovariz sandilar
Ama aldandilar
Bizimkiler onlarin hesaplarini
bozdular
Köylü dedikleri kafalari kullandilar
Çalisip edip kosturdular
Her köseye bir firin ya da imbiss
kurdular
Ama bu kadar iyi haberin acisi da var
Kaybediyoruz can kaybediyoruz kan
Evler yaniyor bazen deliriyor insan
Ben bunlari anlatmak için seçildim
They arrived in Istanbul from their
villages
And got searched in the German
customs
It is as if they got purchased
Germans thought they’d use and kick
them off
But they failed to
Our people ruined their plans
 
Those peasants turned out to be
clever
They worked hard
Opened a bakery or an imbiss on each
corner
But they paid a lot for this success
We are losing life, losing blood
Homes are on fire, we get mad
I was chosen to explain these things
Hepsi bagiriyor “Boe-B söyle”
Ben de hip-hop seklinde sunuyorum
Kadiköy’de
Everybody screams “Tell us Boe-B”
And I am telling our story as hip-hop
15in Kadiköy
Selaminaleyküm aleykümselam
Selaminaleyküm aleykümselam
Müzigimize devam
Burda olanlari size anlatiyoruz
Haberlerimizi size evet sunuyorum
Bizim semtten Kadiköy’e bir baglanti
kuruyoruz
Harbi hip-hop duyuruyoruz
Burdan size yolluyoruz
Turlarsin artik sesle mahallelerde
Altinda bir Benz ya da bir BMV, ya
da Golf, ya da Audi, ya da herhangi
Nebileyim, ne bileceksin, polis ar-
kanda
Selaminaleyküm aleykümselam
Selaminaleyküm aleykümselam
Let’s go on rapping
We tell you our experiences
We present you the news
We connect our neighbourhood and
Kadiköy
We are doing real hip-hop
And we tell it to you
You drive with high-decibels in the
streets in either Benz, or BMW, or
Golf, or Audi, or whatsoever.
The police is behind you
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Takip ediyorlar seni
Ama sen farkina varmadin daha
Bakmadin daha
Sinyal vermeden dönüyorsun
Aniden her yerde polis görüyorsun
 
In diyor, indiriyor
Araban çalinti diyor
Bir kagidin eksik diye karakola
götürüyor
Hiç acimiyor
Adam isini biliyor
They are following you
You haven’t yet realised
You haven’t yet looked behind
You are turning without signalling
Suddenly everywhere gets full of
police
He says, “get out!”
He says “you stole this car”
He is taking you to the police station
just because of the lack of a document
He doesn’t have any mercy at all
He knows his business
Sayiyor, aliyor ve kontrol ediyor
Senin de insan oldugunu görmüyor
Hafiften haksizlik oluyor
Ve bunu Boe-B size Kadiköy’e kadar
duyuruyor.
He is counting, taking and
controlling
He doesn’t know, you are also
human
This is unjust
And I am telling this story in a far
land, Kadiköy.
Refrain Refrain
Boe-B (Islamic Force) Boe-B (Islamic Force)
Islamic Force attempts to bridge the gap between the diaspora and the
homeland. Their rap song ‘Selaminaleyküm,’ following the traditional
Turkish minstrel genre with the name of the poet in the last part of the
song, for instance, undertakes to inform the Turkish youth in Turkey
about their own experiences in the diaspora away from ‘home.’ MC
Boe-B narrates in this rap that they have been raised in families who
have been twice migrants. This song is the expression of double dias-
poric identity as well as that of the quest for homeland. By referring
to Kadiköy in the song, he holds on to his roots. He defines himself as
a ‘messenger’ chosen by his community in Berlin to express their state
of being to their Turkish compatriots in the homeland. He tells a ‘true’
story to his ‘imaginary’ Turkish compatriots about the life-worlds of
the German-Turks who are subject to institutional racism, harassment,
arson attacks and discrimination. This song is quite illustrative of two
crucial points: firstly, it exposes how “a diaspora can be created
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through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared
imagination in the age of cyberspace” to use Cohen’s words (1996:
516); and secondly, how the diasporic youth use an emerging global
cultural form (hip-hop) and a granted local cultural form (arabesk) for
their own expressive purposes. This syncretic ‘double diasporic con-
sciousness’ simultaneously points at Turkey and Berlin, past and pres-
ent as well as local and global.
     MC Boe-B’s narrative in the given song resembles that of the Turk-
ish minstrels. In fact, the rapper as a ‘storyteller’ and/or an ‘organic
intellectual’ has its equivalent in Anatolian culture. Though having
completely different musical tastes, rhyming and storytelling are the
common denominators of both artistic forms. Thus, the working-class
Berlin-Turkish youth, who have been raised with the sound of Turk-
ish folk music, could easily relate to the rap form of art. The key con-
cept in what follows will be the transcultural form of Islamic Force. I
have reproduced the personal narratives of the group members to be
able to demonstrate their individual discourses and politics of identi-
ty.
DJ Derezon (26):
He was born in Kreuzberg. He is the son of a German mother and a
Spanish father. He feels alienated in Germany, and akin to the Turkish
minority. He is partly assimilated to the minority Turkish youth cul-
ture; he actually defines himself as Turkish. For him Turkishness is a
state of mind and an equivalent of feeling in minority: “We are all fo-
reigners. We are Turkish.” While saying this, he immediately adds,
“Brooklyn is similar to Kreuzberg.” After receiving his Abitur from
high school, he became involved in hip-hop culture, tagging on the
walls all over Berlin. Then he started DJ-ing. He went to Brooklyn
and did some DJ-ing with Black Americans in 1992. He picked up a
Black American accent there. After returning to Berlin he became one
of the most important figures in the Berlin hip-hop scene. He got in
touch with the Turkish rapper Boe-B (Bülent) and the manager Yüksel
in 1993 and later with Killa Hakan and Nelie. After listening to some
Turkish samples, he decided to mix the Turkish melodies with beat
and rhythm. He also convinced Boe-B that he should rap on Turkish
samples: “I said: it is your roots, Boe-B, you should do that. Every-
body is doing that.” He always refers to the Black American origin of
hip-hop. His presence in Islamic Force and his transnational links with
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the East Coast hip-hop community confirm the transcultural character
of hip-hop culture.
     DJ Derezon also defines the role of the rapper as a medium estab-
lishing communication between various segments of the community:
Rappers are the speakers of the streets […] They are the politicians of the com-
munity […] We live here in Kreuzberg and have many friends. We always talk
to our friends and have a continuous exchange of ideas. At the end of the day,
we construct our own vision, and then express it to society […] We are doing
culture rap and political rap […] Rap is a chance for the subordinated minorities
to appear on the stage of art.
Boe-B (24):
He came to Germany when he was 8 and finished Hauptschule in
Kreuzberg. His friends called him Bobby (Boe-B) in the primary
school due to his resemblance to Bobby in the American TV series
Dallas. Then he recovered this name for the stage, changing it to
Boe-B (B is the initial of his forename, Bülent). Having been involved
in gangsta groups in the past, he is afraid that some day Kreuzberg
might turn into another New York in terms of the crime rate:
We are the voice of the streets. The media do not present life in the streets.
What we do is to bring the street life onto the stage […] We express ourselves
through rap.
As the songwriter of the group, Boe-B composes lyrics against racism,
drug abuse, materialism, police terror, exclusion, youth bands and rap
theft. He favours East-Coast rap, which gives priority to lyrics and
political messages. His favourite rap group is Wu Tang Clan (WTC)
because he sees a resemblance between WTC and themselves. WTC is
an East-Coast rap group who displays a bohemian way of life and a
gangsta profile like Islamic Force. Since Boe-B’s group has begun to be
involved in the commercial rap business, he is shifting towards West-
Coast rap laying the emphasis on beat and rhythm rather than lyrics.
     Boe-B’s rap is a clear exponent of the fact that the beauty of the rap
experience does not only spring from the mix and the beat, but also
from the quality of the rhyme and of the voice. The point is not to
show that one can rhyme but that one can rhyme differently. While
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stating the peculiarities of good rapping, he underlines the competition
between Islamic Force and Cartel. One of his main concerns is rap
theft. It is said that Cartel and TCA Microphone Mafia have stolen
some of their Turkish samples.
Killa Hakan (23):
He was born in Kreuzberg. He dropped out of the Oberschule. He is a
16fan of hardcore rap and arabesk (especially Müslüm Gürses). He
used to be a gangsta before joining Islamic Force. He defines the rap-
per as a ‘storyteller,’ or a narrator, who utters various stories. He at-
tributes a broad meaning to hip-hop:
Real hip-hop does not exist in Turkey. We are trying to take it there. The rap-
pers are gonna change the Turkish youth in Turkey. After the introduction of
hip-hop, Turkey will improve itself much further.
He often complains about racism in Germany, and he seems quite
keen on returning to Turkey for good:
When the Germans see a black-haired Turkish youth driving a brand-new car,
they stare at him with questioning eyes. They don’t like the Turks with leather
jackets at all.
Hakan’s discourse on racism reminds us that biological racism is still
quite significant for the diasporic Turkish youth. By aligning himself
with ‘hardcore’ rap, Hakan attempts to renegotiate his own ethnicity
through proclaiming a specific musical taste. By positioning himself in
the marginal space of hardcore rap, he also aims to disavow the domi-
nant regimes of representation and to incorporate himself into the
global youth culture. In the meantime, he seems to complain that hav-
ing an advantageous economic position is not enough to get rid of ra-
cial harassment.
Nelie (26):
She was born in Kreuzberg, too. Her mother is German and her father
Kosovo-Albanian. She is a Muslim. Having been raised with the Turks
in her childhood, she attended the Koran courses in a Turkish mosque
and learned to speak fluent Turkish from her Turkish friends. Now,
she is making soul music in Turkish.
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Erci-E: Party Rap
Erci-E (23) is one of the rappers of Cartel. He was born in Berlin out-
side Kreuzberg. Erci first encountered rap when he was 13 years old.
His first acquaintance with rap was a crucial moment for him. Rap
meant, for him as well as for many other rappers, transcending the
pessimism of pop music at first sight:
Rap is my favourite music. I have loved that coolness since the age of 13. The
other music styles have become boring for me. For instance, pop music was very
stable without any change. What fascinates me in rap is its dynamism and power.
After giving up university for music, he began making oriental or al-
ternative rap. Like many other Turkish rappers, he relates better to
East Coast rappers. He is well aware of the changes in rap music all
around the world, especially in the United States. Like all the Turkish
rappers, Erci-E gives reference to the American differentiation of rap
sound as East-Coast and West-Coast. Erci-E underlines the creative
and progressive character of the rap music for the Turkish diaspora as
well as for the other minority youth all around the world. He sees
hip-hop as a ticket out of the ‘ghetto’:
In rap, rhythm and melody are as important as lyrics. Cartel gave something to
the Turkish youngsters living in Europe. Now I want to give something else to
them. Rap should be progressive. I don’t want to talk about the problems any
more, I want them to enjoy themselves by listening to optimistic rap and hav-
ing positive feelings. The message of my new solo long-play, which I will give
to the Turkish youngsters in minority all around Europe, is to struggle against
violence and to seek solidarity […] Wherever there is a minority, hip-hop is
there. It is a rebellion culture. It is not necessarily a revolt against the political
government. American-Blacks have grown up in the ghetto. Hip-Hop has be-
come a way for them to get out of the ghetto. By means of Hip-Hop they have
the chance to do more creative things in their leisure time.
He is planning to have his solo long-play produced all over Europe
and even in the United States of America:
Turks in Europe have been forgotten; they should communicate with each
other. Turkish youngsters in France should know that they are living the same
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things as the Turkish youngsters in Germany […] I want to explain something
new to them in their own ‘broken’ Turkish accent […] Turkish pop is not for
us. It is just talking about love, that is it. There is, for instance, sea in those
pop songs, but there is no sea in Germany. I repeat it: Turkish pop is not for
us.
Erci-E tends to see hip-hop in a much broader context which leads
him to the conclusion that rap may well create what we might call a
‘diasporic interchange’ and ‘diasporic intimacy’ among Turkish peo-
ples in the diaspora struggling against racism and capitalist exploitation
in their countries of settlement. The progressive and resisting role of
music is not only limited by national boundaries. The existing network
of global capitalism and communication technology takes the message
of the diasporic form of organic intellectuals beyond the national terri-
tories (Decker, 1992). He also attempts, on the other hand, to break up
the ‘rhythmic obedience’ of the pop and arabesk music by providing
17an alternative to the Turkish audience. By saying so, he also under-
lines the fact that rap has reversed the established pattern of pop music
by dictating a strong and progressive lyrical content beyond the much
more common passivist romanticism.
     For Erci-E, back to basics is one of the main aspects of hip-hop cul-
ture in terms of ethnic symbols, music taste and images. Accordingly,
he attempts to add Turkishness to rap. He is aware of the fact that,
while making rap music, it is vital to have a sample melody. For in-
stance, in the USA, almost all the songs of James Brown have been
made into samples for the rap songs. Erci does not like to take James
Brown’s songs as samples because:
He is not Turkish; he is black. I thought samples should be from our own mu-
sic. Baris Manço is the James Brown of Turkish rap. There is also Erkin Koray
and Mogollar. They were making soul-funk in the seventies. We used to listen
to their songs during the journeys to Turkey by car when I was nine, or ten
years old; and we were proud of their bass sound.
Those were the Turkish popstars of the seventies, who were, in a way,
providing a contact with the West, in a musical sense, for the Turkish
audience in Turkey. It is quite amazing to be witness to the fact that
these musicians have had an essential meaning in the diasporic Turkish
youngsters’ imagination. Those popstars have given them a safe bridge,
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or a reference point, to combine two different cultures without any
contradiction.
     Erci, as an intellectual of his own community, is trying to find some
correlation between the radical, or rebellious, character of the Turkish
youth and their representation in the media:
I have grown up in Berlin. I haven’t seen any other place apart from Germany.
I speak German. Germans don’t like me, and I don’t like them. There is pover-
ty in Turkey; Germany seems reasonably better than Turkey. We have always
been misrepresented here in the German media. For instance, Turkey repre-
sents poverty and Islamic fundamentalism for the German televisions. Turkish
children grow up with these images and with a kind of reactionary feeling that
explodes in adolescence. What we can do is to protect ourselves against them
and not to bother them. We are capable and able to do this. Since most of the
Turkish children are in the Hauptschule, what else can the Germans think
about the Turks? The parents didn’t look after their children. The result is that
the children haven’t seen their parents as important as they are, and they take
them for granted. Then, they conclude that we have poverty, because we are
Turks. No, we are here and we are gonna stay here. We have to change things.
We are paying taxes, so we have the right to get something in return. This is
the reason why the Kreuzberg people are so miserable […] We must change the
image of Turkey. Cartel was a good example. We have joined the European
Football championship finals in England this year, and there are many German
tourists going to Turkey. On top of all these things, we want to make a contri-
bution to the new image of Turkey.
By doing so, Erci-E wages a war against the formal representation of
Turkey and Turks in the German media, which he considers the main
source of tension between Germans and Turks. Furthermore, Erci’s
narrative makes one point very clear: the welfare of the diasporic
youth is directly related to the image of the homeland in the country
of settlement. What he aims to achieve is to be able to give a positive
sense of identity to the diasporic Turkish subjects by means of infor-
mal networks of communication such as rap.
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Ünal: Gangsta Rap
Ünal (27) was born in Kreuzberg. He was sent to Turkey by his par-
ents to have a ‘better’ education when he was seven years old. He stay-
ed in Turkey until the age of fifteen. Then he obtained his university
degree from the School of Audio Engineering at the Berlin Technical
University. Now, he is living in Steglitz, a district of Berlin with a
very small Turkish population. He is both a rapper and a producer. He
is called Soft-G on the stage. He first founded Ypsilon Music with
Yüksel, the manager of Islamic Force. After the Ypsilon Music project
ended, he started to run the Orient Express Music Company produc-
ing basically for the Turkish market. The pop-music singers Can Kat,
Ahmet and Bay-X are his productions for Turkey. He is recently run-
ning another project for the Turkish market in collaboration with a
Turkish female soul singer living in New York and a songwriter from
Istanbul. He is the producer in the middle, using the global network of
electronic mail, fax and telephone.
     He has made a video for Can Kat as well. In the video, Ünal is rap-
ping in a tenor voice wearing an Italian-American gangster suit of the
twenties. The video was a big success in Turkey. In contrast to the
other Turkish rappers, he is more attracted by the Italian-American
rap style. Besides the music production for the Turkish market, he is
making music for the Turkish youngsters living in Germany as well.
Azize-A, for instance, is a Turkish woman rapper working with Ünal
to break into the German music market.
     Ünal often draws attention to the politics of rapping. He points out
that the rapper is an intellectual, and at the same time the microphone
is the rappers’ ‘lethal weapon.’ On that account, in the hip-hop scene
he is called Soft-G, where the letter G refers to ‘gangsta.’ Ünal’s pic-
ture on Can Kat’s CD, which contains some of his rap pieces, is very
illustrative in this sense. He holds a big microphone in his hands as if
18he is gripping a ‘lethal weapon.’ His politics of rap is identical to
that of Ice-T: Ice-T declares in the song that his ‘lethal weapon’ is his
19mind.
     Ünal depicts the major differences between the youth cultures since
the sixties. The main difference of hip-hop culture from the others, to
him, is its local character:
The difference of hip-hop from the previous youth cultures is that hippie and
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punk were global, whereas hip-hop is very local. Every epoch has its own par-
ticular problem. Hippies were concerned with some global problems such as
sexual freedom, peace and nature. Punk culture was a bit closer to hip-hop due
to its concern with some local concerns such as revolt against the dominant so-
cial values. Hip-Hop springs from the minorities unlike the Hippie and Punk
cultures. Hip-Hop youngsters living all around the world have various prob-
lems and concerns. For instance, an American rapper doesn’t necessarily have
to get on well with the Turkish rapper in Berlin. Hippies were different; they
had a global communication through the common idols that they used to listen
to such as The Beatles […].
Ünal also points out the ‘Turkification of rap’ through the mixing of
instruments and melodies. By saying so, he acknowledges the ‘brico-
lage’ character of rap transcending the cultural boundaries in music:
In a sense, we Turkify the rap. We are, for instance, trying to mix Zurna and
20rock in our own melodies. Günay is an example of this. We must create a
Turkish Community in rap like the East-Coast or West-Coast. In a very near
future, I will produce a tape including two rap songs from each Turkish rap
group in Berlin.
Like many other Turkish rap groups such as Cartel, Islamic Force and
Erci-E he also underlines his objection to pop music which is repeti-
21tive and leading to ‘narcotic passiveness’ and/or ‘rhythmic obedi-
ence’:
Rap is rebellious music, whereas pop is commercial music. This is the differ-
ence between rap and pop. Rap is usually a social critique. When a rebellious
rap becomes too popular, it shouldn’t be conceived as pop music, because it
still keeps its critical nature.
His claim on popular-critical rap, in fact, undercuts the perspectives of
Adorno by arguing that repetition in rap is not always connected to
the commodity system of late capitalism in the same way as other
popular musical forms are. Adorno’s interpretation of popular music
as an ideological instrument leading to ‘rhythmic obedience’ (Adorno,
1990/1941) is challenged by Ünal’s interpretation of popular rap
which may well lead to a form of collective resistance.
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Azize-A: Woman Rap
Azize-A (26) is a woman rapper from Berlin. She is living in Steglitz
with her parents. She completed the Realschule. Although she does not
want to be considered a feminist rapper, she does feminist rap. Besides
rapping, she appears in a children’s programme, Dr. Mag, made for
ZDF TV. Her taste of music is dominated by American black music,
such as jazz, funk and soul. She is very critical of Turkish arabesk
music due to its pessimism. She is trying to break the traditional image
of the Turkish woman in Europe, and wants to show that the second
and third generation Turkish youngsters have become very ‘multi-
kulti’ and cosmopolitan. She attempts to play with the multicultural
capital in order to be accepted by the majority society.
     She calls her rap oriental rap because she mixes some Turkish and
Arabic musical instruments such as Ney, Ud and Saz with the western
ones. She also uses some Turkish samples for her rap:
22I used a song of Ibrahim Tatlises as a sample. Turkish people have forgotten
their roots because of imitating the West too much. We want to reverse this
flow. We are trying to use our own treasures. We turn towards Turkey, and
they (the Turks) turn towards the West. In the end, we meet in the middle.
The letter A in Azize-A refers to the initial of the Turkish word Abla,
which means elder sister. Azize-A is like her equivalents Sister Souljah
(a member of Public Enemy between 1990 and 1992) and Schwester-S
(a German woman rapper). Azize-A adds a crucial meaning to rap:
Rap sends subliminal messages to the people. I want to explain to the people
(German and Turkish) that the Turkish woman has many other values and tal-
ents. I want to demonstrate that we are not sitting at home and doing house-
work all day. I also attempt to erase the question of “are we Turkish or Ger-
man?,” and announce that we are multi-kulti and cosmopolitan. I want to
show that we are no more sitting between the two chairs, we have got a ‘third
chair’ between those two chairs […].
The whole process, which is embodied by Azize-A and other Ger-
man-Turkish rappers, illustrates the formation of cultural bricolage by
modern diasporic subjects. Cultural bricolage which is grounded on
the lines of local-global, ‘tradition’-‘translation,’ and past-present ne-
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gates many of the ill-defined concepts about the state of ethnic minori-
ty youths such as ‘in-betweenness,’ ‘lost generation’ and ‘degenerated.’
Negating the so-called state of ‘in-betweenness,’ Azize-A draws a new
picture of the diasporic youth. Her insistence on multiculturalism
seems to be the main pillar of her politics of identity. She does not in-
vest in the cultural boundaries imprisoning culture as a distinct, self-
contained and essentialist form. By stating that she wants to erase the
question: “are we Turkish or German?,” she denies the classical under-
standing of culture and reconfirms what Rosaldo (1989: 26) said: “Cul-
tures are learned, not genetically encoded.”
*  *  *
To reiterate, rap has become the urban popular art of a remarkable
number of Turkish youths in Berlin. The Turkish rappers in Berlin are
substantial constituents of the diasporic cultural form developed by a
considerable amount of working-class Turkish youths. Using the tra-
ditional Turkish musical genre as the source of their samples and hav-
ing been guided by the traditional Turkish minstrels in terms of lyri-
cal structure, these contemporary minstrels, or storytellers, tend to be
the spokespersons of the Turkish diaspora. What Ünal’s ‘Turkish
community’ attempts to provide is an informal network of communi-
cations which will shape popular knowledge in a manner that contests
German nationalism and hegemony from within the Turkish diaspora.
In this sense, Turkish rappers do not merely constitute a form of pro-
test like hippies and punks, but also initiate a ‘class politics’ along the
lines of Gramsci’s notion of ‘organic intellectuals.’
     As organic cultural intellectuals, the rappers transform ‘common-
sense’ knowledge of oppression into a new critical awareness that is
attentive not only to ethnic but also to class contradictions. These or-
ganic intellectuals attempt to build a ‘historical bloc’ – a coalition of
oppositional groups united around counter-hegemonic ideas – against
the ‘traditional elite’ who try to ‘manage consent’ by making domina-
tion appear natural, voluntary, and inevitable. The efforts by Turkish
rappers in Berlin to enter the mainstream by forming a ‘Turkish com-
munity’ reflect their struggle to assemble a ‘historical bloc’ capable of
challenging the ideological hegemony of German cultural domination.
Furthermore, rap music, as a popular cultural form, becomes a power-
ful vehicle, which allows today’s Turkish youth to gain a better under-
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standing of their heritage and their present identities when official
channels of remembering and identity formation continually fail to
meet their needs. What Azize-A calls the ‘third chair’ illustrates how
the diasporic subject crosses over the cultural borders and constructs a
syncretic cultural identity. In his poem ‘Doppelmann,’ Zafer Senocak
writes of his Germany as:
I carry two worlds within me
but neither one whole
they’re constantly bleeding
the border runs
23right through my tongue.
The diasporic subject who is defined in this poem is someone expe-
riencing a constant tension between homelessness/rootlessness and
diasporic home. “The split,” as Senocak states, “can give rise to a dou-
ble identity. This identity lives on the tension. One’s feet learn to walk
on both banks of the river at the same time” (Suhr, 1989: 102). The
discourses of the Turkish rappers in Berlin, which I presented, affirm
what Hall (1994) pointed out that contemporary diasporic identities
are developed on two paramount dimensions: universalism and partic-
ularism. The universalist axis refers us to the model of interculturalism
in the form of ‘third space’ – or ‘process of heterogenesis,’ or ‘third
culture’ – (Guattari, 1989; Bhabha, 1990; Featherstone, 1990). On the
other hand, the particularist axis presents the model of cultural essen-
tialism. Cultural identity of the diasporic subject is simultaneously
grounded both on an ‘archaeological’ form that entails the rediscovery
of an essential and historical culture, and a ‘retelling of the past’ that
claims the production of a positional, situational and contextual cult-
ural identity. In other words, the whole question of diasporic cultural
identity is a tense interaction between essence and politics and be-
tween ‘Tradition’ and ‘Translation.’
     This chapter has also displayed that the music of the diaspora con-
stitutes a philosophical discourse because they reject “the modern, oc-
cidental separation of ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics” (Gil-
roy, 1993: 38). The musical genre of the diaspora is, at the same time,
the indication of the emergence of a global culture transcending na-
tional boundaries. This new notion of global culture contradicts the
conventional notion of culture that is thought to be territorial, and be-
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longing to nations, regions and localities (Smith, 1990, 1995). The na-
ture of the existing culture is syncretic. This ‘cultural syncreticism’ is
facilitated by global capitalism, which disrupts the national bounda-
ries. The emergence of modern diasporic cultures and identities is con-
sistent with current scholarship in cultural studies, which suggest that
the concept of culture must be looked at in new ways “that are capable
of somehow operating against its own inner character, which was de-
fined long ago by the notions of rootedness, stasis, and fixity that are
intrinsic to its original meanings in the fields of crop management and
animal husbandry” (Gilroy, 1995: 18).
Notes
1 The rap group Cartel is represented in a slightly different way
from the others, as most members of the group originate outside
Berlin. The only member of the group from Berlin is Erci-E
whom I interviewed separately.
2 Gramsci (1971) makes a differentiation between the ‘professional
intellectuals’ and ‘organic intellectuals.’ Professional intellectuals
are attached to the state, whereas organic intellectuals aim to im-
prove socio-economic, political and cultural interests of their com-
munities. Professional intellectuals are the deputies of the State,
and they have a ‘mandarin consciousness.’ Organic intellectual, on
the other hand, must be an organiser of the centrifugal forces. It
should also be pointed out that the term ‘organic intellectual’ was
first used by Gilroy (1987: 196) to define the black London rapper
Smiley Culture. For further information, see also Decker (1992).
3 Some of the mythical Turkish minstrels in the seventeen century
were Karacaoglan, Köroglu and Pir Sultan Abdal. Arif Sag, Musa
Eroglu, Mahsuni Serif, Yavuz Top and Mazlum Çimen are some
of the contemporary minstrels in Turkey. These minstrels are
often invited to European cities by Turkish communities to per-
form their art and to ‘preach.’
4 Martin Greve calls the Turkish folk music minstrels in diaspora
as the ‘transnational minstrels.’ For a detailed explanation on this
issue see, Martin Greve (2000).
5 Swedenburg (1992) classifies the rap groups into four sub cat-
egories in the Anglo-American context: a) hard or serious nation-
alist rap of, say, Public Enemy; b) playful cultural-nationalist rap
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of, say, Jungle Brothers; c) gangsta rap of, say, Ice-T; and d) wom-
en’s rap of, say, Queen Latifah.
6 ‘Allahim yine mi?’ (Oh my God, again?) is the cry of a woman
in the background, which echoes the image of the ‘caring mother.’
Her cry is for the Turkish families who were killed in the arson
attacks in Mölln and Solingen.
7 Laz and Circassian are just two of the major ethnic groups in
Turkey. For a detailed map of ethnic composition of Turkey, see
Andrews (1989).
8 Islamic Force, or Kan-Ak, could not achieve going to Turkey.
The group disintegrated after the sudden death of Boe-B in 1999.
Now, Killa Hakan is doing solo rap; and Derezon is Djing for
some other groups.
9 Mapping out the creation of black-British youth identities,
Claire E. Alexander (1996: 56-58) raises similar issues concerning
the use of the term ‘nigga’ by the working-class black youth.
10 The history of arabesk music in Turkey starts with the internal
migration from rural spaces to urban spaces since early 1960s. It is
an epiphenomenon of urbanisation. Arabesk is primarily associat-
ed with music, but also with film, novels and foto-roman (photo
dramas in newspapers with speech bubbles). Arabesk music is a
style, which is composed of western and oriental instruments
with an Arabic rhythm. This syncretic form of music has always
borrowed some instruments and beat of the traditional Turkish
folk music. The presence of the arabesk music on TV was banned
by the state until the early eighties. The conservative-populist
government of Turgut Özal set it free in the mid-eighties. The
main characteristic of arabesk music is the fatalism, sadness and
pessimism of the lyrics and rhythm. Hitherto, the lyrics were
composed of an irrational and pessimist reaction of people with a
rural background to the capitalist urban life. Recently, the com-
position of the lyrics has extensively changed. Instead of expres-
sing pessimism in the urban space, lyrics tend to celebrate the
beauty of the pastoral life, which has been left behind. In other
words, it has become a call to the people to go back to basics. It
should be pointed out that there is an extensive literature on the
sociological dimensions of the arabesk music in Turkey (Özbek,
1994; Stokes, 1994; Güngör, 1993).
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11 The group is using the old popular Turkish melodies from Baris
Manço, Zülfü Livaneli and Sezen Aksu as their samples.
12 The term ‘double diasporic consciousness’ derives from Gilroy’s
notion of ‘double consciousness’ – a term which he reinterpreted
from W. E. B. Du Bois (Gilroy, 1987).
13 This song is a critique of urbanisation and industrialisation, and
narrates the longing and nostalgia of the ‘gurbetçi’ for the pastoral
way of life.
14 Similarly, Ulf Hannerz (1968) has defined the concept of ‘soul’
as a solidarity symbol among the Black ‘ghetto’ youth which is
not threatening to anybody.
15 Kadiköy is a district of Istanbul in the Anatolian side. MC
Boe-B states the name of Kadiköy because he was born there.
16 Müslüm Gürses is one of the main figures, or schools, of the ara-
besque music in Turkey. A remarkable number of his ‘groupies,’
on ecstasy, tend to harm themselves with razor blades during the
concerts. A similar trend has also been noticed in Berlin amongst
a group of Turkish youth living in the ethnic enclave.
17 Theodor Adorno (1990/1941) used the notion of ‘rhythmic obe-
dience’ to refer to the ‘pseudo individualisation’ aspect of popular
music.
18 Can Kat (1995). Çek Git, Berlin: E. M. Y. Records.
19 Ice-T (1989). “Lethal Weapon.” The Iceberg/Freedom of Speech
… Just Watch What You Say. Sire Records.
20 Günay is the Turkish solo in a multi-cultural music group com-
posed of an American, a Cameron, a German and three Turkish
musicians. They try to improvise the Turkish folk music by
mixing the instruments and sounds.
21 I borrowed the term ‘narcotic passiveness’ from Umberto Eco.
In fact, he uses the term in the context of media: ‘Liberated from
the contents of communication, the addressee of the messages of
the mass media receives only a global ideological lesson, the call
to narcotic passiveness. When the mass media triumph, the human
being dies’ (Eco, 1986: 137; italics mine).
22 Ibrahim Tatlises is a very popular arabesk singer in Turkey and
in the Middle East.
23 Quoted in Suhr (1989: 102).
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Conclusion
This study has explored four inter-related theoretical concepts: diaspo-
ric consciousness, diasporic youth, globalisation and cultural bricolage
with reference to the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. This work pri-
marily suggests that the contemporary diasporic consciousness is built
on two contradictory axes: particularism and universalism. The pres-
ence of this dichotomy derives from the unresolved historical dia-
logues that the diasporic communities experience between continuity
and disruption, essence and positionality, tradition and translation,
homogeneity and difference, past and future, ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘roots’
and ‘routes,’ and local and global (cf. inter alia Clifford, Hall, Gilroy,
Cohen and Vertovec).
     By the same token, it should also be stated that the particularist
constituents of diaspora identities such as inheritance, tradition, reli-
gion and ethnicity are all deferred and altered in the diaspora as spirit-
ual, cultural and political metaphors. Hence, losing their essentialist
nature, these particularist constituents are put into play by the diaspo-
ric subject as key ingredients for a politics of identity. For instance, the
idea of ‘going back to basics’ among the working-class Turkish dias-
poric youth is, in fact, a counterculture of self-defence. As we saw,
Neco’s attempt to reify the Ottoman past in his paintings as the very
essence of his Turkishness is, by and large, a fiction or a form of mim-
icry which is far from essentialism, because what we call Ottoman cul-
ture does not have a fixed essence in the sense that Neco is referring to.
Contrarily, the Ottoman culture was a hybrid culture, which was
comprised of Turkish, Roman, Greek, Seljuk, Arabic and Persian
components.
     Secondly, this work has claimed that the processes of cultural iden-
tity formation among the working-class Berlin-Turkish male hip-hop
youth have principally revolved around their attempt to form a dias-
poric consciousness. The working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop
youths are active agents in the construction and articulation of the di-
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asporic consciousness. Being raised in Kreuzberg, which I presented in
this work as a prototype of diasporic space (Kleines Istanbul), these
youths have created a new home there as well as an identity grounded
in more than one location: Berlin and Turkey. Kreuzberg as a diaspo-
ric space has provided these ethnic minority youths with a symbolic
wall or fortress protecting them against racialisation, unemployment,
misrepresentation, exclusion and discrimination. Accordingly, the
sense of being a member of a ‘different’ people with historical roots
and destinies outside the time/space of the ‘host’ nation provides them
with a distinction and pride.
     The third key term that I have considered is globalisation, which
appears here as an individual consciousness of the global situation. The
construction of modern diasporic consciousness does not merely de-
pend upon the rigid incorporation regimes of the country of settle-
ment; it also owes a lot to globalisation. The wide networks of com-
munication and transportation between German-Turks and Turkey
play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of a diasporic
identity among the transnational communities. The modern circuitry
connects the diasporic youth both to the homeland and to the rest of
the world. This is the reason why it becomes much easier for them to
live on ‘both banks of the river’ at the same time. Turkish hip-hop
youth in Berlin, as explored in this work, exemplify a growing stream,
of what Brecher et al. (1993) have called ‘globalisation from below.’
This constitutive entanglement has become a characteristic of modern
diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, cultural and political
networks between German-Turks and Turkey, for instance, points to
this growing stream. In the context of the diasporic condition, ‘globa-
lisation from below’ refers to the enhancement of the access of trans-
national migrants and their descendants to those social, cultural, politi-
cal and economic mechanisms which enable them to transcend the
conditions imposed upon them by the transnational capitalism which
is organising them into a system of international and hierarchical divi-
sion of labour. To put it differently, diasporic consciousness enables
the diasporic subject to overcome the limitations and oppression of the
global capitalism.
     The fourth crucial concept that I explored throughout the book is
cultural syncreticism, or cultural bricolage. It is globalisation that gives
birth to the processes of cultural bricolage among the diasporic youth.
What emerges out of this cultural syncreticism is what we might call
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‘third space’ or ‘third culture’ (cf. Bhabha, 1990). As I demonstrated in
the previous chapters, these ‘third cultures,’ that are formed in the
‘border zones’ and that Azize-A called ‘third chair,’ might contribute
to the disruption of the conventional binarism of ‘migrant culture’ ver-
sus ‘host culture.’ Thus, knowing that such new cosmopolitan forms,
or ‘glocalised’ identities, spring from presumed discrete cultural tradi-
tions, we might open ourselves up to a relationship that transcends us,
that exists beyond and apart from us instead of fully explaining and as-
similating the other, thereby reducing her/him to our world.
     Among other things, Berlin-Turkish youth that simultaneously ex-
perience various life-worlds, also acquire a multicultural competence
to behave appropriately in a number of different social spaces. There
are linguistic, social and cultural borders between their distinct life-
worlds, which I presented in Chapter 4 as youth centre, street, school
and household. These youngsters always have to translate and negoti-
ate within and between these rigidly defined spaces. Accordingly, di-
asporic youths construct their cultural identities in the intersection line
of these separate social spaces, or in what Rosaldo (1989) calls ‘border
zones.’
     The aesthetics of diaspora such as rap music and literature that are
produced within the Turkish diaspora might give us some clue about
the characteristics of these newly emerging cosmopolitan and transna-
tional third cultures. For instance, ‘Oriental’ rap as a form of popular
art is produced through a blend of particularist and universalist con-
stituents such as the mix of traditional Turkish samples and lyric struc-
tures with an Afro-American drum-computer rhythm. This unique
form of cultural bricolage in the context of the Turkish diasporic
youth negates those conventional and stereotypical assumptions made
by many scholars on the descendants of transnational migrants, which
include, for instance, ‘caught betwixt and between,’ ‘lost generation,’
‘inbetween,’ ‘acculturated’ and ‘assimilated.’
     As far as the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth is con-
cerned, the stereotyped definitions of German-Turkish youth made by
various scholars have been disproved by the youths themselves. The
terms such as ‘deculturated’ and ‘culturally impoverished,’ which have
been attributed to the descendants of transnational migrants under-
mine the increasing impact of global interconnectedness and symbolic
links between the subject and the homeland. Rather, these youngsters
are subject to an enriched condition, which springs from being both
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inside and outside the West, or from what Du Bois called ‘double con-
sciousness.’ The state of ‘double consciousness’ conjures up the very
nature of diasporic identity, i. e. particularism and universalism.
     This fruitful objectivity of the diasporic youth can also be explica-
ble through Georg Simmel’s notion of ‘stranger.’ The stranger is a
constitutive element of the group itself – an element that is both inside
and outside the group. The stranger develops a unity of closeness and
remoteness in her/his human relationships: as Simmel (1971/1908: 143)
pointed out, the distance within this relation indicates that one who is
close by becomes remote, but his/her strangeness indicates that one
who is remote becomes near. Although the stranger is excluded, and
distances himself/herself, from the receiving society, s/he imports qual-
ities into it, which do not spring from the group. Accordingly, his/her
distance to the group itself enables him/her to develop objectivity.
     Yet, the diasporic cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth is
not only limited to the state of ‘double consciousness,’ it goes beyond
this factual predicament. These youngsters construct and articulate a
state of what I call double diasporic consciousness in their imagery. This
consciousness springs from the double migration experience of their
parents, which they encountered both in Turkey and in Germany. As I
outlined in Chapter 6, this double diasporic consciousness has become
evident in the youths’ expressive culture. Arabesk and hip-hop are the
two major cultural forms that the Turkish hip-hop youth employed to
express their own ‘double diasporic condition.’
     Additionally, this work has brought to attention ways in which a
diaspora can be created through cultural artefacts and a shared image-
ry, which symbolically connect the diaspora to homeland. As I de-
monstrated in the case of the rap group Islamic Force (see Chapter 6),
MC Boe-B tries to develop an imaginary intimate relationship with his
people in Kadiköy, Istanbul. This corresponds to an important fact of
the world we live in today: many persons on the globe live in what, ex-
tending Benedict Anderson (1983), Arjun Appadurai has called ‘ima-
gined worlds’ (1990: 296-97). Such ‘imagined worlds’ which are con-
stituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups
can, in some cases, demonstrate the fact that diaspora might also be an
imaginary fiction as well as an actual condition.
     This study has also examined Turkish migratory processes; incor-
poration regimes of the Federal Republic of Germany; ethnic-based
political participation strategies of Turkish migrants; notions of ethnic
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minorisation and culturalisation; features and discontents of multicul-
turalism in the city of Berlin; Turkish ethnic associations; and cultural
identity of the middle-class Berlin-Turkish youths. All of these com-
plex issues have been raised to comprise a competent theoretical
ground in order to formulate the major components of the modern di-
asporic identity. In addition to this, it was concluded that modern di-
asporic identities are historically conditioned according to the patterns
of migratory processes in question, to the immigration policies of
‘host’ states, to the transnational networks of communication and
transportation, and to the conscious intervention of social actors. It
was also demonstrated that, creating a community consciousness, di-
aspora discourse constructs a network of solidarity and confinement
among transnational migrants and their descendants. In this sense, di-
asporic discourse appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing,
migrant and minority strategies.
     Modern diaspora identities are those that are constantly producing
and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and differ-
ence. They are not defined by essence or purity, but by the recognition
of heterogeneity, diversity, divergence, multiplicity and syncreticism.
This is why I have refrained myself from locating the Turkish diaspo-
ric youth in a continuous space between diaspora and homeland with-
out reinscribing an ideology of cultural difference. In this sense, the
notion of diaspora conveys an identity that is not a fixed, essentialist
and authorised totality, but is always in a constant process of change
and transformation. Accordingly, this work has outlined the whole
question of identity as a matter of politics and process, but not of es-
sence and inheritance. Although it was phrased that modern diasporic
identities have been grounded on both essentialist and situationalist
pillars, it was made clear that the essence, in the final analysis, has be-
come a principal source of identity politics for the transnational mi-
grants and their descendants.
     Hence, the diasporic cultural identity of the Berlin-Turkish hip-
hop youth corresponds to a particular time and space. It delimits itself
within this certain time and space. It is highly unlikely that we will see
a similar snapshot of these youngsters in the near future, representing
their cultural identity. However, the future generations will carry on
forming new identities and ‘third cultures’ that transcend conventional
binarism and dominant regimes of representation.
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Glossary
Alem Universe, world; having parties with friends.
Alemci Someone who has amusing parties with his/her
friends.
Alevism Anatolian version of Shiism, but it is a more hy-
brid form of belief consisting of many different
rituals and religious undertones such as Sufism,
Shamanism, Christianity, Judaism as well as Is-
lam. Turkish Alevis used to be concentrated in
central Anatolia, with important pockets through-
out the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal region
and the European part of Turkey. Kurdish Alevis
were concentrated in the northwest of the Kurd-
ish settlement zone. Both Turkish and Kurdish
Alevis have left their isolated villages for the big
cities of Turkey and Europe since 1950s.
Almanci, Almanyali German-like; stereotypical definition of German-
Turks in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypi-
cal images of German-Turks are those of their
being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable
life in Germany, losing their Turkishness, and be-
coming more and more German.
Arabesk It is mostly known as a music style, which is
composed of western and oriental instruments
with an Arabic rhythm. This syncretic form of
music has always borrowed some instruments
and beat of the traditional Turkish folk music.
The main characteristic of arabesk music is the
fatalism, sadness and pessimism of the lyrics and
rhythm. It also corresponds to a fatalistic and
pessimistic life style, which emerges in the urban
spaces of Turkey.
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Ausländerbeauftragte Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs
Ausländergesetz Foreigners’ law in Germany.
Ausländerliteratur Foreigners’ literature in Germany.
Aussiedler Ethnic Germans who repatriate from Eastern Eu-
rope; resettlers.
Baglama A musical instrument having a guitar-like body,
long, and strings that are plucked or strummed
with the fingers or a plectrum.
Berufsschule Vocational school
Bombing A hip-hop term, which refers to the tagging
and/or painting of several locations in one go.
CDU Christian Democratic Union – Conservative
Party in the FRG
CSU Bavarian Sister Party of the CDU
Dügün Wedding ceremony
Efes Popular Turkish beer.
FDP Free Democratic Party
Gastarbeiter Guest worker.
Gesamtschule Comprehensive school; grades 5-13.
Grüne (Green Party) Ecological Party in the FRG
Grundschule Primary school; grades 1-6
Gurbet An Arabic word, which derives from garaba, to
go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a fo-
reign country, to emigrate, to be away from one’s
homeland, to live as a foreigner in another coun-
try.
Gurbetçi Someone who is in gurbet.
Gymnasium Academic secondary school; grades 5-13
Hauptschule Lower secondary school; grades 5-9 (or 10)
Hemsehri Fellow villager.
Imbiss German word for ‘döner kebab’ kiosk.
Isyan müzigi Rebellion music, protest music.
Kanak Turkish vernacular of the German word kanake,
which is an offensive word used by the right wing
Germans to identify the Africans.
Kanak Sprak A creole language spoken and written by the
working-class German-Turkish youth.
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Länder The 16 constituent political-administrative units
of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Mitbürger Fellow citizen.
Oberschule Grammar school; grades 5-13
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus – Left-
Socialist Party in the FRG
Raki Popular Turkish alcoholic beverage, made of
grape and aniseed.
Realschule Intermediate secondary school; grades 5-10
Sila Home
Sonderschule A different kind of primary school with specialist
classes for children with ‘learning difficulties;’
grades 1-9
SPD Socialdemocratic Party
Sunni The dominant school in Islam religion.
Tagging A pseudonym signature made with one colour
marker pen or spray can.
Übersiedler East Germans who migrated to the Federal Re-
public of Germany during the Cold War.
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